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Unrestricted
Warfare
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The
following selections are taken from "Unrestricted Warfare,"
a book published in China in February 1999 which proposes tactics for
developing countries, in particular China, to compensate for their military
inferiority vis-à-vis the United States during a high-tech war.
The selections include the table of contents, preface, afterword, and
biographical information about the authors printed on the cover. The book
was written by two PLA senior colonels from the younger generation of
Chinese military officers and was published by the PLA Literature and
Arts Publishing House in Beijing, suggesting that its release was endorsed
by at least some elements of the PLA leadership. This impression was reinforced
by an interview with Qiao and laudatory review of the book carried by
the party youth league's official daily Zhongguo Qingnian Bao on 28 June
1999.
Published prior to the bombing
of China's embassy in Belgrade, the book has recently drawn the attention
of both the Chinese and Western press for its advocacy of a multitude
of means, both military and particularly non-military, to strike at the
United States during times of conflict. Hacking into websites, targeting
financial institutions, terrorism, using the media, and conducting urban
warfare are among the methods proposed. In the Zhongguo Qingnian Bao interview,
Qiao was quoted as stating that "the first rule of unrestricted warfare
is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden." Elaborating
on this idea, he asserted that strong countries would not use the same
approach against weak countries because "strong countries make the
rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes . . .The United
States breaks [UN rules] and makes new ones when these rules don't suit
[its purposes], but it has to observe its own rules or the whole world
will not trust it." |
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| TABLE
OF CONTENTS |
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| Preface |
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| Part
One: On New Warfare |
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| Chapter
1: The Weapons Revolution Which Invariably Comes First |
| Chapter
2: The War God's Face Has Become Indistinct |
| Chapter
3: A Classic That Deviates From the Classics |
| Chapter
4: What Do Americans Gain By Touching the Elephant? |
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| Part
Two: Ommitted but available |
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| Conclusion |
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| Afterword
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| Authors'
Background |
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| Preface |
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Everyone
who has lived through the last decade of the 20th century will have a
profound sense of the changes in the world. We don't believe that there
is anyone who would claim that there has been any decade in history in
which the changes have been greater than those of this decade. Naturally,
the causes behind the enormous changes are too numerous to mention, but
there are only a few reasons that people bring up repeatedly. One of those
is the Gulf War.
One war changed the world. Linking such a conclusion to
a war which occurred one time in a limited area and which only lasted
42 days seems like something of an exaggeration. However, that is indeed
what the facts are, and there is no need to enumerate one by one all the
new words that began to appear after 17 January 1991. It is only necessary
to cite the former Soviet Union, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, cloning,
Microsoft, hackers, the Internet, the Southeast Asian financial crisis,
the euro, as well as the world's final and only superpower -- the United
States. These are sufficient. They pretty much constitute the main subjects
on this planet for the past decade.
However, what we want to say is that all these are related
to that war, either directly or indirectly. However, we definitely do
not intend to mythicize war, particularly not a lopsided war in which
there was such a great difference in the actual power of the opposing
parties. Precisely the contrary. In our in-depth consideration of this
war, which changed the entire world in merely half a month, we have also
noted another fact, which is that war itself has now been changed. We
discovered that, from those wars which could be described in glorious
and dominating terms, to the aftermath of the acme of what it has been
possible to achieve to date in the history of warfare, that war, which
people originally felt was one of the more important roles to be played
out on the world stage, has at one stroke taken the seat of a B actor.
A war which changed the world ultimately changed war itself.
This is truly fantastic, yet it also causes people to ponder deeply. No,
what we are referring to are not changes in the instruments of war, the
technology of war, the modes of war, or the forms of war. What we are
referring to is the function of warfare. Who could imagine that an insufferably
arrogant actor, whose appearance has changed the entire plot, suddenly
finds that he himself is actually the last person to play this unique
role. Furthermore, without waiting for him to leave the stage, he has
already been told that there is no great likelihood that he will again
handle an A role, at least not a central role in which he alone occupies
center stage. What kind of feeling would this be?
Perhaps those who feel this most deeply are the Americans,
who probably should be counted as among the few who want to play all the
roles, including savior, fireman, world policeman, and an emissary of
peace, etc. In the aftermath of "Desert Storm," Uncle Sam has
not been able to again achieve a commendable victory. Whether it was in
Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, this has invariably been the case. In particular,
in the most recent action in which the United States and Britain teamed
up to carry out air attacks on Iraq, it was the same stage, the same method,
and the same actors, but there was no way to successfully perform the
magnificent drama that had made such a profound impression eight years
earlier. Faced with political, economic, cultural, diplomatic, ethnic,
and religious issues, etc., that are more complex than they are in the
minds of most of the military men in the world, the limitations of the
military means, which had heretofore always been successful, suddenly
became apparent. However, in the age of "might makes right"
-- and most of the history of this century falls into this period -- these
were issues which did not constitute a problem. The problem is that the
U.S.-led multinational forces brought this period to a close in the desert
region of Kuwait, thus beginning a new period.
At present it is still hard to see if this age will lead
to the unemployment of large numbers of military personnel, nor will it
cause war to vanish from this world. All these are still undetermined.
The only point which is certain is that, from this point on, war will
no longer be what it was originally. Which is to say that, if in the days
to come mankind has no choice but to engage in war, it can no longer be
carried out in the ways with which we are familiar. It is impossible for
us to deny the impact on human society and its soul of the new motivations
represented by economic freedom, the concept of human rights, and the
awareness of environmental protection, but it is certain that the metamorphosis
of warfare will have a more complex backdrop. Otherwise, the immortal
bird of warfare will not be able to attain nirvana when it is on the verge
of decline: When people begin to lean toward and rejoice in the reduced
use of military force to resolve conflicts, war will be reborn in another
form and in another arena, becoming an instrument of enormous power in
the hands of all those who harbor intentions of controlling other countries
or regions. In this sense, there is reason for us to maintain that the
financial attack by George Soros on East Asia, the terrorist attack on
the U.S. embassy by Usama Bin Laden, the gas attack on the Tokyo subway
by the disciples of the Aum Shinri Kyo, and the havoc wreaked by the likes
of Morris Jr. on the Internet, in which the degree of destruction is by
no means second to that of a war, represent semi-warfare, quasi-warfare,
and sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic form of another kind of warfare.
But whatever you call them, they cannot make us more optimistic
than in the past. We have no reason for optimism. This is because the
reduction of the functions of warfare in a pure sense does not mean at
all that war has ended. Even in the so-called post-modern, post-industrial
age, warfare will not be totally dismantled. It has only re-invaded human
society in a more complex, more extensive, more concealed, and more subtle
manner. It is as Byron said in his poem mourning Shelley, "Nothing
has happened, he has only undergone a sea change." War which has
undergone the changes of modern technology and the market system will
be launched even more in atypical forms. In other words, while we are
seeing a relative reduction in military violence, at the same time we
definitely are seeing an increase in political, economic, and technological
violence. However, regardless of the form the violence takes, war is war,
and a change in the external appearance does not keep any war from abiding
by the principles of war.
If we acknowledge that the new principles of war are no
longer "using armed force to compel the enemy to submit to one's
will," but rather are "using all means, including armed force
or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-lethal
means to compel the enemy to accept one's interests."
This represents change. A change in war and a change in
the mode of war occasioned by this. So, just what has led to the change?
What kind of changes are they? Where are the changes headed? How does
one face these changes? This is the topic that this book attempts to touch
on and shed light on, and it is also our motivation in deciding to write
this book.
[Written on 17 January 1999, the 8th anniversary of the
outbreak of the Gulf War]
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| Part
One: On New Warfare |
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'Although ancient states were great, they inevitably
perished when they were fond of war' - Sima Rangju, Technology is
the Totem of Modern Man [1]
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| Stirred
by the warm breeze of utilitarianism, it is not surprising that technology
is more in favor with people than science is. The age of great scientific
discoveries had already been left behind before Einstein's time. However,
modern man is increasingly inclined to seeing all his dreams come true during
his lifetime. This causes him, when betting on his own future, to prostrate
himself and expect wonders from technology through a 1000-power concave
lens. In this way, technology has achieved startling and explosive developments
in a rather short period of time, and this has resulted in innumerable benefits
for mankind, which is anxious for quick success and instant rewards. However,
we proudly term this technological progress, not realizing that at this
time we have already consigned ourselves to a benighted technological age
in which we have lost our hearts [2]. |
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| Technology
today is becoming increasingly dazzling and uncontrollable. Bell Labs and
Sony continue to put out novel toys, Bill Gates opens new "Windows"
each year, and "Dolly," the cloned sheep, proves that mankind
is now planning to take the place of God the Creator. The fearsome Russian-built
SU-27 fighter has not been put to use on any battlefield, and already the
SU-35 has emerged to strike a pose [3], but whether or not, once it has
exhausted its time in the limelight, the SU-35 will be able to retire having
rendered meritorious service is still a matter of considerable doubt. Technology
is like "magic shoes" on the feet of mankind, and after the spring
has been wound tightly by commercial interests, people can only dance along
with the shoes, whirling rapidly in time to the beat that they set. |
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| The names
Watt and Edison are nearly synonymous with great technical inventions, and
using these great technological masters to name their age may be said to
be reasonable. However, from then on, the situation changed, and the countless
and varied technological discoveries of the past 100 years or so makes it
difficult for the appearance of any new technology to take on any self-importance
in the realm of human life. While it may be said that the formulations of
"the age of the steam engine" and "the age of electrification"
can be said to be names which reflect the realities of the time, today,
with all kinds of new technology continuously beating against the banks
of the age so that people scarcely have the time to accord them brief acclaim
while being overwhelmed by an even higher and newer wave of technology,
the age in which an era could be named for a single new technology or a
single inventor has become a thing of the past. This is the reason why,
if one calls the current era the "nuclear age" or the "information
age," it will still give people the impression that you are using one
aspect to typify the whole situation. |
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| There is
absolutely no doubt that the appearance of information technology has been
good news for human civilization. This is because it is the only thing to
date that is capable of infusing greater energy into the technological "plague"
that has been released from Pandora's box, and at the same time it also
provides a magic charm as a means of controlling it [technology]. It is
just that, at present, there is still a question of who in turn will have
a magic charm with which to control it [information technology]. The pessimistic
viewpoint is that, if this technology develops in a direction which cannot
be controlled by man, ultimately it will turn mankind into its victim [4].
However, this frightening conclusion is totally incapable of reducing people's
ardor for it. |
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| The optimistic
prospects that it displays itself are intensely seductive for mankind, which
has a thirst for technical progress. After all, its unique features of exchanging
and sharing represent the light of intelligence which we can hope will lead
mankind out of the barbarism of technology, although this is still not sufficient
to make us like those futurists who cannot see the forest for the trees,
and who use its name to label the entire age. Its characteristics are precisely
what keep it from being able to replace the various technologies that we
already have in great quantity, that are just emerging, or which are about
to be born, particularly those such as biotechnology, materials technology,
and nanotechnology, these technologies which have a symbiotic relationship
with information technology in which they rely on and promote one another. |
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| Over the
past 300 years, people have long since become accustomed to blindly falling
in love with the new and discarding the old in the realm of technology,
and the endless pursuit of new technology has become a panacea to resolve
all the difficult questions of existence. Infatuated with it, people have
gradually gone astray. Just as one will often commit ten other mistakes
to cover up one, to solve one difficult problem people do not hesitate to
bring ten more on themselves [5]. For example, for a more convenient means
of transportation, people invented cars, but a long string of problems followed
closely on the heels of the automobile -- mining and smelting, mechanical
processing, oil extraction, rubber refining, and road-building, etc., which
in turn required a long string of technical means to solve, until ultimately
it led to pollution of the environment, destroying resources, taking over
farmland, traffic accidents, and a host of thornier problems. In the long
run, comparing the original goal of using cars for transportation with these
derivative problems, it almost seems unimportant. In this way, the irrational
expansion of technology causes mankind to continually lose his goals in
the complex ramifications of the tree of technology, losing his way and
forgetting how to get back. We may as well dub this phenomenon the "ramification
effect." Fortunately, at this time, modern information technology made
its appearance. We can say with certainty that this is the most important
revolution in the history of technology. Its revolutionary significance
is not merely in that it is a brand new technology itself, but more in that
it is a kind of bonding agent which can lightly penetrate the layers of
barriers between technologies and link various technologies which appear
to be totally unrelated. Through its bonding, not only is it possible to
derive numerous new technologies which are neither one thing nor the other
while they also represent this and that, and furthermore it also provides
a kind of brand new approach to the relationship between man and technology. |
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| Only from
the perspective of mankind can mankind clearly perceive the essence of technology
as a tool, and only then can he avoid becoming a slave to technology --
to the tool -- during the process of resolving the difficult problems he
faces in his existence. Mankind is completely capable of fully developing
his own powers of imagination so that, when each technology is used its
potential is exhausted, and not being like a bear breaking off corncobs,
only able to continually use new technology to replace the old. Today, the
independent use of individual technologies is now becoming more and more
unimaginable. The emergence of information technology has presented endless
possibilities for match-ups involving various old and new technologies and
among new and advanced technologies. Countless facts have demonstrated that
the integrated use of technology is able to promote social progress more
than even the discovery of the technology [6]. |
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| The situation
of loud solo parts is in the process of being replaced by a multi-part chorus.
The general fusion of technology is irreversibly guiding the rising globalization
trend, while the globalization trend in turn is accelerating the process
of the general fusion of technology, and this is the basic characteristic
of our age. |
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| This characteristic
will inevitably project its features on every direction of the age, and
naturally the realm of war will be no exception. No military force that
thirsts for modernization can get by without nurturing new technology, while
the demands of war have always been the midwife of new technology. During
the Gulf War, more than 500 kinds of new and advanced technology of the
80s ascended the stage to strike a pose, making the war simply seem like
a demonstration site for new weaponry. However, the thing that left a profound
impression on people was not the new weaponry per se, but was rather the
trend of systemization in the development and use of the weapons. Like the
"Patriots" intercepting the "Scuds," it seemed as simple
as shooting birds with a shotgun, while in fact it involved numerous weapons
deployed over more than half the globe: |
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| After a
DSP satellite identified a target, an alarm was sent to a ground station
in Australia, which was then sent to the central command post in Riyadh
through the U.S. Cheyenne Mountain command post, after which the "Patriot"
operators were ordered to take their battle stations, all of which took
place in the mere 90-second alarm stage, relying on numerous relays and
coordination of space-based systems and C3I systems, truly a "shot
heard 'round the world." |
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| The real-time
coordination of numerous weapons over great distances created an unprecedented
combat capability, and this was precisely something that was unimaginable
prior to the emergence of information technology. While it may be said that
the emergence of individual weapons prior to World War II was still able
to trigger a military revolution, today no-one is capable of dominating
the scene alone. |
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| War in
the age of technological integration and globalization has eliminated the
right of weapons to label war and, with regard to the new starting point,
has realigned the relationship of weapons to war, while the appearance of
weapons of new concepts, and particularly new concepts of weapons, has gradually
blurred the face of war. Does a single "hacker" attack count as
a hostile act or not? Can using financial instruments to destroy a country's
economy be seen as a battle? Did CNN's broadcast of an exposed corpse of
a U.S. soldier in the streets of Mogadishu shake the determination of the
Americans to act as the world's policeman, thereby altering the world's
strategic situation? And should an assessment of wartime actions look at
the means or the results? Obviously, proceeding with the traditional definition
of war in mind, there is no longer any way to answer the above questions.
When we suddenly realize that all these non-war actions may be the new factors
constituting future warfare, we have to come up with a new name for this
new form of war: Warfare which transcends all boundaries and limits, in
short: unrestricted warfare. |
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| If this
name becomes established, this kind of war means that all means will be
in readiness, that information will be omnipresent, and the battlefield
will be everywhere. It means that all weapons and technology can be superimposed
at will, it means that all the boundaries lying between the two worlds of
war and non-war, of military and non-military, will be totally destroyed,
and it also means that many of the current principles of combat will be
modified, and even that the rules of war may need to be rewritten. |
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| However,
the pulse of the God of War is hard to take. If you want to discuss war,
particularly the war that will break out tomorrow evening or the morning
of the day after tomorrow, there is only one way, and that is to determine
its nature with bated breath, carefully feeling the pulse of the God of
War today. |
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| Footnotes: |
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[1]
In Man and Technology, O. Spengler stated that "like God, our father,
technology is eternal and unchanging, like the son of God, it will save
mankind, and like the Holy Spirit, it shines upon us." The philosopher
Spengler's worship for technology, which was just like that of a theologian
for God, was nothing but a manifestation of another type of ignorance
as man entered the great age of industrialism, which increasingly flourished
in the post-industrial age.
[2] In this regard, the French philosopher and scientist
Jean Ladrihre has a unique viewpoint. He believes that science and technology
have a destructive effect as well as a guiding effect on culture. Under
the combined effects of these two, it is very difficult for mankind to
maintain a clear-headed assessment of technology, and we are constantly
oscillating between the two extremes of technical fanaticism and "anti-science"
movements. Bracing oneself to read through his The Challenge Presented
to Cultures by Science and Technology, in which the writing is abstruse
but the thinking recondite, may be helpful in observing the impact of
technology on the many aspects of human society from a broader perspective.
[3] Although the improvement of beyond visual range (BVR)
weapons has already brought about enormous changes in the basic concepts
of air combat, after all is said and done it has not completely eliminated
short-range combat. The SU-27, which is capable of "cobra" maneuvers
and the SU-35, which is capable of "hook" moves, are the most
outstanding fighter aircraft to date.
[4] F. G. Ronge [as published 1715 2706 1396 2706] is
the sharpest of the technological pessimists. As early as 1939, Ronge
had recognized the series of problems that modern technology brings with
it, including the growth of technological control and the threat of environmental
problems. In his view, technology has already become an unmatched, diabolical
force. It has not only taken over nature, it has also stripped away man's
freedom. In Being and Time, Martin Heidegger termed technology an "outstanding
absurdity," calling for man to return to nature in order to avoid
technology, which posed the greatest threat. The most famous technological
optimists were [Norbert] Wiener and Steinbuch. In Wiener's Cybernetics,
God and Robots, and The Human Use of Human Beings and Steinbuch's The
Information Society, Philosophy and Cybernetics, and other such works,
we can see the bright prospects that describe for human society, driven
by technology.
[5] In David Ehrenfeld's book, The Arrogance of Humanism,
he cites numerous examples of this. In Too Clever, Schwartz states that
"the resolution of one problem may generate a group of new problems,
and these problems may ultimately preclude that kind of resolution."
In Rational Consciousness, Rene Dibo [as published 3583 0355 6611 0590]
also discusses a similar phenomenon.
[6] In The Age of Science and the Future of Mankind, E.
Shulman points out that "during the dynamic development of modern
culture, which is based on the explosive development of modern technology,
we are increasingly faced with the fact of multidisciplinary cooperation...it
is impossible for one special branch of science to guide our practice
in a sufficiently scientific manner."
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| Chapter
1: The Weapons Revolution Which Invariably Comes First |
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'As
soon as technological advances may be applied to military goals, and furthermore
are already used for military purposes, they almost immediately seem obligatory,
and also often go against the will of the commanders in triggering changes
or even revolutions in the modes of combat' - Engels |
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| The weapons
revolution invariably precedes the revolution in military affairs by one
step, and following the arrival of a revolutionary weapon, the arrival of
the revolution in military affairs is just a matter of time. The history
of warfare is continually providing this kind of proof: bronze or iron spears
resulted in the infantry phalanx, and bows and arrows and stirrups provided
new tactics for cavalry [1]. Black powder cannons gave rise to a full complement
of modern warfare modes....from the time when conical bullets and rifles
[2] took to the battlefield as the vanguard of the age of technology, weapons
straightaway stamped their names on the chest of warfare. |
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| First,
it was the enormous steel-clad naval vessels that ruled the seas, launching
the "age of battleships," then its brother the "tank"
ruled land warfare, after which the airplane dominated the skies, up until
the atomic bomb was born, announcing the approach of the "nuclear age."
Today, a multitude of new and advanced technology weapons continues to pour
forth, so that weapons have solemnly become the chief representative of
war. When people discuss future warfare, they are already quite accustomed
to using certain weapons or certain technologies to describe it, calling
it "electronic warfare," "precision-weapons warfare,"
and "information warfare." |
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| Coasting
along in their mental orbit, people have not yet noticed that a certain
inconspicuous yet very important change is stealthily approaching. |
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No
One Has the Right to Label Warfare |
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| The weapons
revolution is a prelude to a revolution in military affairs. What is different
than in the past is that the revolution in military affairs that is coming
will no longer by driven by one or two individual weapons. In addition to
continuing to stimulate people to yearn for and be charmed by new weapons,
the numerous technological inventions have also quickly eradicated the mysteries
of each kind of weapon. In the past, all that was needed was the invention
of a few weapons or pieces of equipment, such as the stirrup and the Maxim
machine gun [3], and that was sufficient to alter the form of war, whereas
today upwards of 100 kinds of weapons are needed to make up a certain weapons
system before it can have an overall effect on war. |
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| However,
the more weapons are invented, the smaller an individual weapon's role in
war becomes, and this is a paradox that is inherent in the relationship
between weapons and war. Speaking in that sense, other than the all-out
use of nuclear weapons, a situation which is more and more unlikely and
which may be termed nuclear war, none of the other weapons, even those that
are extremely revolutionary in nature, possesses the right to label future
warfare. |
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| Perhaps
it is precisely because people recognize this point that we then have formulations
such as "high-tech warfare" and "information warfare"
[4], whose intent is to use the broad concept of technology to replace the
concept of specific weapons, using a fuzzy-learning approach to resolve
this knotty problem. However, it seems that this still is not the way to
resolve the problem. |
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| When one
delves deeply into this, the term "high-technology"[5], which
first appeared in the architectural industry in the United States, is in
fact a bit vague. What constitutes high technology? What does it refer to?
Logically speaking, high and low are only relative concepts. However, using
an extremely mutable concept in this irrational manner to name warfare,
which is evolving endlessly, in itself constitutes a considerable problem.
When one generation's high technology becomes low technology with the passage
of time, are we still prepared to again dub the new toys that continue to
appear as being high tech? Or is it possible that, in today's technological
explosion, this may result in confusion and trouble for us in naming and
using each new technology that appears? Not to mention the question of just
what should be the standard to determine whether something is high or not?
With regard to technology itself, each technology has specific aspects,
which therefore means that each has its time limits. Yesterday's "high"
is very possibly today's "low," while today's "new"
will in turn become tomorrow's "old." |
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| Compared
to the M-60 tank, the "Cobra" helicopter, and the B-52, the main
battle weapons of the 60s-70s, the "Abrams" tank, the "Apache"
helicopter gunship, the F-117, the "Patriot" missiles, and the
"Tomahawk" cruise missiles are high tech. However, faced with
the B-2, the F-22, the "Comanche" helicopter, and the "J-Stars"
joint-surveillance target-attack radar system, they in turn seem outmoded.
It is as if to say there is the concept of high-tech weapons, which is a
variable throughout, and which naturally becomes the title of the "bride."
Then, as the "flowers bloom each year, but the people change,"
all that is left is the empty shell of a name, which is continually placed
on the head of the girl who is becoming the next "bride." Then,
in the chain of warfare with its continuous links, each weapon can go from
high to low and from new to old at any time and any place, with time's arrow
being unwilling to stop at any point; nor can any weapon occupy the throne
of high technology for long. Since this is the case, just what kind of high
technology does this so-called high-tech warfare refer to? |
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| High technology,
as spoken of in generalities, cannot become a synonym for future warfare,
nor is information technology -- which is one of the high technologies of
the present age and which seems to occupy an important position in the makeup
of all modern weapons -- sufficient to name a war. Even if in future wars
all the weapons have information components embedded in them and are fully
computerized, we can still not term such war information warfare, and at
most we can just call it computerized warfare [6]. This is because, regardless
of how important information technology is, it cannot completely supplant
the functions and roles of each technology per se. For example, the F-22
fighter, which already fully embodies information technology, is still a
fighter, and the "Tomahawk" missile is still a missile, and one
cannot lump them all together as information weapons, nor can war which
is conducted using these weapons be termed information warfare [7]. Computerized
warfare in the broad sense and information warfare in the narrow sense are
two completely different things. The former refers to the various forms
of warfare which are enhanced and accompanied by information technology,
while the latter primarily refers to war in which information technology
is used to obtain or suppress information. In addition, the contemporary
myth created by information worship has people mistakenly believing that
it is the only rising technology, while the sun has already set on all the
others. This kind of myth may put more money in the pockets of Bill Gates,
but it cannot alter the fact that the development of information technology
similarly relies on the development of other technology, and the development
of related materials technology is a direct constraint on information technology
breakthroughs. For example, the development of biotechnology will determine
the future fate of information technology [8]. Speaking of bio-information
technology, we may as well return to a previous topic and again make a small
assumption: |
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| If people
use information-guided bio-weapons to attack a bio-computer, should this
be counted as bio-warfare or information warfare? I fear that no one will
be able to answer that in one sentence, but this is something which is perfectly
capable of happening. Actually, it is basically not necessary for people
to wrack their brains over whether or not information technology will grow
strong and unruly today, because it itself is a synthesis of other technologies,
and its first appearance and every step forward are all a process of blending
with other technologies, so that it is part of them, and they are part of
it, and this is precisely the most fundamental characteristic of the age
of technological integration and globalization. Naturally, like the figures
from a steel seal, this characteristic may leave its typical imprint on
each modern weapon. We are by no means denying that, in future warfare,
certain advanced weapons may play a leading role. However, as for determining
the outcome of war, it is now very difficult for anyone to occupy an unmatched
position. It may be leading, but it will not be alone, much less never-changing.
Which is also to say that there is no one who can unblushingly stamp his
own name on a given modern war. |
| |
| 'Fighting
the Fight that Fits One's Weapons' and 'Making the Weapons to Fit the Fight' |
| |
| These two
sentences, 'fight the fight that fits one's weapons' and 'build the weapons
to fit the fight' show the clear demarcation line between traditional warfare
and future warfare, as well as pointing out the relationship between weapons
and tactics in the two kinds of war. The former reflects the involuntary
or passive adaptation of the relationship of man to weapons and tactics
in war which takes place under natural conditions, while the latter suggests
the conscious or active choice that people make regarding the same proposition
when they have entered a free state. In the history of war, the general
unwritten rule that people have adhered to all along is to "fight the
fight that fits one's weapons." Very often it is the case that only
after one first has a weapon does one begin to formulate tactics to match
it. With weapons coming first, followed by tactics, the evolution of weapons
has a decisive constraining effect on the evolution of tactics. Naturally,
there are limiting factors here involving the age and the technology, but
neither can we say that there is no relationship between this and the linear
thinking in which each generation of weapons making specialists only thinks
about whether or not the performance of the weapon itself is advanced, and
does not consider other aspects. Perhaps this is one of the factors why
a weapons revolution invariably precedes a revolution in military affairs.
|
| |
| Although
the expression "fight the fight that fits one's weapons" is essentially
negative in nature because what it leaves unsaid reflects a kind of helplessness,
we have no intention of belittling the positive meaning that it has today,
and this positive meaning is seeking the optimum tactics for the weapons
one has. In other words, seeking the combat mode which represents the best
match for the given weapons, thereby seeing that they perform up to their
peak values. Today, those engaged in warfare have now either consciously
or unconsciously completed the transition of this rule from the negative
to the positive. It is just that people still wrongfully believe that this
is the only initiative that can be taken by backward countries in their
helplessness. They hardly realize that the United States, the foremost power
in the world, must similarly face this kind of helplessness. Even though
she is the richest in the world, it is not necessarily possible for her
to use up her uniform new and advanced technology weapons to fight an expensive
modern war [9]. It is just that she has more freedom when it comes to the
selection and pairing up of new and old weapons. |
| |
| If one
can find a good point of agreement, which is to say, the most appropriate
tactics, the pairing up and use of new and older generation weapons not
only makes it possible to eliminate the weakness of uniform weaponry, it
may also become a "multiplier" to increase the weapons' effectiveness.
The B-52 bomber, which people have predicted on many occasions is long since
ready to pass away peacefully, has once again become resplendent after being
coupled with cruise missiles and other precision guided weapons, and its
wings have not yet rested to date. By the use of external infrared guided
missiles, the A-10 aircraft now has night-attack capabilities that it originally
lacked, and when paired with the Apache helicopter, they complement each
other nicely, so that this weapons platform which appeared in the mid-70s
is very imposing. |
| |
| Obviously,
"fight the fight that fits one's weapons" by no means represents
passive inaction. For example, today's increasingly open weapons market
and multiple supply channels have provided a great deal of leeway with regard
to weapons selection, and the massive coexistence of weapons which span
multiple generations has provided a broader and more functional foundation
for trans-generation weapons combinations than at any age in the past, so
that it is only necessary to break with our mental habit of treating the
weapons' generations, uses, and combinations as being fixed to be able to
turn something that is rotten into something miraculous. If one thinks that
one must rely on advanced weapons to fight a modern war, being blindly superstitious
about the miraculous effects of such weapons, it may actually result in
turning something miraculous into something rotten. We find ourselves in
a stage where a revolutionary leap forward is taking place in weapons, going
from weapons systems symbolized by gunpowder to those symbolized by information,
and this may be a relatively prolonged period of alternating weapons. At
present we have no way of predicting how long this period may last, but
what we can say for sure is that, as long as this alternation has not come
to an end, fighting the kind of battle that fits one's weapons will be the
most basic approach for any country in handling the relationship between
weapons and combat, and this includes the United States, the country which
has the most advanced weapons. What must be pointed out is that, the most
basic thing is not the thing with the greatest future. Aggressive initiatives
under negative preconditions is only a specific approach for a specific
time, and by no means constitutes an eternal rule. In man's hands, scientific
progress has long since gone from passive discovery to active invention,
and when the Americans proposed the concept of "building the weapons
to fit the fight," it triggered the greatest single change in the relationship
between weapons and tactics since the advent of war. |
| |
| First determine
the mode of combat, then develop the weapons, and in this regard, the first
stab that the Americans took at this was "Air-Land battle," while
the currently popular "digitized battlefield" and "digitized
units" [10] which have given rise to much discussion represent their
most recent attempt. This approach indicates that the position of weapons
in invariably preceding a revolution in military affairs has now been shaken,
and now tactics come first and weapons follow, or the two encourage one
another, with advancement in a push-pull manner becoming the new relationship
between them. At the same time, weapons themselves have produced changes
with epoch-making significance, and their development no longer looks only
to improvements in the performance of individual weapons, but rather to
whether or not the weapons have good characteristics for linking and matching
them with other weapons. As with the F-111, which was in a class by itself
at the time, because it was too advanced, there was no way to pair it up
with other weapons, so all they could do was shelve it. That lesson has
now been absorbed, and the thinking that tries to rely on one or two new
and advanced technology weapons to serve as "killer weapons" which
can put an end to the enemy is now outmoded. |
| |
| 'Building
the weapons to fit the fight,' an approach which has the distinctive features
of the age and the characteristics of the laboratory, may not only be viewed
as a kind of active choice, it can also be taken as coping with shifting
events by sticking to a fundamental principle, and in addition to being
a major breakthrough in the history of preparing for war, it also implies
the potential crisis in modern warfare: Customizing weapons systems to tactics
which are still being explored and studied is like preparing food for a
great banquet without knowing who is coming, where the slightest error can
lead one far astray. Viewed from the performance of the U.S. military in
Somalia, where they were at a loss when they encountered Aidid's forces,
the most modern military force does not have the ability to control public
clamor, and cannot deal with an opponent who does things in an unconventional
manner. On the battlefields of the future, the digitized forces may very
possibly be like a great cook who is good at cooking lobsters sprinkled
with butter, when faced with guerrillas who resolutely gnaw corncobs, they
can only sigh in despair. The "generation gap"[11] in weapons
and military forces is perhaps an issue that requires exceptional attention.
The closer the generation gap is, the more pronounced are the battle successes
of the more senior generation, while the more the gap opens, the less each
party is capable of dealing with the other, and it may reach the point where
no one can wipe out the other. Looking at the specific examples of battles
that we have, it is difficult for high-tech troops to deal with unconventional
warfare and low-tech warfare, and perhaps there is a rule here, or at least
it is an interesting phenomenon which is worth studying[12]. |
| |
| Weapons
of New Concepts and New Concepts of Weapons |
| |
| Compared
to new-concept weapons, nearly all the weapons that we have known so far
may be termed old-concept weapons. The reason they are called old is because
the basic functions of these weapons were their mobility and lethal power.
Even things like precision-guided bombs and other such high-tech weapons
really involve nothing more than the addition of the two elements of intelligence
and structural capabilities. From the perspective of practical applications,
no change in appearance can alter their nature as traditional weapons, that
is, their control throughout by professional soldiers and their use on certain
battlefields. All these weapons and weapons platforms that have been produced
in line with traditional thinking have without exception come to a dead
end in their efforts to adapt to modern warfare and future warfare. Those
desires of using the magic of high-technology to work some alchemy on traditional
weapons so that they are completely remade have ultimately fallen into the
high-tech trap involving the endless waste of limited funds and an arms
race. This is the paradox that must inevitably be faced in the process of
the development of traditional weapons: To ensure that the weapons are in
the lead, one must continue to up the ante in development costs; the result
of this continued raising of the stakes is that no one has enough money
to maintain the lead. Its ultimate result is that the weapons to defend
the country actually become a cause of national bankruptcy. |
| |
| Perhaps
the most recent examples are the most convincing. Marshal Orgakov, the former
chief of the Soviet general staff, was acutely aware of the trend of weapons
development in the "nuclear age," and when, at an opportune time,
he proposed the brand-new concept of the "revolution in military technology,"
his thinking was clearly ahead of those of his generation. But being ahead
of time in his thinking hardly brought his country happiness, and actually
brought about disastrous results [13]. As soon as this concept -- which
against the backdrop of the Cold War was seen by his colleagues as setting
the pace for the time -- was proposed, it further intensified the arms race
which had been going on for some time between the United States and the
Soviet Union. It was just that, at that time no one could predict that it
would actually result in the breakup of the Soviet Union and its complete
elimination from the superpower contest. A powerful empire collapsed without
a single shot being fired, vividly corroborating the lines of the famous
poem by Kipling, "When empires perish, it is not with a rumble, but
a snicker." Not only was this true for the former Soviet Union, today
the Americans seem to be following in the footsteps of their old adversary,
providing fresh proof of the paradox of weapons development that we have
proposed. As the outlines of the age of technology integration become increasingly
clear, they are investing more and more in the development of new weapons,
and the cost of the weapons is getting higher and higher. The development
of the F-14 and F-15 in the 60s-70s cost one billion dollars, while the
development of the B-2 in the 80s cost over $10 billion, and the development
of the F-22 in the 90s has exceeded $13 billion. Based on weight, the B-2
[14], which runs $13-$15 billion each, is some three times more expensive
than an equivalent weight of gold [15]. Expensive weapons like that abound
in the U.S. arsenal, such as the F-117A bomber, the F-22 main combat aircraft,
and the Comanche helicopter gunship. The cost of each of these weapons exceeds
or approaches $100 million, and this massive amount of weapons with unreasonable
cost-effectiveness has covered the U.S. military with increasingly heavy
armor, pushing them step by step toward the high-tech weapons trap where
the cost stakes continue to be raised. If this is still true for the rich
and brash United States, then how far can the other countries, who are short
of money, continue down this path? Obviously, it will be difficult for anyone
to keep going. Naturally, the way to extricate oneself from this predicament
is to develop a different approach. |
| |
| Therefore,
new-concept weapons have emerged to fill the bill. However, what seems unfair
to people is that it is again the Americans who are in the lead in this
trend. As early as the Vietnam war, the silver iodide powder released over
the "Ho Chi Minh trail" that resulted in torrential rains and
the defoliants scattered over the subtropical forests put the "American
devils" in the sole lead with regard to both the methods and ruthlessness
of new-concept weapons. Thirty years later, with the dual advantages of
money and technology, others are unable to hold a candle to them in this
area. |
| |
| However,
the Americans are not necessarily in the sole lead in everything. The new
concepts of weapons, which came after the weapons of new concepts and which
cover a wider area, were a natural extension of this. However, the Americans
have not been able to get their act together in this area. This is because
proposing a new concept of weapons does not require relying on the springboard
of new technology, it just demands lucid and incisive thinking. However,
this is not a strong point of the Americans, who are slaves to technology
in their thinking. The Americans invariably halt their thinking at the boundary
where technology has not yet reached. It cannot be denied that man-made
earthquakes, tsunamis, weather disasters, or subsonic wave and new biological
and chemical weapons all constitute new concept weapons [16], and that they
have tremendous differences with what we normally speak of as weapons, but
they are still all weapons whose immediate goal is to kill and destroy,
and which are still related to military affairs, soldiers, and munitions.
Speaking in this sense, they are nothing more than non-traditional weapons
whose mechanisms have been altered and whose lethal power and destructive
capabilities have been magnified several times over. |
| |
| However,
a new concept of weapons is different. This and what people call new-concept
weapons are two entirely different things. While it may be said that new-concept
weapons are weapons which transcend the domain of traditional weapons, which
can be controlled and manipulated at a technical level, and which are capable
of inflicting material or psychological casualties on an enemy, in the face
of the new concept of weapons, such weapons are still weapons in a narrow
sense. This is because the new concept of weapons is a view of weapons in
the broad sense, which views as weapons all means which transcend the military
realm but which can still be used in combat operations. In its eyes, everything
that can benefit mankind can also harm him. This is to say that there is
nothing in the world today that cannot become a weapon, and this requires
that our understanding of weapons must have an awareness that breaks through
all boundaries. With technological developments being in the process of
striving to increase the types of weapons, a breakthrough in our thinking
can open up the domain of the weapons kingdom at one stroke. As we see it,
a single man-made stock-market crash, a single computer virus invasion,
or a single rumor or scandal that results in a fluctuation in the enemy
country's exchange rates or exposes the leaders of an enemy country on the
Internet, all can be included in the ranks of new-concept weapons. A new
concept of weapons provides direction for new-concept weapons, while the
new-concept weapons give fixed forms to the new concept of weapons. With
regard to the flood of new-concept weapons, technology is no longer the
main factor, and the true underlying factor is a new concept regarding weapons.
|
| |
| What must
be made clear is that the new concept of weapons is in the process of creating
weapons that are closely linked to the lives of the common people. Let us
assume that the first thing we say is: The appearance of new-concept weapons
will definitely elevate future warfare to a level which is hard for the
common people -- or even military men -- to imagine. Then the second thing
we have to say should be: The new concept of weapons will cause ordinary
people and military men alike to be greatly astonished at the fact that
commonplace things that are close to them can also become weapons with which
to engage in war. We believe that some morning people will awake to discover
with surprise that quite a few gentle and kind things have begun to have
offensive and lethal characteristics. |
| |
| The
Trend to 'Kinder' Weapons |
| |
| Before
the appearance of the atom bomb, warfare was always in a "shortage
age" with respect to lethal power. Efforts to improve weapons have
primarily been to boost their lethal power, and from the "light-kill
weapons" represented by cold steel weapons and single-shot firearms
to the "heavy-kill weapons" represented by various automatic firearms,
the history of the development of weapons has almost always been a process
of continuing to boost the lethal power of weapons. Prolonged shortages
resulted in a thirst among military men for weapons of even greater lethal
power that was difficult to satisfy. With a single red cloud that arose
over the wasteland of New Mexico in the United States, military men were
finally able to obtain a weapon of mass destruction that fulfilled their
wishes, as this could not only completely wipe out the enemy, it could kill
them 100 or 1000 times over. This gave mankind lethal capabilities that
exceeded the demand, and for the first time there was some room to spare
with regard to lethal power in war. |
| |
| Philosophical
principles tell us that, whenever something reaches an ultimate point, it
will turn in the opposite direction. The invention of nuclear weapons, this
"ultra-lethal weapon" [17] which can wipe out all mankind, has
plunged mankind into an existential trap of its own making. |
| |
| Nuclear
weapons have become a sword of Damocles hanging over the head of mankind
which forces it to ponder: Do we really need "ultra-lethal weapons"?
What is the difference between killing an enemy once and killing him 100
times? What is the point of defeating the enemy if it means risking the
destruction of the world? How do we avoid warfare that results in ruin for
all? A "balance of terror" involving "mutually-assured destruction"
was the immediate product of this thinking, but its by-product was to provide
a braking mechanism for the runaway express of improving the lethal capabilities
of weapons, which was continually picking up speed, so that the development
of weapons was no longer careening crazily down the light-kill weapons --
heavy-kill weapons -- ultra-lethal weapons expressway, with people trying
to find a new approach to weapons development which would not only be effective
but which could also exercise control over the lethal power of the weapons.
|
| |
| Any major
technological invention will have a profound human background. The "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights" passed by the United Nations General Assembly
in 1948 and the more than 50 subsequent pacts related to it have established
a set of international rules for human rights in which it is recognized
that the use of weapons of mass destruction -- particularly nuclear weapons
-- is a serious violation of the "right to life" and represents
a "crime against mankind." |
| |
| Influenced
by human rights and other new political concepts, plus the integration trend
in international economics, the interlocking demands and political positions
involving the interests of various social and political forces, the proposal
of the concept of "ultimate concern" for the ecological environment,
and particularly the value of human life, have resulted in misgivings about
killing and destruction, forming a new value concept for war and new ethics
for warfare. |
| |
| The trend
to "kinder" [18] weapons is nothing other than a reflection in
the production and development of weapons of this great change in man's
cultural background. At the same time, technological progress has given
us the means to strike at the enemy's nerve center directly without harming
other things, giving us numerous new options for achieving victory, and
all these make people believe that the best way to achieve victory is to
control, not to kill. There have been changes in the concept of war and
the concept of weapons, and the approach of using uncontrolled slaughter
to force the enemy into unconditional surrender has now become the relic
of a bygone age. Warfare has now taken leave of the meat-grinder age of
Verdun-like campaigns. |
| |
| The appearance
of precision-kill (accurate) weapons and non-lethal (non-fatal) weapons
is a turning point in the development of weapons, showing for the first
time that weapons are developing in a "kinder," not a "stronger"
direction. Precision-kill weapons can hit a target precisely, reducing collateral
casualties, and like a gamma knife which can excise a tumor with hardly
any bleeding, it has led to "surgical" strikes and other such
new tactics, so that inconspicuous combat actions can achieve extremely
notable strategic results. For example, by merely using one missile to track
a mobile telephone signal, the Russians were able to still forever the tough
mouth of Dudayev, who was a headache, and at the same time eased the enormous
trouble that had been stirred up by tiny Chechnya. Non-lethal weapons can
effectively eliminate the combat capabilities of personnel and equipment
without loss of life [19]. The trend that is embodied in these weapons shows
that mankind is in the process of overcoming its own extreme thinking, beginning
to learn to control the lethal power that it already has but which is increasingly
excessive. In the massive bombing that lasted more than a month during the
Gulf War, the loss of life among civilians in Iraq only numbered in the
thousands [20], far less than in the massive bombing of Dresden during World
War II. Kinder weapons represent the latest conscious choice of mankind
among various options in the weapons arena by which, after the weapons are
infused with the element of new technology, the human component is then
added, thereby giving warfare an unprecedented kind-hearted hue. However,
a kinder weapon is still a weapon, and it does not mean that the demands
of being kinder will reduce the battlefield effectiveness of the weapon.
To take away a tank's combat capabilities one can use cannons or missiles
to destroy it, or a laser beam can be used to destroy its optical equipment
or blind its crew. On the battlefield, someone who is injured requires more
care than someone who is killed, and unmanned weapons can eliminate increasingly
expensive protective facilities. Certainly those developing kinder weapons
have already done cold cost-effectiveness calculations of this. Casualties
can strip away an enemy's combat capabilities, causing him to panic and
lose the will to fight, so this may be considered an extremely worthwhile
way to achieve victory. Today, we already have enough technology, and we
can create many methods of causing fear which are more effective, such as
using a laser beam to project the image of injured followers against the
sky, which would be sufficient to frighten those soldiers who are devoutly
religious. There are no longer any obstacles to building this kind of weapon,
it just requires that some additional imagination be added to the technical
element. |
| |
| Kinder
weapons represent a derivative of the new concept of weapons, while information
weapons are a prominent example of kinder weapons. Whether it involves electromagnetic
energy weapons for hard destruction or soft-strikes by computer logic bombs,
network viruses, or media weapons, all are focused on paralyzing and undermining,
not personnel casualties. |
| |
| Kinder
weapons, which could only be born in an age of technical integration, may
very well be the most promising development trend for weapons, and at the
same time they will bring about forms of war or revolutions in military
affairs which we cannot imagine or predict today. They represent a change
with the most profound implications in the history of human warfare to date,
and are the watershed between the old and the new forms of war. This is
because their appearance has been sufficient to put all the wars in the
age of cold and hot weapons into the "old" era. Nonetheless, we
still cannot indulge in romantic fantasies about technology, believing that
from this point on war will become a confrontation like an electronic game,
and even simulated warfare in a computer room similarly must be premised
upon a country's actual overall capabilities, and if a colossus with feet
of clay comes up with ten plans for simulated warfare, it will still not
be sufficient to deter an enemy who is more powerful with regard to actual
strength. |
| |
| War is
still the ground of death and life, the path of survival and destruction,
and even the slightest innocence is not tolerated. Even if some day all
the weapons have been made completely humane, a kinder war in which bloodshed
may be avoided is still war. It may alter the cruel process of war, but
there is no way to change the essence of war, which is one of compulsion,
and therefore it cannot alter its cruel outcome, either. |
| |
| Footnotes: |
| |
[1]
Engels said, "In the age of barbarism, the bow and arrow was still
a decisive weapon, the same as the iron sword in an uncivilized age and
firearms in the age of civilization." (Collected Works of Marx and
Engels, Vol. 4, People's Press, 1972, p. 19)
With regard to how stirrups altered the mode of combat, we can refer to
the translation and commentary by Gu Zhun [7357 0402] of an article entitled
"Stirrups and Feudalism -- Does Technology Create History?"
"Stirrups...immediately made hand-to-hand combat possible, and this
was a revolutionary new mode of combat...very seldom had there been an
invention as simple as the stirrup, but very seldom did it play the kind
of catalytic role in history that this did." "Stirrups resulted
in a series of military and social revolutions in Europe." (Collected
Works of Gu Zhun, Guizhou People's Press, 1994, pp 293-309).
[2] "Compared to the development of any advanced
new weapons technology, the invention of the rifle and the conical bullet
between 1850-1860 had the most profound and immediate revolutionary impact.....The
impact on their age of high-explosive bombs, airplanes, and tanks, which
appeared in the 20th century, certainly does not compare to that of the
rifle at the time." For details, see T. N. Dupuy's The Evolution
of Weapons and Warfare, part 3, section 21, "Rifles, Conical Bullets,
and Dispersed Formations." (Military Science Publishing House, 1985,
pp 238-250).
[3] In the engagement of the Somme river in World War
I, on 1 July 1916 the English forces launched an offensive against the
Germans, and the Germans used Maxim machine guns to strafe the English
troops, which were in a tight formation, resulting in 60,000 casualties
in one day. From that point, mass formation charges gradually began to
retreat from the battlefield. (Weapons and War -- The Historical Evolution
of Military Technology, Liu Jifeng [0491 2060 6912], University of Science
and Technology for National Defense Publishing House, 1992, pp 172-173).
[4] If Wiener's views on war game machines are not taken
as the earliest discussion of information weapons. Then, a comment by
Tom Luona [as published 5012 6719] in 1976 to the effect that information
warfare is a "struggle among decision-making systems" makes
him the first to come up with the term "information warfare"
(U.S., Military Intelligence magazine, 1997, Jan-Mar issue, Douglas Dearth,
"Implications, Characteristics, and Impact of Information Warfare").
Through independent research, in 1990, Shen Weiguang [3088 0251 0342],
a young scholar in China who has over ten years of military service, published
Information Warfare, which is probably the earliest monograph on information
warfare. On the strength of his Third Wave, in another best-seller entitled
Power Shift, Toffler gave information warfare a global look, while the
Gulf War happened along to become the most splendid advertisement for
this new concept of combat. At that point, discussing "information
warfare" became fashionable.
[5] Foreign experts hold that "high technology"
is not a completely fixed concept and that it is also a dynamic concept,
with different countries emphasizing high technology differently. Military
high technology mainly includes military microelectronic device technology,
computer technology, optoelectric technology, aerospace technology, biotechnology,
new materials technology, stealth technology, and directed-energy technology.
The most important characteristic of military high technology is "integration,"
i.e., each military high technology is made up of various technologies
to form a technology group. (For details, see "Foreign Military Data,"
Academy of Military Sciences, Foreign Military Research Dept., No. 69,
1993).
[6] Regarding the definition of "information warfare,"
to date opinions still vary. The definition by the U.S. Department of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff is: Actions taken to interfere with
the enemy's information, information processing, information systems,
and computer networks to achieve information superiority over the enemy,
while protecting one's own information, information processing, information
systems, and computer networks. According to U.S. Army Field Manual FM100-6,
"the DOD's understanding of information warfare leans toward the
effects of information in actual conflicts," while the Army's understanding
is that "information has already permeated every aspect, from peacetime
to military actions in global warfare" (Military Science Publishing
House, Chinese translation, pp 24-25). "In a broad sense, information
warfare constitutes actions which use information to achieve national
goals." That is the definition given to information warfare by George
Stein, a professor at the U.S. Air University, reflecting a somewhat broader
vision than that of the Army. In an article in the 1997 summer edition
of "Joint Force Quarterly," Col. Brian Fredericks proposed that
"information warfare is a national issue that goes beyond the scope
of national defense," and perhaps this is the most accurate description
of information warfare in the broad sense.
[7] Running precisely counter to the situation in which
the implications of the concept of "information warfare" are
getting broader and broader, some of the smart young officers in the U.S.
military are increasingly questioning the concept of "information
warfare." Air Force Lt. Col. James Rogers points out that "information
warfare really isn't anything new...whether or not those who assert that
information warfare techniques and strategies will inevitably replace
'armed warfare' are a bit too self-confident." (U.S. Marines magazine
, April, 1997). Navy Lieutenant Robert Guerli [as published 0657 1422
0448] proposed that "the seven areas of misunderstanding with regard
to information warfare are: (1) the overuse of analogous methods; (2)
exaggerating the threat; (3) overestimating one's own strength; (4) historical
relevance and accuracy; (5) avoiding criticism of anomalous attempts;
(6) totally unfounded assumptions; and (7) non-standard definitions."
(U.S., Events magazine, Sep 97 issue). Air Force Major Yulin Whitehead
wrote in the fall 1997 issue of Airpower Journal that information is not
all-powerful, and that information weapons are not "magic weapons."
Questions about information warfare are definitely not limited to individuals,
as the U.S. Air Force document "The Foundations of Information Warfare"
makes a strict distinction between "warfare in the information age"
and "information warfare." It holds that "warfare in the
information age" is warfare which uses computerized weapons, such
as using a cruise missile to attack a target, whereas "information
warfare" treats information as an independent realm and a powerful
weapon. Similarly, some well-known scholars have also issued their own
opinions. Johns Hopkins University professor Eliot Cohen reminds us that
"just as nuclear weapons did not result in the elimination of conventional
forces, the information revolution will not eliminate guerilla tactics,
terrorism, or weapons of mass destruction."
[8] Macromolecular systems designed and produced using
biotechnology represent the production materials for even higher order
electronic components. For example, protein molecule computers have computation
speeds and memory capabilities hundreds of millions of times greater than
our current computers. (New Military Perspectives for the Next Century,
Military Science Publishing House, 1997 edition, pp 142-145).
[9] Even in the Gulf War, which has been termed a testing
ground for the new weapons, there were quite a few old weapons and conventional
munitions which played important roles. (For details, see "The Gulf
War -- U.S. Department of Defense Final Report to Congress -- Appendix")
[10] Starting with "Air-Land Battle," weapons
development by the U.S. military has mainly been divided into five stages:
Propose requirements, draft a plan, proof of concept, engineering development
and production, and outfitting the units. Development regarding the equipping
of digitized units is following this same path. (U.S. Army magazine, Oct
1995). In March, 1997, the U.S. Army conducted a brigade-size high-level
combat test, testing a total of 58 kinds of digitized equipment. (U.S.
Army Times, 31 March, 7 April, 28 April 1997). According to John E. Wilson,
commander of the U.S. Army's Materiel Command, his mission is to cooperate
with the Training and Doctrine Command, thinking up and developing bold
and novel advanced technology equipment for them which meets their needs.
(U.S. Army magazine, October 1997).
[11] Slipchenko [si li pu qin ke 2448 0448 2528 3830 4430],
chairman of the Dept. of Scientific Research at the Russian General Staff
Academy, believes that war and weapons have already gone through five
ages, and we are now heading toward the sixth. (Zhu Xiaoli, Zhao Xiaozhuo,
The New U.S. and Russian Military Revolution, Military Science Publishing
House, 1996 edition, p 6).
[12] The Journal of the National Defense University, No.
11, 1998, carried an article on Chen Bojiang's interview of Philip Odeen,
chairman of the U.S. National Defense Panel. Odeen mentioned "asymmetrical
warfare" several times, believing that this is a new threat to the
United States. Antulio Echevarria published an article in Parameters magazine
in which he proposed that "in the post-industrial age, the thing
that will still be most difficult to deal with will be a 'people's war.'"
[13] U.S. defense specialists believe that Orgakov already
saw that electronic technology would result in a revolution in conventional
weapons, and that they would replace nuclear weapons with respect to their
effects. However, Orgakov's foresight and wisdom with regard to the issue
of a revolution in military affairs ran aground because of structural
problems. "If, in keeping up with the extremely high costs of the
revolution in military affairs, a country exceeds the limits that can
be borne by its system and material conditions, but it keeps engaging
in military power contests with its opponents, the only outcome can be
that they will fall further behind with regard to the military forces
that they can use. This was the fate of Russia during the czarist and
Soviet eras: the Soviet Union undertook military burdens that were difficult
to bear, while in turn the military was unwilling to accept the need for
strategic retrenchment." (See U.S., Strategic Review magazine, spring
1996, Steven Blank, "Preparing for the Next War: Some Views on the
Revolution in Military Affairs").
[14] In 1981, the U.S. Air Force estimated that it could
produce 132 B-2s with an investment of $22 billion. However, eight years
later, this money had only produced one B-2. Based on its value per unit
weight, one B-2 is worth three times its weight in gold. (See Modern Military,
No. 8, 1998, p 33, and Zhu Zhihao's Analysis of U.S. Stealth Technology
Policy.)
[15] The U.S. Dept. of Defense conducted an analysis of
the 13 January 1993 air attack on Iraq and believes that there are numerous
limitations to high-tech weapons, and that the effect of the combined
effect bombs was at times better than that of precision bombs. (U.S.,
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 25 January 93).
[16] New-concept weapons primarily include kinetic-energy
weapons, directed-energy weapons, subsonic weapons, geophysical weapons,
meteorological weapons, solar energy weapons, and gene weapons, etc. (New
Military Perspectives for the Next Century, Military Science Publishing
House, 1997 edition, p 3).
[17] The point in substituting the concept of "ultra-lethal
weapons" for the concept of "weapons of mass destruction"
is to stress that the lethal power of such weapons exceeds the needs of
warfare and represents a product of man's extremist thinking.
[18] The "kind" in "kinder weapons"
mainly refers to the fact that it reduces slaughter and collateral casualties.
[19] The April 1993 issue of the British journal International
Defense Review revealed that the United States was energetically researching
a variety of non-lethal weapons, including optical weapons, high-energy
microwave weapons, acoustic beam weapons, and pulsed chemical lasers.
The 6 March 1993 issue of Jane's Defense Weekly reported that a high-level
non-lethal weapons steering committee at the Dept. of Defense had formulated
a policy regulating the development, procurement, and use of such weapons.
In addition, according to the 1997 World Military Yearbook (pp 521-522),
the U.S. Dept. of Defense has established a "non-lethal weapons research
leading group," whose goal is to see that non-lethal weapons appear
on the weapons inventory as soon as possible.
[20] See Military Science Publishing House Foreign Military
Data, 26 March 1993, No. 27, p 3.
|
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|
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| Chapter
2: The War God's Face Has Become Indistinct |
| |
'Throughout
the Entire Course of History, Warfare is Always Changing.' - Andre Beaufre
|
| |
| Ever since
early man went from hunting animals to slaughtering his own kind, people
have been equipping the giant war beast for action, and the desire to attain
various goals has prompted soldiers to become locked in bloody conflict.
It has become universally accepted that warfare is a matter for soldiers.
For several thousand years, the three indispensable "hardware"
elements of any war have been soldiers, weapons and a battlefield. Running
through them all has been the "software" element of warfare: its
purposefulness. Before now, nobody has ever questioned that these are the
basic elements of warfare. The problem comes when people discover that all
of these basic elements, which seemingly were hard and fast, have changed
so that it is impossible to get a firm grip on them. When that day comes,
is the war god's face still distinct? |
| |
| Why
Fight and for Whom? |
| |
| In regard
to the ancient Greeks, if the account in Homer's epic is really trustworthy,
the purpose of the Trojan War was clear and simple: it was worth fighting
a ten-year war for the beautiful Helen. As far as their aims, the wars prosecuted
by our ancestors were relatively simple in terms of the goals to be achieved,
with no complexity to speak of. This was because our ancestors had limited
horizons, their spheres of activity were narrow, they had modest requirements
for existence, and their weapons were not lethal enough. Only if something
could not be obtained by normal means would our ancestors generally resort
to extraordinary measures to obtain it, and then without the least hesitation.
Just so, Clausewitz wrote his famous saying, which has been an article of
faith for several generations of soldiers and statesmen: "War is a
continuation of politics." Our ancestors would fight perhaps for the
orthodox status of a religious sect, or perhaps for an expanse of pastureland
with plenty of water and lush grass. They would not even have scruples about
going to war over, say, spices, liquor or a love affair between a king and
queen. The stories of wars over spices and sweethearts, and rebellions over
things like rum, are recorded in the pages of history--stories that leave
us not knowing whether to laugh or cry. Then there is the war that the English
launched against the Qing monarchy for the sake of the opium trade. This
was national drug trafficking activity on probably the grandest scale in
recorded history. It is clear from these examples that, prior to recent
times, there was just one kind of warfare in terms of the kind of motive
and the kind of subsequent actions taken. Moving to later times, Hitler
expounded his slogan of "obtaining living space for the German people,"
and the Japanese expounded their slogan of building the so called "Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." While a cursory look at these slogans
would suggest that the goals must have been somewhat more complex than the
goals of any previous wars, nevertheless the substance behind the slogans
was simply that the new great powers intended to once again carve up the
spheres of influence of the old great powers and to reap the benefits of
seizing their colonies. |
| |
| To assess
why people fight is not so easy today, however. In former times, the ideal
of "exporting revolution" and the slogan of "checking the
expansion of communism" were calls to action that elicited countless
responses. But especially after the conclusion of the Cold War, when the
Iron Curtain running all along the divide between the two great camps suddenly
collapsed, these calls have lost their effectiveness. The times of clearly
drawn sides are over. |
| |
| Who are
our enemies? Who are our friends? These used to be the paramount questions
in regard to revolution and counterrevolution. Suddenly the answers have
become complicated, confusing and hard to get hold of. A country that yesterday
was an adversary is in the process of becoming a current partner today,
while a country that once was an ally will perhaps be met on the battlefield
at the next outbreak of war. Iraq, which one year was still fiercely attacking
Iran on behalf of the U.S. in the Iran-Iraq War, itself became the target
of a fierce attack by the U.S. military in the next year (see Endnote 1).
An Afghan guerilla trained by the CIA becomes the latest target for an attack
by U.S. cruise missiles overnight. Furthermore, NATO members Greece and
Turkey have nearly come to blows several times in their dispute over Cyprus,
and Japan and South Korea, who have concluded a treaty of alliance, have
come just short of an open break as a result of their dispute over a tiny
island. All of this serves to again confirm that old saying: "all friendship
is in flux; self-interest is the only constant." The kaleidoscope of
war is turned by the hands of self-interest, presenting constantly shifting
images to the observer. |
| |
| Astonishing
advances in modern advanced technology serve to promote globalization, further
intensifying the uncertainty associated with the dissolution of some perceived
self-interests and the emergence of others. The reason for starting a war
can be anything from a dispute over territory and resources, a dispute over
religious beliefs, hatred stemming from tribal differences, or a dispute
over ideology, to a dispute over market share, a dispute over the distribution
of power and authority, a dispute over trade sanctions, or a dispute stemming
from financial unrest. |
| |
| The goals
of warfare have become blurred due to the pursuit of a variety of agendas.
Thus, it is more and more difficult for people to say clearly just why they
are fighting (see Endnote 2). Every young lad that participated in the Gulf
War will tell you right up front that he fought to restore justice in tiny,
weak Kuwait. However, the real reason for the war was perhaps far different
from the high-sounding reason that was given. Hiding under the umbrella
furnished by this high-sounding reason, they need not fear facing the light
directly. In reality, every country that participated in the Gulf War decided
to join "Desert Storm" only after carefully thinking over its
own intentions and goals. Throughout the whole course of the war, all of
the Western powers were fighting for their oil lifeline. To this primary
goal, the Americans added the aspiration of building a new world order with
"USA" stamped on it. Perhaps there was also a bit of missionary
zeal to uphold justice. In order to eliminate a threat that was close at
hand, the Saudi Arabians were willing to smash Muslim taboos and "dance
with wolves." From start to finish, the British reacted enthusiastically
to President Bush's every move, in order to repay Uncle Sam for the trouble
he took on their behalf in the Malvinas Islands War. The French, in order
to prevent the complete evaporation of their traditional influence in the
Middle East, finally sent troops to the Gulf at the last moment. Naturally,
there is no way that a war prosecuted under these kinds of conditions can
be a contest fought over a single objective. The aggregate of the self-interests
of all the numerous countries participating in the war serves to transform
a modern war like "Desert Storm" into a race to further various
self-interests under the banner of a common interest. Thus, so-called "common
interest" has become merely the war equation's largest common denominator
that can be accepted by every allied party participating in the war effort.
Since different countries will certainly be pursuing different agendas in
a war, it is necessary to take the self-interest of every allied party into
consideration if the war is to be prosecuted jointly. Even if we consider
a given country's domestic situation, each of the various domestic interest
groups will also be pursuing its own agenda in a war. The complex interrelationships
among self-interests make it impossible to pigeonhole the Gulf War as having
been fought for oil, or as having been fought for the new world order, or
as having been fought to drive out the invaders. Only a handful of soldiers
are likely to grasp a principle that every statesman already knows: that
the biggest difference between contemporary wars and the wars of the past
is that, in contemporary wars, the overt goal and the covert goal are often
two different matters. |
| |
| Where
to Fight? |
| |
| "To
the battlefield!" The young lad with a pack on his back takes leave
of his family as his daughters and other relatives see him off with tears
in their eyes. This is a classic scene in war movies. Whether the young
lad is leaving on a horse, a train, a steamship or a plane is not so important.
The important thing is that the destination never changes: it is the battlefield
bathed in the flames of war. |
| |
| During
the long period of time before firearms, battlefields were small and compact.
A face-off at close quarters between two armies might unfold on a small
expanse of level ground, in a mountain pass, or within the confines of a
city. In the eyes of today's soldier, the battlefield that so enraptured
the ancients is a "point" target on the military map that is not
particularly noteworthy. Such a battlefield is fundamentally incapable of
accommodating the spectacle of war as it has unfolded in recent times on
such a grand scale. The advent of firearms led to dispersed formations,
and the "point" ["dian"] type battlefield was gradually
drawn out into a line of skirmishers. The trench warfare of the First World
War, with lines extending hundreds of miles, served to bring the "point"
and "line" ["xian"] type battlefield to its acme. At
the same time, it transformed the battlefield into an "area" ["mian"]
type battlefield which was several dozens of miles deep. For those who went
to war during those times, the new battlefield meant trenches, pillboxes,
wire entanglements, machine guns and shell craters. They called war on this
type of battlefield, where heavy casualties were inflicted, a "slaughterhouse"
and a "meat grinder." The explosive development of military technology
is constantly setting the stage for further explosive expansion of the battlespace.
The transition from the "point" type battlefield to the "line"
type battlefield, and the transition from the two-dimensional battlefield
to the three- dimensional battlefield did not take as long as people generally
think. One could say that, in each case, the latter stage came virtually
on the heels of the former. When tanks began roaring over military trenches,
prop airplanes were already equipped with machine guns and it was already
possible to drop bombs from zeppelins. The development of weapons cannot,
in and of itself, automatically usher in changes in the nature of the battlefield.
In the history of warfare, any significant advance has always depended in
part on active innovating by military strategists. The battlefield, which
had been earthbound for several thousand years, was suddenly lifted into
three dimensional space. This was due in part to General J.F.C. Fuller's
Tanks in the Great War of 1914-1918 and Giulio Douhet's The Command of the
Air, as well as the extremely deep operations that were proposed and demonstrated
under the command of Marshall Mikhail N. Tukhachevsky. Erich Ludendorff
was another individual who attempted to radically change the nature of the
battlefield. He put forth the theory of "total war" and tried
to combine battlefield and non-battlefield elements into one organic whole.
While he was not successful, he nevertheless was the harbinger of similar
military thought that has outlived him for more than half a century. Ludendorff
was destined only to fight at battlefields like Verdun and the Masurian
Lakes. A soldier's fate is determined by the era in which he lives. At that
time, the wingspan of the war god could not extend any farther than the
range of a Krupp artillery piece. Naturally, then, it was impossible to
fire a shell that would pass through the front and rear areas on its parabolic
path. Hitler was more fortunate than Ludendorff. 20 years later, he had
long range weapons at his disposal. He utilized bombers powered by Mercedes
engines and V-1 and V-2 guided missiles and broke the British Isles' record
of never having been encroached upon by an invader. Hitler, who was neither
a strategist nor a tactician, relied on his intuition and made the line
of demarcation between the front and rear less prominent in the war, but
he never really understood the revolutionary significance of breaking through
the partition separating battlefield elements from non-battlefield elements.
Perhaps this concept was beyond the ken of an out-and- out war maniac and
half-baked military strategist. |
| |
| This revolution,
however, will be upon us in full force soon enough. This time, technology
is again running ahead of the military thinking. While no military thinker
has yet put forth an extremely wide-ranging concept of the battlefield,
technology is doing its utmost to extend the contemporary battlefield to
a degree that is virtually infinite: there are satellites in space, there
are submarines under the water, there are ballistic missiles that can reach
anyplace on the globe, and electronic countermeasures are even now being
carried out in the invisible electromagnetic spectrum space. Even the last
refuge of the human race--the inner world of the heart--cannot avoid the
attacks of psychological warfare. There are nets above and snares below,
so that a person has no place to flee. All of the prevailing concepts about
the breadth, depth and height of the operational space already appear to
be old-fashioned and obsolete. In the wake of the expansion of mankind's
imaginative powers and his ability to master technology, the battlespace
is being stretched to its limits. |
| |
| In 1985,
China implemented a "Massive Million Troop Drawdown" in its armed
forces. With this as a prelude, every major nation in the world carried
out round after round of force reductions over the next dozen or so years.
According to many commentators on military affairs, the main factor behind
the general worldwide force reductions is that, with the conclusion of the
Cold War, countries that formerly were pitted against each other are now
anxious to enjoy the peace dividend. Little do these commentators realize
that this factor is just the tip of the iceberg. |
| |
| The factors
leading to armed forces reductions are by no means limited to this point.
A deeper reason for the force reductions is that, as the wave of information
technology (IT) warfare ["xinxihua zhanzheng"] grows and grows,
it would require too much of an effort and would be too grandiose to set
up a large-scale professional military, cast and formed on the assembly
lines of big industry and established according to the demands of mechanized
warfare. Precisely for this reason, during these force reductions, some
farsighted countries, rather than primarily having personnel cuts in mind,
are instead putting more emphasis on raising the quality of military personnel,
increasing the amount of high technology and mid- level technology in weaponry,
and updating military thought and warfighting theory [see Endnote 4]. The
era of "strong and brave soldiers who are heroic defenders of the nation"
has already passed. In a world where even "nuclear warfare" will
perhaps become obsolete military jargon, it is likely that a pasty-faced
scholar wearing thick eyeglasses is better suited to be a modern soldier
than is a strong young lowbrow with bulging biceps. The best evidence of
this is perhaps a story that is circulating in Western military circles
regarding a lieutenant who used a modem to bring a naval division to its
knees [see Endnote 5]. The contrast between today's soldiers and the soldiers
of earlier generations is as plain to see as the contrast which we have
already noted between modern weapons and their precursors. This is because
modern soldiers have gone through the severe test of an uninterrupted technological
explosion throughout the entire 100 years of the twentieth century, and
perhaps also because of the salutary influence of the worldwide pop culture;
viz., rock and roll, discos, the World Cup, the NBA and Hollywood, etc.,
etc. The contrast is stark whether we are talking about physical ability
or intellectual ability. |
| |
| Even though
the new generation of soldiers born in the 70's and 80's has been trained
using the "beast barracks" style of training, popularized by West
Point Military Academy, it is difficult for them to shed their gentle and
frail natures rooted in the soil of contemporary society. In addition, modern
weapons systems have made it possible for them to be far removed from any
conventional battlefield, and they can attack the enemy from a place beyond
his range of vision where they need not come face to face with the dripping
blood that comes with killing. All of this has turned each and every soldier
into a self-effacing gentleman who would just as soon avoid the sight of
blood. The digital fighter is taking over the role formerly played by the
"blood and iron" warrior--a role that, for thousands of years,
has not been challenged. |
| |
| Now that
it has come on the stage of action and has rendered obsolete the traditional
divisions of labor prevailing in a society characterized by big industry,
warfare no longer is an exclusive imperial garden where professional soldiers
alone can mingle. A tendency towards civilianization has begun to become
evident [see Endnote 6]. Mao Zedong's theory concerning "every citizen
a soldier" has certainly not been in any way responsible for this tendency.
The current trend does not demand extensive mobilization of the people.
Quite the contrary, it merely indicates that a technological elite among
the citizenry have broken down the door and barged in uninvited, making
it impossible for professional soldiers with their concepts of professionalized
warfare to ignore challenges that are somewhat embarrassing. Who is most
likely to become the leading protagonist on the terra incognita of the next
war? The first challenger to have appeared, and the most famous, is the
computer "hacker." This chap, who generally has not received any
military training or been engaged in any military profession, can easily
impair the security of an army or a nation in a major way by simply relying
on his personal technical expertise. |
| |
| A classic
example is given in the U.S. FM100-6 Information Operations regulations.
In 1994, a computer hacker in England attacked the U.S. military's Rome
Air Development Center in New York State, compromising the security of 30
systems. He also hacked into more than 100 other systems. The Korea Atomic
Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and NASA suffered damage, among others.
What astounded people was not only the scale of those affected by the attack
and the magnitude of the damage, but also the fact that the hacker was actually
a teenager who was merely 16 years old. Naturally, an intrusion by a teenager
playing a game cannot be regarded as an act of war. The problem is, how
does one know for certain which damage is the result of games and which
damage is the result of warfare? Which acts are individual acts by citizens
and which acts represent hostile actions by non-professional warriors, or
perhaps even organized hacker warfare launched by a state? In 1994, there
were 230,000 security-related intrusions into U.S. DOD networks. How many
of these were organized destructive acts by non-professional warriors? Perhaps
there will never be any way of knowing [see Endnote 7]. |
| |
| Just as
there are all kinds of people in society, so hackers come in all shapes
and colors. All types of hackers, with varying backgrounds and values, are
hiding in the camouflage provided by networks: curious middle school students;
on-line gold diggers; corporate staff members nursing a grudge; dyed-in-the-wool
network terrorists; and network mercenaries. In their ideas and in their
actions, these kinds of people are poles apart from each other, but they
gather together in the same network world. They go about their business
in accordance with their own distinctive value judgments and their own ideas
of what makes sense, while some are simply confused and aimless. For these
reasons, whether they are doing good or doing ill, they do not feel bound
by the rules of the game that prevail in the society at large. Using computers,
they may obtain information by hook or by crook from other people's accounts.
They may delete someone else's precious data, that was obtained with such
difficulty, as a practical joke. Or, like the legendary lone knight-errant,
they may use their outstanding on-line technical skills to take on the evil
powers that be. The Suharto government imposed a strict blockade on news
about the organized aggressive actions against the ethnic Chinese living
in Indonesia. The aggressive actions were first made public on the Internet
by witnesses with a sense of justice. As a result, the whole world was utterly
shocked and the Indonesian government and military were pushed before the
bar of morality and justice. Prior to this, another group of hackers calling
themselves "Milworm" put on another fine performance on the Internet.
In order to protest India's nuclear tests, they penetrated the firewall
of the network belonging to India's [Bhabha] Atomic Research Center (BARC),
altered the home page, and downloaded 5 MB of data. These hackers could
actually be considered polite. They went only to a certain point and no
further, and did not give their adversary too much trouble. Aside from the
direct results of this kind of action, it also has a great deal of symbolic
significance: in the information age, the influence exerted by a nuclear
bomb is perhaps less than the influence exerted by a hacker. |
| |
| More murderous
than hackers--and more of a threat in the real world--are the non-state
organizations, whose very mention causes the Western world to shake in its
boots. These organizations, which all have a certain military flavor to
a greater or lesser degree, are generally driven by some extreme creed or
cause, such as: the Islamic organizations pursuing a holy war; the Caucasian
militias in the U.S.; the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult; and, most recently,
terrorist groups like Osama bin Ladin's, which blew up the U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania. The various and sundry monstrous and virtually insane
destructive acts by these kinds of groups are undoubtedly more likely to
be the new breeding ground for contemporary wars than is the behavior of
the lone ranger hacker. Moreover, when a nation state or national armed
force, (which adheres to certain rules and will only use limited force to
obtain a limited goal), faces off with one of these types of organizations,
(which never observe any rules and which are not afraid to fight an unlimited
war using unlimited means), it will often prove very difficult for the nation
state or national armed force to gain the upper hand. |
| |
| During
the 1990's, and concurrent with the series of military actions launched
by non-professional warriors and non-state organizations, we began to get
an inkling of a non-military type of war which is prosecuted by yet another
type of non-professional warrior. This person is not a hacker in the general
sense of the term, and also is not a member of a quasi-military organization.
Perhaps he or she is a systems analyst or a software engineer, or a financier
with a large amount of mobile capital or a stock speculator. He or she might
even perhaps be a media mogul who controls a wide variety of media, a famous
columnist or the host of a TV program. His or her philosophy of life is
different from that of certain blind and inhuman terrorists. Frequently,
he or she has a firmly held philosophy of life and his or her faith is by
no means inferior to Osama bin Ladin's in terms of its fanaticism. Moreover,
he or she does not lack the motivation or courage to enter a fight as necessary.
Judging by this kind of standard, who can say that George Soros is not a
financial terrorist? |
| |
| Precisely
in the same way that modern technology is changing weapons and the battlefield,
it is also at the same time blurring the concept of who the war participants
are. From now on, soldiers no longer have a monopoly on war. |
| |
| Global
terrorist activity is one of the by-products of the globalization trend
that has been ushered in by technological integration. Non-professional
warriors and non-state organizations are posing a greater and greater threat
to sovereign nations, making these warriors and organizations more and more
serious adversaries for every professional army. Compared to these adversaries,
professional armies are like gigantic dinosaurs which lack strength commensurate
to their size in this new age. Their adversaries, then, are rodents with
great powers of survival, which can use their sharp teeth to torment the
better part of the world. |
| |
| What
Means and Methods Are Used to Fight? |
| |
| There's
no getting around the opinions of the Americans when it comes to discussing
what means and methods will be used to fight future wars. This is not simply
because the U.S. is the latest lord of the mountain in the world. It is
more because the opinions of the Americans on this question really are superior
compared to the prevailing opinions among the military people of other nations.
The Americans have summed up the four main forms that warfighting will take
in the future as: 1) Information warfare; 2) Precision warfare [see Endnote
8]; 3) Joint operations [see Endnote 9]; and 4) Military operations other
than war (MOOTW) [see Endnote 10]. This last sentence is a mouthful. From
this sentence alone we can see the highly imaginative, and yet highly practical,
approach of the Americans, and we can also gain a sound understanding of
the warfare of the future as seen through the eyes of the Americans. Aside
from joint operations, which evolved from traditional cooperative operations
and coordinated operations, and even Air- Land operations, the other three
of the four forms of warfighting can all be considered products of new military
thinking. General Gordon R. Sullivan, the former Chief of Staff of the U.S.
Army, maintained that information warfare will be the basic form of warfighting
in future warfare. For this reason, he set up the best digitized force in
the U.S. military, and in the world. Moreover, he proposed the concept of
precision warfare, based on the perception that "there will be an overall
swing towards information processing and stealthy long-range attacks as
the main foundations of future warfare." For the Americans, the advent
of new, high-tech weaponry, such as precision-guided weapons, the Global
Positioning System (GPS), C4I systems and stealth airplanes, will possibly
allow soldiers to dispense with the nightmare of attrition warfare. |
| |
| Precision
warfare, which has been dubbed "non-contact attack" by the Americans,
and "remote combat" by the Russians [see Endnote 11], is characterized
by concealment, speed, accuracy, a high degree of effectiveness, and few
collateral casualties. In wars of the future, where the outcome will perhaps
be decided not long after the war starts, this type of tactic, which has
already showed some of its effectiveness in the Gulf War, will probably
be the method of choice that will be embraced most gladly by U.S. generals.
However, the phrase that really demonstrates some creative wording is not
"information warfare" or "precision warfare," but rather
the phrase "military operations other than war." This particular
concept is clearly based on the "world's interest," which the
Americans are constantly invoking, and the concept implies a rash overstepping
of its authority by the U.S.--a classic case of the American attitude that
"I am responsible for every place under the sun." Nevertheless,
such an assessment does not by any means stifle our praise of this concept
because, after all, for the first time it permits a variety of measures
that are needed to deal comprehensively with the problems of the 20th and
21st centuries to be put into this MOOTW box, so that soldiers are not likely
to be in the dark and at a loss in the world that lies beyond the battlefield.
Thus, the somewhat inferior "thought antennae" of the soldiers
will be allowed to bump up against the edges of a broader concept of war.
Such needed measures include peacekeeping, efforts to suppress illicit drugs,
riot suppression, military aid, arms control, disaster relief, the evacuation
of Chinese nationals residing abroad, and striking at terrorist activities.
Contact with this broader concept of war cannot but lessen the soldiers'
attachment to the MOOTW box itself. Ultimately, they will not be able to
put the brand new concept of "non-military war operations" into
the box. When this occurs, it will represent an understanding that has genuine
revolutionary significance in terms of mankind's perception of war. |
| |
| The difference
between the concepts of "non-military war operations" and "military
operations other than war" is far greater than a surface reading would
indicate and is by no means simply a matter of changing the order of some
words in a kind of word game. The latter concept, MOOTW, may be considered
simply an explicit label for missions and operations by armed forces that
are carried out when there is no state of war. The former concept, "non-military
war operations," extends our understanding of exactly what constitutes
a state of war to each and every field of human endeavor, far beyond what
can be embraced by the term "military operations." This type of
extension is the natural result of the fact that human beings will use every
conceivable means to achieve their goals. While it seems that the Americans
are in the lead in every field of military theory, they were not able to
take the lead in proposing this new concept of war. However, we cannot fail
to recognize that the flood of U.S.-style pragmatism around the world, and
the unlimited possibilities offered by new, high technology, were nevertheless
powerful forces behind the emergence of this concept. |
| |
| So, which
[of many kinds of unconventional] means, which seem totally unrelated to
war, will ultimately become the favored minions of this new type of war--"the
non-military war operation"--which is being waged with greater and
greater frequency all around the world? |
| |
| Trade
War: If one should note that, about a dozen years ago, "trade
war" was still simply a descriptive phrase, today it has really become
a tool in the hands of many countries for waging non-military warfare. It
can be used with particularly great skill in the hands of the Americans,
who have perfected it to a fine art. Some of the means used include: the
use of domestic trade law on the international stage; the arbitrary erection
and dismantling of tariff barriers; the use of hastily written trade sanctions;
the imposition of embargoes on exports of critical technologies; the use
of the Special Section 301 law; and the application of most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment, etc., etc. Any one of these means can have a destructive
effect that is equal to that of a military operation. The comprehensive
eight-year embargo against Iraq that was initiated by the U.S. is the most
classic textbook example in this regard. |
| |
| Financial
War: Now that Asians have experienced the financial crisis in Southeast
Asia, no one could be more affected by "financial war" than they
have been. No, they have not just been affected; they have simply been cut
to the very quick! A surprise financial war attack that was deliberately
planned and initiated by the owners of international mobile capital ultimately
served to pin one nation after another to the ground--nations that not long
ago were hailed as "little tigers" and "little dragons."
Economic prosperity that once excited the constant admiration of the Western
world changed to a depression, like the leaves of a tree that are blown
away in a single night by the autumn wind. After just one round of fighting,
the economies of a number of countries had fallen back ten years. What is
more, such a defeat on the economic front precipitates a near collapse of
the social and political order. The casualties resulting from the constant
chaos are no less than those resulting from a regional war, and the injury
done to the living social organism even exceeds the injury inflicted by
a regional war. Non-state organizations, in this their first war without
the use of military force, are using non-military means to engage sovereign
nations. Thus, financial war is a form of non-military warfare which is
just as terribly destructive as a bloody war, but in which no blood is actually
shed. Financial warfare has now officially come to war's center stage--a
stage that for thousands of years has been occupied only by soldiers and
weapons, with blood and death everywhere. We believe that before long, "financial
warfare" will undoubtedly be an entry in the various types of dictionaries
of official military jargon. Moreover, when people revise the history books
on twentieth-century warfare in the early 21st century, the section on financial
warfare will command the reader's utmost attention [see Endnote 12]. The
main protagonist in this section of the history book will not be a statesman
or a military strategist; rather, it will be George Soros. Of course, Soros
does not have an exclusive monopoly on using the financial weapon for fighting
wars. Before Soros, Helmut Kohl used the deutsche mark to breach the Berlin
Wall--a wall that no one had ever been able to knock down using artillery
shells [see Endnote 13]. After Soros began his activities, Li Denghui [Li
Teng-hui 2621 4098 6540] used the financial crisis in Southeast Asia to
devalue the New Taiwan dollar, so as to launch an attack on the Hong Kong
dollar and Hong Kong stocks, especially the "red-chip stocks."
[Translator's note: "red-chip stocks" refers to stocks of companies
listed on the Hong Kong stock market but controlled by mainland interests.]
In addition, we have yet to mention the crowd of large and small speculators
who have come en masse to this huge dinner party for money gluttons, including
Morgan Stanley and Moody's, which are famous for the credit rating reports
that they issue, and which point out promising targets of attack for the
benefit of the big fish in the financial world [see Endnote 14]. These two
companies are typical of those entities that participate indirectly in the
great feast and reap the benefits. |
| |
| In the
summer of 1998, after the fighting in the financial war had been going on
for a full year, the war's second round of battles began to unfold on an
even more extensive battlefield, and this round of battles continues to
this day. This time, it was not just the countries of Southeast Asia, (which
had suffered such a crushing defeat during the previous year), that were
drawn into the war. Two titans were also drawn in--Japan and Russia. This
resulted in making the global economic situation even more grim and difficult
to control. The blinding flames even set alight the fighting duds of those
who ventured to play with fire in the first place. It is reported that Soros
and his "Quantum Fund" lost not less than several billion dollars
in Russia and Hong Kong alone [see Endnote 15]. Thus we can get at least
an inkling of the magnitude of financial war's destructive power. Today,
when nuclear weapons have already become frightening mantlepiece decorations
that are losing their real operational value with each passing day, financial
war has become a "hyperstrategic" weapon that is attracting the
attention of the world. This is because financial war is easily manipulated
and allows for concealed actions, and is also highly destructive. By analyzing
the chaos in Albania not long ago, we can clearly see the role played by
various types of foundations that were set up by transnational groups and
millionaires with riches rivaling the wealth of nation states. These foundations
control the media, control subsidies to political organizations, and limit
any resistance from the authorities, resulting in a collapse of national
order and the downfall of the legally authorized government. Perhaps we
could dub this type of war "foundation-style" financial war. The
greater and greater frequency and intensity of this type of war, and the
fact that more and more countries and non-state organizations are deliberately
using it, are causes for concern and are facts that we must face squarely.
|
| |
| New
Terror War in Contrast to Traditional Terror War: Due to the limited
scale of a traditional terror war, its casualties might well be fewer than
the casualties resulting from a conventional war or campaign. Nevertheless,
a traditional terror war carries a stronger flavor of violence. Moreover,
in terms of its operations, a traditional terror war is never bound by any
of the traditional rules of the society at large. From a military standpoint,
then, the traditional terror war is characterized by the use of limited
resources to fight an unlimited war. This characteristic invariably puts
national forces in an extremely unfavorable position even before war breaks
out, since national forces must always conduct themselves according to certain
rules and therefore are only able to use their unlimited resources to fight
a limited war. This explains how a terrorist organization made up of just
a few inexperienced members who are still wet behind the ears can nevertheless
give a mighty country like the U.S. headaches, and also why "using
a sledgehammer to kill an ant" often proves ineffective. The most recent
proof is the case of the two explosions that occurred simultaneously at
the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The advent of bin Ladin-style
terrorism has deepened the impression that a national force, no matter how
powerful, will find it difficult to gain the upper hand in a game that has
no rules. Even if a country turns itself into a terrorist element, as the
Americans are now in the process of doing, it will not necessarily be able
to achieve success. |
| |
| Be that
as it may, if all terrorists confined their operations simply to the traditional
approach of bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and plane hijackings,
this would represent less than the maximum degree of terror. What really
strikes terror into people's hearts is the rendezvous of terrorists with
various types of new, high technologies that possibly will evolve into new
superweapons. We already have a hint of what the future may hold--a hint
that may well cause concern. When Aum Shinrikyo followers discharged "Sarin"
poison gas in a Tokyo subway, the casualties resulting from the poison gas
accounted for just a small portion of the terror. This affair put people
on notice that modern biochemical technology had already forged a lethal
weapon for those terrorists who would try to carry out the mass destruction
of humanity [see Endnote 16]. In contradistinction to masked killers that
rely on the indiscriminate slaughter of innocent people to produce terror,
the "Falange Armed Forces" [Changqiangdang Wuzhuang] group in
Italy is a completely different class of high-tech terrorist organization.
Its goals are explicit and the means that it employs are extraordinary.
It specializes in breaking into the computer networks of banks and news
organizations, stealing stored data, deleting programs, and disseminating
disinformation. These are classic terrorist operations directed against
networks and the media. This type of terrorist operation uses the latest
technology in the most current fields of study, and sets itself against
humanity as a whole. We might well call this type of operation "new
terror war." |
| |
| Ecological
War: Ecological war refers to a new type of non-military warfare
in which modern technology is employed to influence the natural state of
rivers, oceans, the crust of the earth, the polar ice sheets, the air circulating
in the atmosphere, and the ozone layer. By methods such as causing earthquakes
and altering precipitation patterns, the atmospheric temperature, the composition
of the atmosphere, sea level height, and sunshine patterns, the earth's
physical environment is damaged or an alternate local ecology is created.
Perhaps before very long, a man-made El Nino or La Nina effect will become
yet another kind of superweapon in the hands of certain nations and/or non-state
organizations. It is more likely that a non-state organization will become
the prime initiator of ecological war, because of its terrorist nature,
because it feels it has no responsibility to the people or to the society
at large, and because non-state organizations have consistently demonstrated
that they unwilling to play by the rules of the game. Moreover, since the
global ecological environment will frequently be on the borderline of catastrophe
as nations strive for the most rapid development possible, there is a real
danger that the slightest increase or decrease in any variable would be
enough to touch off an ecological holocaust. |
| |
| Aside from
what we have discussed above, we can point out a number of other means and
methods used to fight a non-military war, some of which already exist and
some of which may exist in the future. Such means and methods include psychological
warfare (spreading rumors to intimidate the enemy and break down his will);
smuggling warfare (throwing markets into confusion and attacking economic
order); media warfare (manipulating what people see and hear in order to
lead public opinion along); drug warfare (obtaining sudden and huge illicit
profits by spreading disaster in other countries); network warfare (venturing
out in secret and concealing one's identity in a type of warfare that is
virtually impossible to guard against); technological warfare (creating
monopolies by setting standards independently); fabrication warfare (presenting
a counterfeit appearance of real strength before the eyes of the enemy);
resources warfare (grabbing riches by plundering stores of resources); economic
aid warfare (bestowing favor in the open and contriving to control matters
in secret); cultural warfare (leading cultural trends along in order to
assimilate those with different views); and international law warfare (seizing
the earliest opportunity to set up regulations), etc., etc In addition,
there are other types of non-military warfare which are too numerous to
mention. In this age, when the plethora of new technologies can in turn
give rise to a plethora of new means and methods of fighting war, (not to
mention the cross-combining and creative use of these means and methods),
it would simply be senseless and a waste of effort to list all of the means
and methods one by one. What is significant is that all of these warfighting
means, along with their corresponding applications, that have entered, are
entering, or will enter, the ranks of warfighting means in the service of
war, have already begun to quietly change the view of warfare held by all
of mankind. Faced with a nearly infinitely diverse array of options to choose
from, why do people want to enmesh themselves in a web of their own making
and select and use means of warfare that are limited to the realm of the
force of arms and military power? Methods that are not characterized by
the use of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even
by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate
the successful realization of the war's goals, if not more so. As a matter
of course, this prospect has led to revision of the statement that "war
is politics with bloodshed," and in turn has also led to a change in
the hitherto set view that warfare prosecuted through force of arms is the
ultimate means of resolving conflict. Clearly, it is precisely the diversity
of the means employed that has enlarged the concept of warfare. Moreover,
the enlargement of the concept of warfare has, in turn, resulted in enlargement
of the realm of war-related activities. If we confine ourselves to warfare
in the narrow sense on the traditional battlefield now, it will very difficult
for us to regain our foothold in the future. Any war that breaks out tomorrow
or further down the road will be characterized by warfare in the broad sense--a
cocktail mixture of warfare prosecuted through the force of arms and warfare
that is prosecuted by means other than the force of arms. |
| |
| The goal
of this kind of warfare will encompass more than merely "using means
that involve the force of arms to force the enemy to accept one's own will."
Rather, the goal should be "to use all means whatsoever--means that
involve the force of arms and means that do not involve the force of arms,
means that involve military power and means that do not involve military
power, means that entail casualties and means that do not entail casualties--to
force the enemy to serve one's own interests." |
| |
| ENDNOTES
|
| |
1. For
more on the close relationship between Iraq and the U.S., the reader may
refer to Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint
Forces Commander, Junshi Yiwen [6511 0057 6146 2429] Publishing House,
p. 212. "Iraq had established extremely close relations with the
United States. Iraq had received weapons and valuable intelligence regarding
Iranian movements from the U.S., as well as U.S. military support for
attacks on Iran's navy."
2. An article by the then-U.S. Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin entitled "On the Sea Change in the Security Environment"
was published in the February, 1993, issue of The Officer magazine, (published
in the U.S.):
|
| |
| A Comparison
of The New and the Old Security Environments |
| |
| 1. In Regard
to the Geopolitical Environment |
| |
OLD
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT |
| |
Bipolar
(rigid)
Predictable Communism
U.S. the number one Western power
Permanent alliances
A paralyzed U.N. |
| |
NEW
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT |
| |
Multipolar
(complex)
Uncertain
Nationalism and religious extremism
U.S. only the number one military power
Temporary alliances
A dynamic U.N.
|
| |
| 2. In Regard
to Threats Faced by the U.S. |
| |
OLD
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT |
| |
Single
(Soviet)
Threat to U.S. survival
Clear
Deterrable
Europe-centered
High risk of escalation
Use of strategic nuclear weapons
Overt
|
| |
NEW
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT |
| |
Diverse
Threat to U.S. interests
Unclear
Non-deterrable
Other regions
Little risk of escalation
Terrorists using nuclear weapons
Covert
|
| |
| 3. In Regard
to the Use of Military Force |
| |
OLD
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT |
| |
Attrition
warfare
War by proxy
Reliance primarily on high technology
Forward deployed
Forward based
Host nation support |
| |
NEW
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT |
| |
Decisive
attacks on key targets
Direct reinforcement
Integrated use of high, medium and low
technology
Power projection
Home based
Reliance on own strength |
| |
| From the
table above, one can see the sensitivity of the Americans to the changes
in their security environment, and also the various types of forces and
factors that are constraining and influencing the formation of the world's
new setup since the conclusion of the Cold War. |
| |
| 3. "Technological
space" is a new concept that we are proposing in order to distinguish
this type of space from physical space. |
| |
| 4. According
to the U.S. Department of Defense National Defense Report for fiscal year
1998, the number of U.S. military personnel has been cut by 32% since 1989.
In addition, the U.S. retired a large amount of obsolete equipment, thus
actually increasing combat strength to some degree even while large reductions
in U.S. military personnel were being carried out. The U.S. DOD issued its
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) in May of 1997. The QDR emphasized "taking
the future into consideration and reforming the U.S. military." It
advocated continued personnel cuts and building the U.S. military in accordance
with new military affairs theories. However, it also advocated comparatively
greater expenditures for the purchase of equipment. |
| |
| 5. This
story first appeared in the British Sunday Telegraph. According to this
report, the U.S. military carried out a "Joint Warrior" exercise
from Sep 18 until Sep 25, 1995, in order to test the security of its national
defense electronics systems. During the exercise, an Air Force officer successfully
hacked into the naval command system, (see The Network is King by Hu Yong
[5170 3144] and Fan Haiyan [5400 3189 3601], Hainan Publishing House, pp.
258-259.) There are many similar stories, but there also are some military
experts who believe that these are cases of "throwing up a confusing
mist before someone's eyes." |
| |
| 6. In their
book War and Anti-War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler wrote: "If the tools
of warfare are no longer tanks and artillery, but rather computer viruses
and microrobots, then we can no longer say that nations are the only armed
groups or that soldiers are the only ones in possession of the tools of
war." In his article entitled "What the Revolution in Military
Affairs is Bringing--The Form War Will Take in 2020," a Colonel in
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces by the name of Shoichi Takama has noted
that the civilianization of war will be an important characteristic of 21st
century warfare. |
| |
| 7. Many
hackers are adopting a new tactic which might be styled "network guerrilla
warfare." |
| |
| 8. Precision
warfare is a new form of warfighting. It came about as a result of combining
increased weapons accuracy with increased battlefield transparency. (See
"From Gettysburg to the Gulf and Beyond," by Colonel Richard J.
Dunn III [McNair Paper 13, 1992], quoted in World Military Affairs Yearbook
for 1997, [1997 Nian Shijie Junshi Nianjian], published by the PLA in Chinese,
pp. 294-295.) |
| |
| 9. "Joint
Vision 2010," a document prepared by the [Chairman of the] U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff/Joint Staff. See Joint Force Quarterly, Summer 1996. |
| |
| 10. See
the U.S. Army's 1993 edition of Operations Essentials, [translator's note:
this probably refers to FM 100-5, "Operations," Department of
the Army, June, 1993]. Consult ARMY Magazine (U.S.), June, 1993. |
| |
| 11. After
his research on the Gulf War, the Russian tactical expert I.N. Vorobyev
pointed out that remote combat is a warfighting method that has great potential.
(Military Thought, in Russian, 1992, #11.) |
| |
| 12. There
was an article entitled "Financial Markets are the Biggest Threat to
Peace" in the August 23, 1998, issue of the Los Angeles Times. The
article noted: "At present, financial markets constitute the biggest
threat to world peace, not terrorist training camps." (See Reference
News [Cankao Xiaoxi], Beijing, September 7, 1998.) |
| |
| 13. Who
Has Joined the Fray?--Helmut Kohl, by Wang Jiannan [3769 0494 0589], China
Broadcasting Publishing House [in Chinese], 1997, pp. 275, 232, 357. |
| |
| 14. An
article entitled "A New York Corporation that Affects Economies"
in the July 29, 1998, issue of The Christian Science Monitor disclosed how
Moody's credit rating reports influence and even manipulate economic trends
in Italy, South Korea, Japan and Malaysia. See Reference News, August 20,
1998. |
| |
| 15. Soros
pours out all his bitterness in his book, The Crisis of Global Capitalism.
On the basis of a ghastly account of his investments in 1998, Soros analyzes
the lessons to be learned from this economic crisis. |
| |
| 16. Some
security experts in the U.S. have suggested to the government that it lay
up large stores of antidotes, in order to guard against a surprise chemical
attack by a terrorist organization. |
| |
|
| |
| Chapter
3: A Classic That Deviates From the Classics |
| |
‘Did
the special nature of the Gulf War...trigger 'a revolution in military
affairs' or not? This is ultimately a question of perspective.’
- Anthony H. Cordesman, Abraham R. Wagner. |
| |
| Compared
to any war in history, the Gulf War can be considered a major war. More
than 300 warships from six carrier groups, 4,000 aircraft, 12,000 tanks
and 12,000 armored vehicles, and nearly two million soldiers from more than
30 nations took part in the war. Of the 42-day war, 38 days were air strikes,
while the ground war lasted only 100 hours. The U.S.-led multinational force
crushed 42 Iraqi divisions, and the Iraqi forces suffered 30,000 casualties
and 80,000 prisoners; 3,847 tanks, 1,450 armored vehicles, and 2,917 artillery
pieces were destroyed, while the U.S. forces only lost 184 people, but incurred
the enormous cost of $61 billion. [1] |
| |
| Perhaps
because victory was achieved so easily, to this day there are very few people
in Uncle Sam's wildly jubilant group that have accurately evaluated the
significance of the war. Some hotheads used this to ceaselessly fabricate
the myth that the United States was invincible, while some who could still
be considered cool-headed -- most of whom were commentators and generals
unable to take part in ‘Desert Storm’ in a complex and subtle
frame of mind -- believed that ‘Desert Storm’ was not a typical
war [2] and that a war conducted under such ideal conditions cannot serve
as a model. When one listens to such talk it smacks somewhat of sour grapes.
Actually, viewed from a traditional perspective, ‘Desert Storm’
was not a classic war in the typical sense but [since it was a war conducted
just as the greatest revolution in military affairs in the history of man
to date was arriving it cannot be measured with traditional or even outmoded
standards. At a time when new warfare required a new classic, the U.S.-led
allied forces created it right on time in the Gulf, and only those who were
fettered by the old conventions could not see its classic significance for
future warfare. This is because the classics for future warfare can only
be born by departing from traditional models. We have no intention of helping
the Americans create a myth, but when ‘Desert Storm’ unfolded
and concluded for all to see, with its many combatant countries, enormous
scale, short duration, small number of casualties, and glorious results
startling the whole world, who could say that a classic war heralding the
arrival of warfare in the age of technical integration-globalization had
not opened wide the main front door to the mysterious and strange history
of warfare - even though it was still just a classic created by U.S. technology
and the U.S. style of fighting? |
| |
| When we
attempt to use wars that have already occurred to discuss what constitutes
war in the age of technical integration-globalization, only ‘Desert
Storm’ can provide ready-made examples. At present, in any sense it
is still not just the only [example], but the classic [example], and therefore
it is the only apple that is worthy of our close analysis [the author returns
to the analysis of analyzing an apple later in the chapter]. |
| |
| The
‘Overnight’ Alliance |
| |
| From Saddam's
perspective, annexing Kuwait seemed more like a household matter in the
extended Arab family compared to the taking of American hostages during
the Iranian revolution, and besides, he had given notice ahead of time.
However, he overlooked the differences between the two. When Iran took the
hostages, it was certainly a slap in the Americans' face, but Iraq had seized
the entire West by the throat. Lifelines are naturally more important than
face, and the United States had no choice but to take it seriously, while
other countries which felt threatened by Iraq also had to take it seriously.
In their alliance with the United States, what most of the Arab countries
had in mind was rooting out the Islamic heresy represented by Saddam to
keep him from damaging their own interests were he to grow stronger unopposed,
and it is very difficult to really say that they wanted to extend justice
to Kuwait. [3] |
| |
| The common
concerns about their interests enabled the United States to weave an allied
network to catch Iraq very quickly. The Western powers are already thoroughly
familiar with modern international political skills, and the anti-Iraq alliance
was assembled under the United Nations banner. The halo of justice successfully
dispelled the Arab people's religious complex, so that Saddam was playing
the role of a modern-day Saladin, whose plan to launch a ‘holy war’
against the Christians fell through. Numerous countries volunteered to be
responsible nodes in this alliance network. Although they were unwilling,
Germany and Japan finally seemed actually happy to open their purses, and
what was more important than providing money was that neither of them lost
the opportunity to send their own military personnel, thereby taking a stealthy
and symbolic step toward again becoming global powers. Egypt persuaded Libya
and Jordan to be neutral in the war and no longer support Iraq, so that
Saddam became thoroughly isolated. Even Gorbachev, who wanted to get the
Americans' support for his weak position domestically, ultimately tacitly
recognized the military strikes of the multinational forces against his
old ally. |
| |
| The common
concerns about their interests enabled the United States to weave an allied
network to catch Iraq very quickly. The Western powers are already thoroughly
familiar with modern international political skills, and the anti-Iraq alliance
was assembled under the United Nations banner. The halo of justice successfully
dispelled the Arab people's religious complex, so that Saddam was playing
the role of a modern-day Saladin, whose plan to launch a ‘holy war’
against the Christians fell through. Numerous countries volunteered to be
responsible nodes in this alliance network. Although they were unwilling,
Germany and Japan finally seemed actually happy to open their purses, and
what was more important than providing money was that neither of them lost
the opportunity to send their own military personnel, thereby taking a stealthy
and symbolic step toward again becoming global powers. Egypt persuaded Libya
and Jordan to be neutral in the war and no longer support Iraq, so that
Saddam became thoroughly isolated. Even Gorbachev, who wanted to get the
Americans' support for his weak position domestically, ultimately tacitly
recognized the military strikes of the multinational forces against his
old ally. |
| |
| Even powers
such as the United States must similarly rely on the support of its allies,
and this support was primarily manifested in providing legitimacy for its
actions and in logistical support, not in adding so many troops. The reason
that President Bush's policies were able to get widespread approval from
the American public was to a great extent due to the fact that he had established
an international alliance, thereby getting the people to believe that this
was not a case of pulling someone else's chestnuts out of the fire, and
it was not just the Americans who were funding the war and preparing to
have their blood spilled. They went so far as to send the VII Corps from
Germany to Saudi Arabia, mobilizing 465 trains, 312 barges, and 119 fleets
from four NATO countries. At the same time, Japan also provided the electronics
parts urgently needed by U.S. military equipment, and this further demonstrated
the increasing reliance of the United States on its allies. In the new age,
‘going it alone’ is not only unwise, it is also not a realistic
option. [4] For example, the alliance formed a kind of common need. From
the Security Council's Resolution 660 calling for Iraq to withdraw from
Kuwait to Resolution 678 which authorized the member countries to take any
actions, international society broadly identified itself with the alliance
which was temporarily cobbled together. One hundred and ten countries took
part in the embargo against Iraq, and more than 30 countries took part in
the use of force, including numerous Arab countries! Obviously, every country
had fully estimated where its interests were prior to this action. |
| |
| The full-scale
intervention of the United Nations was not sufficient to make it possible
for this fragile and dew-laden spider-web like alliance, which was formed
in a very short period of time, to easily withstand the impact of a war.
It can be said that, as far as the politicians were concerned, the alliance
was only a single high-level meeting following a careful weighing of interests,
a single contract signing, or even a verbal promise via a hot-line. However,
for the troops carrying out the allied warfare, no detail could be overlooked.
To avoid having U.S. soldiers violate Muslim commandments, in addition to
stipulating that they must abide strictly by the customs of the country
in which they were stationed, the U.S. military even leased a ‘Cunard
Princess’ yacht and anchored it at sea to provide Western-style amusements
for the U.S troops. |
| |
| To prevent
the Israelis from retaliating against the ‘Scud’ missile attacks
and throwing the camp which was assaulting Iraq into disorder, the United
States made a tremendous effort to provide the Israelis with air support,
taking great pains to look after the alliance network. |
| |
| More profoundly,
the appearance of the ‘overnight’ alliance brought an era to
a close. That is, the age of fixed-form alliances which had begun with the
signing of the military alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary in
1879. Following the Cold War, the period in which alliances were formed
on the basis of ideology faded away, while the approach in which alliances
are built on interests rose to primacy. Under the general banner of realpolitik,
in which national interests are paramount, any alliance can only be focused
more nakedly on interests, and at times they don't even feel like raising
the banner of morality. Without a doubt, the alliance phenomenon will continue
to exist, but in more cases they will be loose and short-term interest coalitions.
Which is also to say that there will no longer be any alliances where only
morality, not interests, are involved. Different periods have different
interests and goals, and that will be what determines whether there are
alliances or not. Increasingly pragmatic and unconstrained by any moral
fetters, this is the characteristic feature of modern alliances. All forces
are united by a network of interests, and they may be very short-lived but
extremely effective. The interest relationships of modern states, as well
as among trans-national organizations and even among regional forces have
thus begun to be increasingly transitory. As the rock and roll singer Cui
Jian sings, ‘It's not that I don't understand, it is that this world
is rapidly changing.’ Today's mode of ever-changing combinations of
force, along with the age of ever-changing technological integration and
globalization, has given rise to certain tacit alliances which are by no
means fortuitous. Therefore, the ‘overnight’ alliance that was
formed by the Gulf War formally opened the curtain to a new alliance era.
|
| |
| Timely
‘Reorganization Act’ |
| |
| The supercilious
Americans often engage in actions which cause them to reflect on their mistakes,
and this disposition, which would seem to be a contradiction, time and again
amazes those who want to witness the presumptuous Americans suffering. At
the same time it also enables the Americans to time and again reap considerable
benefits. It truly seems as if the Americans are always able to find the
key to open the door of the next military action among the lessons of each
military action. Struggles between the views and interests of factions in
the armed services have been around for a long time, and this is so in every
country. The competition by the various armed services in the U.S. military
to protect their own interests and strive for glory is well known to all,
and they are not equaled in this respect. In this regard, what leaves a
particular deep impression is that sixty years ago in combat with Japan,
to emphasize the roles of their own service arms, MacArthur and Nimitz each
came up with a Pacific strategy. |
| |
| Even President
Roosevelt, who was circumspect and farsighted, had trouble balancing between
the two. Another thing that demonstrates this point is that the U.S. aircraft
which bombed Vietnam 30 years ago actually had to listen to commands from
four different headquarters at the same time, which is truly hard to believe.
Up until about 15 years ago, there were separate and independent command
systems and it was not clear who was in authority, and this had disastrous
consequences for U.S. troops stationed in Beirut, as it led directly to
approximately 200 Marines losing their lives. However, even after he was
made commander-in-chief of the allied forces during ‘Desert Storm,’
the problem that was exposed in Grenada was still fresh in the memory of
General Norman Schwarzkopf. When he was deputy commander of the joint task
force during the ‘Grenada’ action, each of the service arms
of the U.S. forces taking part in the action went its own way. The question
[raised by this action] was, during joint operations, just who listens to
whose commands? |
| |
| It is somewhat
ironic that this problem, which had troubled the U.S military for several
decades, was not overcome by generals who had experienced extensive combat
or experts who were steeped in statecraft, but was resolved by two congressmen
named Goldwater and Nichols. The ‘DOD Reorganization Act’ [5]
proposed by these two which was passed by Congress in 1986, used the legislative
approach to resolve the problem of unified command of the various armed
services during joint combat. |
| |
| Next, there
were issues left over which required a war. Neither too soon nor too late
but just at this time, Saddam foolishly launched his invasion of Kuwait
and this was simply a heaven-sent opportunity for the Americans who were
anxious to test whether or not the ‘Reorganization Act’ would
work. In that sense, rather than saying that the ‘Reorganization Act’
was timely, it would be better to say that the arrival of the Gulf War was
timely. |
| |
| Powell
and Schwarzkopf were the lucky earliest beneficiaries of the ‘Reorganization
Act’ and at the same time they also became the two most powerful generals
in the history of American warfare. As the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS), Powell for the first time had clearly attained the position
of the President's chief military adviser, which enabled him to take orders
directly from the President and the Secretary of Defense, as well as issue
orders to the three services based on that; and he no longer had to serve
as the coordinator for the endless wrangling that took place among the chiefs
of staff of the armed services. As the battlefield commander, Schwarzkopf
was spared the nagging and held the real power in his hands. As for the
incessant chatter coming from the Pentagon, he was free to choose what to
listen to and to do what he wanted to do with the air of a general who is
outside the country and somewhat beyond the command of the monarch, while
the great army swarming over the Gulf, as well as the satellites in space
and the frogmen under the water, all the way to each roll-on roll-off ship,
had to submit to his orders. This made it possible for him to exercise the
trans-service authority granted to the commander of the joint headquarters
by the ‘DOD Reorganization Act’ without any hesitation when
necessary. For example, when the front line Marine commanders urgently requested
to carry out an amphibious landing on the shores of Kuwait, he looked at
the overall situation and resolutely exercised his veto power, continuing
to concentrate on operation ‘Left Hook,’ the well thought-out
plan he had from the start. |
| |
| That a
law which had not been in effect for five years could be implemented so
thoroughly in a war that came along at the same time must be attributed
to the contractual mentality of the people in the legal society represented
by the United States. Furthermore, the new pattern of command which was
derived from this became the most successful and fitting application of
military command since the services were divided. Its direct result was
to reduce the levels of command, implementing true entrusted command and
causing the old deeply-rooted tree-structure command system to start to
evolve toward a network structure; and a side effect of this evolution was
to enable more combat units to share first-time battlefield information.
|
| |
| If the
‘Reorganization Act’ is considered against the wider backdrop
of the age, it is not difficult to discover that this reorganization of
the U.S. military was by no means a chance coincidence, but was timely and
in conformity with the natural demands the new age posed for the old military
command relations, that is, by recombining the service arm authority which
was originally dispersed, then on that basis generating a super-authority
that overrode the authority of all the service arms and which was concentrated
on certain temporary goals, it became possible to be more than equal to
the task in any battlefield contest. The emergence of the ‘Reorganization
Act’ in the United States and the effects it produced in the U.S.
military are food for thought, and any country which hopes to win a war
in the 21st century must inevitably face the option of either ‘reorganizing’
or being defeated. There is no other way. |
| |
| Going
Further Than Air-Land Battle |
| |
| ‘Air-land
battle’ was originally a strategy devised by the U.S. military to
stymie the enemy when dealing with the masses of Warsaw Pact tanks that
could come pouring out like a flood at any time onto the plains of Europe,
but the military suffered from never having a chance to show what it could
do. The Gulf War provided a stage for a full performance by those in the
U.S. military, who were full of creativity and bloodlust, but the actual
battlefield conditions were quite a bit different from what people had envisioned
beforehand. ‘Desert Storm’ was basically an ‘all-air,’
no-’ground’ campaign that lasted several dozen days, and they
barely got to use ‘Desert Sword,’ which was displayed at the
last moment, including that beautiful ‘left hook,’ for only
100 hours before wrapping things up in a huff. The ground war did not become
the next-to-last item on the program as hoped for by the Army, but was like
a concerto which winds up hastily after the first movement is played. [6]
Douhet's prediction that ‘the battlefield in the air will be the decisive
one’ seems to have achieved belated confirmation. However, everything
that happened in the air over the Gulf far exceeded the imagination of this
proponent of achieving victory through the air. Whether in Kuwait or Iraq,
none of the air combat involved gallant duels for air supremacy, but represented
an integrated air campaign that blended all the combat operations, such
as reconnaissance, early-warning, bombing, dogfights, communications, electronic
strikes, and command and control, etc., together, and it also included the
struggle for and occupation of outer space and cyberspace. |
| |
| At this
point, the Americans who proposed the ‘Air-land battle’ concept
have already gone quite a bit further than Douhet, but even so, they will
still have to wait several years before they understand that, once they
resort to the theory of integrated operations in real combat, the scope
will go far beyond what they initially envisioned, extending over a broad
and all-inclusive range that covers the ground, sea, air, space, and cyber
realms. Although it will still require some time to assimilate the results
of the Gulf War, it is already destined to become the starting point for
the theory of ‘omni-dimensional’ combat proposed by the elite
of the U.S Army when they suddenly woke up. |
| |
| The interesting
thing is that, while one may believe that the Americans' insight came somewhat
late, this actually had no effect on their early acquisition of the key
to ‘omni-dimensional combat.’ This is the famous ‘air
tasking order.’ [7] The ‘air tasking order,’ which ran
up to 300 pages every day, was drafted jointly by the Army, the Navy, and
the Air Force and enabled Schwarzkopf, the supreme commander of the allied
forces who was from the Army himself, to issue commands to the entire allied
air force. It was the soul of the air campaign, and every day selected the
optimum strike targets for all the aircraft in keeping with the overall
operational strike plan. Everyday upwards of 1000 aircraft took off from
the Arabian Peninsula, Spain, England, and Turkey and, in keeping with the
computer-processed ‘air tasking order,’ launched trans-service,
trans-border, precise and coordinated air strikes. Although in the eyes
of the Navy this command program was overly ‘Air Force-oriented’
-- and because of this they even took the petty approach of stealthily keeping
behind some of their aircraft so they could be put to good use when an opportunity
for the Navy to shine presented itself (even though it never came) -- ultimately
this program successfully organized the most massive and most complex air
campaign in the history of warfare. |
| |
| Not only
that, but the ‘air tasking order’ also provided a model for
a kind of organizational command for all subsequent combat operations. One
‘order’ represented an optimal scheme for combining the combat
forces among the service arms, and the complexity and success of its trans-national
combinations was where it really shone. In this respect alone, it was already
far beyond the range of what was envisioned by the architects of the ‘Air-land
battle’ theory. This is to say that the U.S. soldiers unintentionally
ushered the God of War into an open area in which she had never set foot.
|
| |
|
Who is the King of Land Warfare? |
| |
| Isoroku
Yamamoto was doubtless the most innovative and ‘extraordinarily talented’
military man of his age, and the use of aircraft carriers in the sneak attack
on Pearl Harbor and the great victory he achieved represent the stroke of
genius he left on the history of naval combat. What is hard to understand
is that the same Yamamoto actually was unable to grasp the epoch-making
significance of his own creative tactics. After commanding the combined
fleet in dealing a severe blow to the U.S. Navy, he still held to the belief
that only battleships were the main decisive force at sea, once again throwing
the key that would open the door to victory and that was already in his
grasp back into the vast waves of the Pacific ocean. While the first person
to make a mistake can still be an object of pity, the second person to make
the same mistake is simply incredibly stupid, particularly those people
who make mistakes which have already been made but which they are just unable
to anticipate. What is regrettable is that in the history of war there are
frequent examples like this in which thinking lags behind acting. Just as
with Isoroku Yamamoto at that time, although the U.S. Army used helicopters
to smash the Iraqi armored and mechanized units, once the gunsmoke in the
Gulf cleared it inexplicably reverted to its pre-war level of thinking,
shunting aside the helicopters which by all rights should have been the
new favorites in the war. It is said that during the entire ground war,
other than one desperate fight put up by the ‘Medina’ armored
division of the Republican Guard when it was surrounded south of Basra by
the U.S. VII Corps, there was hardly any tank warfare worthy of the name.
However, the Americans, who had clearly already used helicopters to inaugurate
a new age in ground warfare, [proceeded to] increase development outlays
for other weapons, including tanks, while appropriations for helicopters
was the only thing cut back. Sticking to their outmoded ways, they are still
treating tanks as the decisive weapon in future ground warfare. [8] |
| |
| Actually,
as early as the Vietnam war, helicopters had begun to display their abilities
in the hands of the Americans, and soon afterward, the Soviet Union let
helicopters show their exceptional skills in the hilly regions of Afghanistan,
as did the British in the Falkland Islands. |
| |
| However,
because their opponents were mainly guerrillas and non-armored infantry,
it delayed the challenge that helicopters would pose to tanks a full 20
years. The Gulf War finally gave helicopters an opportunity to show what
they could do. This time, not counting the helicopter units of the allied
forces, the U.S. military alone deployed 1,600 helicopters of various models
to the Gulf, and this enormous group of helicopters was sufficient to form
one complete helicopter army. However, at this time the Americans, who had
all along boasted of their innovative spirit, showed no originality at all,
but just like the French who in World War II dispersed their tanks and assigned
them to the infantry, they had the helicopters serve as a force attached
to the armored and mechanized units and other troops. Fortunately, the helicopters,
which were destined to establish their name in this war, did not allow this
to mask their royal demeanor. |
| |
| Just as
the Americans were praising the ‘Patriot’, the F-117, the ‘Tomahawk’
missiles, and other battlefield stars to the skies via CNN, the helicopters
were unfairly given the cold shoulder (with just the ‘Apache,’
which was a favorite, getting passing marks). Other than the ‘Final
Report to Congress’ written by the Department of Defense after the
war, very few people still recall that it was the helicopters, not some
of the other favorite new weapons, that performed first-rate service in
‘Desert Storm.’ In the 20 minutes preceding the start of the
continuous bombing, which lasted more than a month, following a ground-hugging
flight of several hours, the MH-53J and AH-64 helicopters used ‘Hellfire’
missiles to carry out advance destruction of Iraqi early-warning radar,
opening a safe passage for the bomber groups and showing the incomparable
penetration capabilities of helicopters. As the most flexible flying platform
on the battlefield, they also undertook a large number of the supply transport,
medical evacuation, search and rescue, battlefield reconnaissance, and electronic
countermeasures missions, etc., and during the battle of Khafji, the main
force which rapidly checked the Iraqi offensive and finally drove back the
Iraqi military was again helicopters. During the war, the thing which truly
left a deep impression and demonstrated the deep potential of the helicopters
was ‘Operation Cobra.’ The 101st [Airborne] Division used more
than 300 helicopters to perform the single most far-reaching ‘leapfrog’
operation in the history of war, establishing the ‘Cobra’ forward
operations base more than 100 kilometers inside Iraq. Subsequently they
relied on the base in cutting off the only escape route for the Iraqi military
scattered behind the Euphrates River valley, as well as intercepting the
Iraqi troops fleeing along the Hamal [as published] dike road. This was
definitely the most deeply significant tactical operation of the ground
war during the war. It proclaimed that, from this point, helicopters were
perfectly capable of conducting large-scale operations independently. |
| |
| When the
throngs of Iraqi soldiers ran from the fortifications destroyed by the helicopters
and knelt to beg to surrender, they were in turn herded into a group by
the helicopters just like a cattle drive on the Western plains, and the
view that ‘only the infantry can ultimately resolve a battle’
has now been radically shaken by these American ‘flying cowboys.’
Originally, however, the initial intent of the leapfrog operation by the
helicopters was just to provide support for the armored units that were
to handle the main offensive, but the unexpected success of the helicopter
units caused the plan to fall far behind the developments in the battle
situation. |
| |
| Because
of this, Schwarzkopf had to order the VII Corps to attack 15 hours ahead
of time, and although under the command of General Franks the speed of the
advance of the VII Corps through the desert was far faster than that of
Gudarian, who became famous at the time for launching tank blitzkriegs,
he [Franks] did not win the good ‘blitzkrieg’ reputation that
the previous generation did, but actually was rebuked for ‘moving
forward slowly, one step at a time, like an old lady.’ Following the
war, General Franks refuted the criticism that came from the allied headquarters
in Riyadh, based on the reason that the Iraqi military still had fighting
capabilities. [9] In reality, however, neither the critics nor those who
refuted them had grasped the essence of the problem. The reason that the
mobility of the tanks under General Franks' command was criticized was precisely
because of the comparison with the helicopters. To this day, there has still
been no example of combat which has demonstrated that any kind of tanks
can keep up with the combat pace of helicopters. |
| |
| Actually,
this did not just involve mobility. As the former ‘kings of land warfare,’
the tanks are being challenged by the helicopters on all fronts. Compared
to the tanks, which have to constantly labor to overcome the coefficient
of friction of the earth's surface, the helicopters' battlespace is at treetop
level, so they are totally unaffected by any surface obstacles and their
excellent mobility is sufficient to cancel out the flaw of not having heavy
armor. Similarly, as mobile weapons platforms, their firepower is by no
means inferior to that of the tanks, and this represents the greatest crisis
encountered by tanks since they ascended the stage of warfare with the nickname
of ‘tanks.’ What is even tougher for the tanks is the energy
required to organize a sizable tank group assault (transporting a given
number of tanks to a staging area alone is a massive headache) and the risks
one runs (when tanks are massed, they are extremely vulnerable to preemptive
strikes by the enemy), so they really have no advantages to speak of when
compared to helicopters, which are good at dispersed deployment and concentrated
strikes, and which can be massed to engage in conventional warfare or dispersed
to fight guerrilla warfare. In fact, tanks and helicopters are natural enemies,
but the former is far from a match for the latter, and even the outmoded
AH-1 ‘Cobra’ helicopters, not to mention the AH-64 ‘tank-killer’
helicopters, destroyed upwards of 100 tanks during the Gulf War while sustaining
no casualties at all of their own. Faced with the powerful strike capabilities
of the helicopters, who can still maintain that ‘the best weapon to
deal with tanks are tanks?’ [10] |
| |
| We can
now say that helicopters are the true tank terminators. This new star, which
rose gradually over the waves of the Gulf, is in the process of achieving
its own coronation through the illustrious battle achievements during the
Gulf War, and there is no doubt that it is just a question of time before
it drives the tank from the battlefield. It may not take very long before
‘winning a land battle from the air’ is no longer an over-dramatized
slogan, and more and more ground force commanders are reaching a consensus
on this point. Furthermore, the new concepts of a ‘flying army’
and ‘flying ground warfare’ in which the helicopter is the main
battle weapon may become standard military jargon and appear in every military
dictionary. |
| |
| Another
Player Hidden Behind the Victory |
| |
| Leaving
aside the point that as commander in chief of the three services Bush certainly
knew the time the attack was to begin, when viewed simply in terms of the
CNN television broadcasts, the whole world was the same as the U.S. president
in that they saw at the same time the soul-stirring start of the war. In
the information-sharing age, a president doesn't really have much more in
the way of special privileges than an ordinary citizen. This is where modern
warfare differs from any wars of the past, with real-time or near real-time
reports turning warfare into a new program that ordinary people can monitor
directly via the media, and thus the media has become an immediate and integral
part of warfare, and no longer merely provides information coming from the
battlefield. |
| |
| Unlike
a direct broadcast of a World Cup soccer match, everything that people saw,
other than that which was first limited by the subjective perspective of
the television reporters (the 1300 reporters sent to the front lines were
all aware of the ‘Revised Regulations Regarding Gulf War News Reports’
that had just been issued by the Pentagon, so each person in his own mind
exercised restraint about what could and could not be reported), also had
to go through the security reviews at the joint news offices set up in Dhahran
and Riyadh. Perhaps U.S. military circles and the media had both learned
the lesson during the Vietnam war when the discord between the two was so
great, but this time the news agencies and the military got along very well.
There is one figure that perhaps can illustrate this issue very well. Of
the more than 1300 news items released throughout the entire period of the
war, only five were sent to Washington for review, and of these four received
approval within several hours, while the remaining item was canceled by
the press unit itself. With the concerted assistance of the news reporters,
the battlefield commanders successfully influenced the eyes and ears of
the entire world, getting people to see everything that the military wanted
them to see, while no one was able to see anything that they did not want
people to know. The U.S. press uniformly abandoned its vaunted neutrality,
enthusiastically joining the anti-Iraq camp and coordinating with the U.S.
military just like an outstanding two-man comic act, quite tacitly and energetically
arriving at the same script for the war, with the force of the media and
that of the allied army forming a joint force regarding the attack on Iraq.
[11] Not long after Iraq invaded Kuwait, reports quickly appeared in the
various media that a massive U.S. force was streaming into Saudi Arabia,
causing the Iraqi military on the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border to flinch and
quietly creating the momentum for a ‘hobbling’ operation. The
day before the start of ‘Desert Storm,’ the Western media again
trumpeted the news of a U.S. carrier fleet passing through the Suez Canal,
which served to confuse Saddam and have him believe that, with disaster
looming, the U.S. forces had still not completed their deployment. Similarly,
without the support of the embellishment by the media, none of the so-called
high-tech weapons sent to be used in the Gulf War would have been as awesome
as people believed. In the upwards of 98 press conferences held throughout
the entire course of the war, people saw images of how the precision-guided
missiles could penetrate the air vents in a building and explode, of ‘Patriots’
intercepting ‘Scuds,’ and numerous other shots that left a profound
impression. All these things represented an intense visual shock to the
entire world, including the Iraqis, and it was from this that the myth about
the unusual powers of the U.S.-made weapons was born, and it was here that
the belief was formed that ‘Iraq would inevitably lose, and the U.S.
was bound to win.’ Obviously, the media helped the Americans enormously.
We might as well say that, intentionally or otherwise, the U.S. military
and the Western media joined hands to form a noose to hang Saddam's Iraq
from the gallows. In the ‘Operational Outline’ that was revised
after the war, the Americans took pains to suggest that ‘the force
of the media reports was able to have a dramatic effect on the strategic
direction and the scope of the military operations,’ while the newly-drafted
field manual FM100-6 (Information Operations) goes even farther in using
the example of the media war during the Gulf War. It would appear that,
in all future wars, in addition to the basic method of military strikes,
the force of the media will increasingly be another player in the war and
will play a role comparable to that of military strikes in promoting the
course of the war. |
| |
| Unlike
battlefield propaganda, which has an excessively subjective tinge and is
easily rejected by an opponent or neutral individuals, because it is cleverly
cloaked as objective reporting the media has a quiet impact that is hard
to gauge. In the Gulf, in the same manner that the U.S.-led allied forces
deprived Iraq of its right to speak militarily, the powerful Western media
deprived it politically of its right to speak, to defend itself, and even
of its right to sympathy and support, and compared to the weak voice of
Iraqi propaganda, which portrayed Bush as the ‘great Satan’
who was wicked beyond redemption, the image of Saddam as a war-crazed aggressor
was played up in a much more convincing fashion. It was precisely the lopsided
media force together with the lopsided military force that dealt a vicious
one-two blow to Iraq on the battlefield and morally, and this sealed Saddam's
defeat. |
| |
| However,
the effects of the media have always been a two-edged sword. This means
that, while it is directed at the enemy, at the same time on another front
it can similarly be a sharp sword directed at oneself. Based on information
that was disclosed following the war, the reason that the ground war abruptly
came to a halt after 100 hours was actually because Bush, influenced by
a hasty assessment of the course of the war that was issued on television
by a battlefield news release officer, later came to a similarly hasty decision
of his own, ‘dramatically shortening the time from strategic decision-making
to concluding the war.’ [12] As a result, Saddam, whose days were
numbered, escaped certain death, and it also left a string of ‘desert
thunder’ operations, which were ultimately duds, for Clinton, who
came to power later. The impact of the media on warfare is becoming increasingly
widespread and increasingly direct, to the point where even major decisions
by the president of a superpower such as this one involving the cessation
of hostilities are to a very great extent rooted in the reaction to a single
television program. From this, one can perceive a bit of the significance
that the media carries in social life today. One can say entirely without
exaggeration that an uncrowned king has now become the major force to win
any battle. After ‘Desert Storm’ swept over the Gulf, no longer
would it be possible to rely on military force alone without the involvement
of the media to achieve victory in a war. |
| |
| An
Apple With Numerous Sections |
| |
| As a war
characterized by the integration of technology that concluded the old era
and inaugurated the new one, ‘Desert Storm’ is a classic war
that can provide all-encompassing inspiration to those in the military in
every country. Any person who enjoys delving into military issues can invariably
draw some enlightenment or lessons from this war, regardless of which corner
of the war one focuses on. Based on that, we are terming this war, which
has multiple meanings with regard to its experiences and lessons, a multi-section
apple. Furthermore, the sectional views of this apple are far from being
limited to those that we have already discussed, and it is only necessary
for one to approach it with a well-honed intellect to have an unexpected
sectional view appear before one's eyes at any moment: |
| |
| When President
Bush spoke with righteous indignation to the United States and the whole
world about the moral responsibility being undertaken for Kuwait, no responsible
economist could have predicted that, to provide for the military outlays
of this war, the United States would propose a typical A-A ‘shared
responsibility’ program, thereby launching a new form for sharing
the costs of international war -- fighting together and splitting the bill.
Even if you aren't a businessman, you have to admire this kind of Wall Street
spirit. [13] |
| |
| Psychological
warfare is really not a new tactic, but what was novel about the psychological
warfare in ‘Desert Storm’ was its creativity. After dropping
an extremely powerful bomb, they would then have the airplanes drop propaganda
leaflets, warning the Iraqi soldiers several kilometers away who were quaking
in their boots from the bombing that the next bomb would be their turn!
This move alone was sufficient to cause the Iraqi units which were organized
in divisions to collapse. In the prisoner of war camp, one Iraqi division
commander admitted that the impact of the psychological war on Iraqi morale
was second only to the bombing by the allied forces. [14] |
| |
| When the
war began, the A-10 was viewed by the Americans as an outmoded ground attack
aircraft, but after forming what was dubbed a ‘lethal union’
with the ‘Apache’ helicopter, by eliminating Iraqi tanks on
a large scale it staved off its own elimination, reaching the point where
it became one of the myriad dazzling stars in the air over the Gulf. By
matching a weapon that was far from advanced with other weapons, they actually
achieved miraculous results like this, and the design and use of these weapons
can be an inspiration that is hard to express in a few words. |
| |
| With regard
to General McPeak, who was hastily given the job of the Air Force chief
of staff not long before the war started, the toothmarks he left in ‘this
apple’ were during the war, when he was able to achieve his dream
of breaking down the barriers between the strategic and tactical air forces
and establish mixed air force wings, as well as his use of the ‘subtract
seven and add four’ approach following the war to bring about the
most richly original reform of the Air Force command structure in its history.
That is, following the elimination of seven Air Force commands, including
the strategic, tactical, transport, logistics, systems, communications,
and security commands, he organized them into the four air combat, mobility,
material and intelligence commands. [15] It is hard to imagine how General
McPeak's colleagues would have taken such a bold innovation had there been
no Gulf War. [16] However, those of us who were outsiders during the Gulf
War have no way of achieving enlightenment and lessons from it, et cetera,
et cetera. |
| |
| If we pursue
this to the limit, we will see that there are even more aspects to this
apple, but not all of them are by any means things that can be pointed out
or circled everywhere. To tell the truth, its flaws and questionable aspects
are nearly as numerous as its strengths, but nonetheless this cannot cause
us to treat it with the slightest contempt. Although this was a war that
is rich with implications, it still cannot be treated as the encyclopedia
of modern warfare, at least it does not provide us with any completely ready-made
answers regarding future warfare. However, after all, it does represent
the first and most concentrated use of a large number of new and advanced
weapons since their appearance, as well as a testing ground for the revolution
in military affairs triggered by this, and this point is sufficient to earn
it the position of a classic in the history of warfare, as well as providing
a completely new hotbed for our budding thoughts. |
| |
| Footnotes: |
| |
[1]
See ‘The Gulf War -- Final Report of the Department of Defense to
Congress,’ ‘Defense in the New Age: Experiences and Lessons
from the Gulf War,’ and other research reports.
[2] The first chapter (‘A Unique War’) in
the research report Military Experiences and Lessons of the Gulf War put
out by the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies holds that
‘Actually, the uniqueness of the Gulf War to a very great extent
keeps us from being able to draw lessons and experiences from it...in
fact, just how much in the way of important, long-term experiences and
lessons can be drawn from the Gulf War is a major issue.’ (The Gulf
War, Vol 2, Military Science Publishing House, 1992 internal publication,
p 155).
Following the Gulf War, people in the Chinese military,
who had been shaken intensely, from the very beginning accepted the views
of Western military circles almost completely, and at this point there
are quite a few of them who are beginning to rethink the lessons and experiences
of the Gulf War. (Conmilit, Nov 1998, No 262).
[3] The anti-Saddam alliance in the Arab world was centered
around Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. According to General Khalid, who
was a commander of the allied forces in ‘Desert Storm,’ Iraq
posed an enormous threat to them, so ‘we have no other choice but
to ask for the assistance of friendly forces, particularly the United
States.’ (see Desert Warrior, Military Translations Publishing House,
p 227)
The Americans also took the alliance very seriously. For
details, see ‘Attachments to the Final Report of the Department
of Defense to Congress,’ No 9, ‘Alliance Construction, Coordination,
and Combat’
[4] Chapter 2 (‘U.S. Military Reliance’) of
the research report Military Experiences and Lessons of the Gulf War put
out by the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies points
out that ‘this war demonstrated without a doubt that, whether with
regard to politics or logistical support, the U.S. military must rely
on friendly states and allies. Without the considerable help of other
countries, the United States has no way to carry out any major emergency
operation. Other than in small operations, the option of 'going it alone'
is basically unworkable, and all diplomatic and defense policy decisions
must be based on this understanding.’ (Ibid.).
[5] In the research report on the Gulf War done for the
House of Representatives by L. Aspin and W. Dickinson, there is high praise
for the ‘Goldwater - Nichols DOD Reorganization Act,’ writing
that ‘the Goldwater - Nichols DOD Reorganization Act ensured that
the three military services would pull together to fight the same war.’
The report also quoted Secretary of Defense Cheney, saying that the said
act ‘is the legislation with the most far-reaching impact on the
Department of Defense since the 'National Security Act.'‘ The generals
in the military also had high praise for it, with Navy Admiral Owens,
who was formerly vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff terming the
‘Goldwater - Nichols DOD Reorganization Act’ ‘one of
the three great revolutions in military affairs in the United States,’
and ‘this act stipulated that in all conflicts, the fight would
be conducted using a joint force, and it also clarified that chiefs of
staff of the services are no longer combat commanders. The combat commanders
are the five theater commanders in chief.’ (Journal of the National
Defense University, No 11, 1998, pp 46-47; Conmilit, No 12, 1998, p 24).
[6] General Merrill McPeak, who was Air Force chief of
staff during the Gulf War, stated that this was ‘a war which involved
the massive use of air power and a victory achieved by the U.S. and multinational
air force units,’ and ‘it was also the first war in history
in which air power was used to defeat ground forces’ (Air Force
Journal (U.S.), May 1991). In a statement prior to the war, his predecessor
Michael J. Dugan noted that ‘the only way to avoid much bloodshed
in a ground war is to use the Air Force.’ Although Dugan was seen
to have overstepped his authority and was removed from his post, his views
were not at all mistaken.
[7] Whether it is the report from the DOD or L. Aspin's
report to the House of Representatives, both give a high assessment of
the ‘air tasking order,’ holding that ‘the air tasking
order orchestrated a precisely-planned, integrated air battle.’
[8] According to predictions by Russian and Western military
specialists, ‘today, the lifespan of a tank as an individual target
on the battlefield does not exceed 2-3 minutes, and its lifespan in the
open as part of a battalion/company formation is 30-50 minutes.’
This kind of estimate by the experts notwithstanding, most countries still
have tanks serving as a main weapon (Soldier (Russia), No 2, 1996). In
an article entitled ‘The Future of Armored Warfare,’ Ralph
Peter states that ‘'Flying tanks' are something that people have
wanted for a long time, but when one considers the rational use of fuel
and the physical and psychological factors during battle, the future need
is still for ground systems. Seeing that attack helicopters are already
a concentration of the various features that we envisioned for flying
tanks, we believe that attack helicopters can complement armored vehicles,
but cannot replace them.’ (Parameters, Fall, 1997).
[9] Into the Storm: A Study in Command is the book that
General Franks wrote after retiring. In it he mentions that the speed
with which the VII Corps crossed the desert was not a mistake, and that
the criticism from Riyadh was unreasonable. (See Army Times (U.S.), 18
August 1997).
[10] See ‘Appendix to the Final Report of the Department
of Defense to Congress,’ p 522.
[11] See ‘Appendix to the Final Report of the Department
of Defense to Congress,’ Section 19, ‘News Reports.’.
[12] U.S. Army Field Manual FM100-6, Information Operations,
discloses the details of this dramatic event (See pp 68-69). The television
news reports on the ‘expressway of death’ also had an effect
on the overly-early conclusion of the war. (Joint Force Quarterly, Fall-Winter
edition, 1997-98).
[13] Section 16 of the ‘Appendix to the Final Report
of the Department of Defense to Congress’ has a special discussion
of the issue of ‘shared responsibility.’ Contrary to the general
belief, the main reason for the U.S. to get their allies to share the
costs of the war was not the economic factor, but rather political considerations.
In 21st Century Rivalries, Lester Thurow notes that, with regard to the
$61 billion that the war cost, ‘compared to its annual GDP of six
trillion dollars, this expense was hardly worth mentioning. The reason
that they wanted those countries which did not send combat personnel to
the war to provide fiscal assistance was entirely to convince the U.S.
public that the war was not America's alone, but was a joint operation.’
[14] In the magazine Special Operations, Major Jake Sam
[as published] reviews the circumstances of the psychological warfare
conducted by the 4th Psyops Group during the Gulf War. (See Special Operations,
October 1992). In the December 1991 issue of the U.S. military's Journal
of Eastern Europe and Middle Eastern Military Affairs there is also an
article devoted to psychological warfare during the Gulf War.
[15] Air Force chief of staff McPeak advocated the use
of ‘mixed wings’ made up of several kinds of aircraft to replace
the wings made up of just one kind of aircraft. He said that ‘if
we were to do something else in Saudi Arabia today, we would no longer
use wings outfitted with 72 F-16s, but rather a wing made up of some attack
airplanes, air defense fighters, jamming aircraft flying outside the air
defense zone, ‘Wild Weasels,’ and refueling aircraft, etc....
This tactic may be of use when an armed conflict breaks out in some region
of the world.’ (Air Force (U.S. journal), February 1991.
[16] Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice held that
‘the Gulf War explained this point (experience) very thoroughly:
Air power can make the greatest contribution during the unified and integrated
planning and implementation of combat operations.’ General Michael
Lowe [as published], commander of the Tactical Air Command, pointed out
that ‘using various terminology such as 'strategy' and 'tactics'
to limit the types and missions of aircraft is impeding the efforts to
develop air power, and at this point, we must carry out organizational
and structural reforms.’ (See Air Force Manual AFM1-1 Basic Aerospace
Theories of the U.S. Air Force, p 329, footnote 8). Deputy Chief of Staff
for programs and operations Jenny V. Adams [as published] believes that
the lesson to be drawn from the Gulf War is ‘to modify, not review,
our combat regulations.’ USAF Deputy Chief of Staff for logistics
and engineering Henry Weiqiliao [as published] also approves of carrying
out reforms to reduce the weak links in the support area. See Jane's Defense
Weekly, 9 March 1991. |
| |
|
| |
| Chapter
4: What Do Americans Gain By Touching the Elephant? |
| |
‘Aerial
combat was the decisive factor for victory in the war against Iraq...
High technology weapons were effectively used, and not only were they
the key reason that air and ground troops demonstrated remarkably in combat,
they also were the key reason United Nations forces were able keep their
casualties and fatalities so low. - L. Aspen |
| |
| The Gulf
War has been the United States military's biggest war catch in the past
few decades. When the war had just ended, the American military, members
of Congress, and various civic organizations began to carry out a detailed
examination of this catch from different points of view. From each of the
reports submitted by them and each of the steps subsequently taken by the
American military, the tremendous achievements of this examination can be
seen. These achievements, moreover, are all extremely valuable to armies
and military personnel throughout the world, and there must be no delay
in looking at them. Because the nationalistic instincts of the Americans
I especially admire are particularly prominent in the long-standing sectarianism
that exists among the military services, theoretical blind spots and thought
errors are bound to occur in the research, to the extent that a grand warfare
investigation has been turned into a blind person trying to size up an elephant.
This is a topic that requires our clear re-examination and should not be
treated as an excuse to deny its value. But what is it, after all, that
Americans want to feel on this big beast? Let's first take a look at it.
|
| |
| The
Hand Extended Under the Military Fence [Each Armed Service Views War Differently]
|
| |
| The fence
erected between the U.S. Army and the Navy since the time of the Civil War
not only could not be eliminated after the birth of the U.S. Air Force,
it instead became the fence separating the three branches of the military.
It became the historical chronic disease giving headaches to the President
and the Pentagon. Even though there was an effective ‘reorganization
method’ during the Gulf War, it was not so much a clever way for getting
to the root of the problem as it was an expedient measure for bringing about
a temporary solution in light of this invisible obstacle. As soon as things
had settled down and all the troops had returned home, the doors were closed
as before and everyone went their own way. Nevertheless, the high ranking
officers at the head of each of the three military branches are certainly
not a mediocre generation of stupidly unchanging leaders. The course and
outcome expected from the Gulf War at the time when it shocked the whole
world also deeply shook these ‘Desert Storm’ policymakers. The
dumbfounded feelings of having lost an adversary that came as a result of
the dissolution of the Soviet Union along with the renewed motivation to
establish the United States at the forefront of the new world order made
these leaders clearly realize the urgency with which they must reform the
armed forces even though they still had no intention of abandoning their
prejudices. In view of each of the successive military combat regulations
in the 1990s, its starting points have without exception been established
on the basis of the many fresh experiences and lessons gained in the Gulf
War. Just as ‘in the eyes of a thousand people, there are a thousand
views,’ what unfolded in the eyes of the three branches of the U.S.
military were three different Gulf Wars. In this war, which not only was
the last war of old times, but also the inaugural war of modern times, each
of the three branches stuck to its own arguments and made every effort to
find the evidence most advantageous to its respective branch, hardly realizing
that the hand outstretched from behind the military wall could not possibly
make heads or tails of such a big elephant as the Gulf War. |
| |
| General
Sullivan felt what may have been an inflexible elephant's leg. Though in
the eyes of this officer, who at the time of the Gulf War was Assistant
Army Chief of Staff and became Chief of Staff only after the war had been
over for a few months, the U.S. Army's show was not unremarkable during
‘Desert Storm,’ but it certainly could not be called outstanding.
Especially when compared with the 38 days of wanton and indiscriminate bombing
by the Air Force, four days of a ground warfare clean sweep were unable
to bring long expected glory to his armed forces. As someone who intimately
knows each key link of the Army, he understood better than anyone wherein
lay the crux of these age-old armed services in this landmark war. Even
though the U.S. Army's prestige was at its apex when he took his position
in ‘Desert Storm,’ it turned into an even stronger military
force with no one to battle because the Soviet Army had declined and the
facts were known. He still farsightedly conveyed, however, prophetic concern
for the common people. His greatest concern was that after the tension of
the Cold War had suddenly relaxed, the Army structure would exhibit signs
of aging, and the politicians who were eager to take part in the dividends
of peace would render his Army unable to cross the threshold of the 21st
century and preserve its leading position among the armies of the world
at the start of the new millennium. Its only way of reviving was to swallow
some very strong medicine and carry out a complete remolding of itself.
To this end, he advanced tentative plans for building a completely new ‘21st
century Army’ in which the U.S. Army would be redesigned at every
segment,’ from the foxholes to the factories.’ [1] In order
to reduce to the greatest possible extent the spread of the effect of bad
bureaucratic practices at the various organizational levels, he initially
established a ‘Louisiana Drill Task Force’ of only 1,100 people
under his direct command which used the experience and lessons drawn from
the Gulf War to mold this special force often referred to as the ‘digitized
force’. Additionally, he used its successfully clever maneuverings
to take the Army to the edge of informational warfare, striding to the forefront
of the armed forces in one step, thus taking the Army down a road of bold
innovation as well as difficult future expectations. During the entire process,
what he did not make clear was that in carrying out such a completely attractive
reform there still were the selfish motives of the armed forces hidden within
-- the size of the military expenditure pie had shrunk during the past few
decades and the piece cut out for the Army was bigger than that of the other
military branches. Sullivan's successor, General Reimer, also knew this
path well and furthered these reforms on the basis of the blueprints drawn
up by his predecessor. [2] |
| |
| Everyone
knows that there was great expense in establishing a digitized force, but
what made this more shrewd on the part of Sullivan and Reimer was that spending
more money was precisely in the interest of acquiring more money. From the
‘21st century Army’ to the ‘post-2010 Army’ and
then to the ‘Army of the future,’ it took two steps to make
three flights. Using a rather convincing development objective as bait,
they attracted the support of Capitol Hill and even more military expenditure
to build up the Army. Regarding those politicians who were totally ignorant
of military issues and who could not necessarily draw new conclusions and
methods for victory in the face of the generals, they mostly feared making
fools of themselves, and so none dared make irresponsible remarks to a man
who might well be the next president. Actually, no matter how much hubbub
the ‘digitized force’ caused, the time when anyone will make
a final conclusion on the validity of this plan is still far off. What others
do not say it that it is just a standard method according to the U.S. Army,
like a new weaponry purchase that goes from a proposed requirement of the
military to manufacture by the industrial sector and then back to the military
for testing, a process than can take as long as 10 years. However, the two
rhythms that cannot work together - the ‘18 month rule’ for
computer development and the ‘60 day rule’ for network technology
- make it very difficult for the ‘digitized force’ to finalize
a technology design and establish a military force, thereby turning it into
a top spun by the continually changing new technology. In the tired course
of dealing with these things, not only is it not known what course to take,
nothing is attempted and nothing is accomplished. [3] On this point alone,
linking an armed force's fate to the popularity of a certain type of technology,
a bold plan with leading characteristics, makes it difficult truly to become
the only road marker guiding the Army's future development. Moreover, who
now dares state with certainty that in future wars this heavy spending will
not result in an electronic Maginot line that is weak because of its excessive
dependence on a single technology? [4] |
| |
| Regarding
the Air Force, the straightforward General Dugan was relieved of his post,
and the Air Force troops under the command of an Army general during the
entire ‘Desert Storm’ operation were not prevented from becoming
the big winners in the Gulf War. [5] ‘Global presence, global power,’
the founding principle of the military, has for the first time withstood
the test of war, and the Air Force has been a force which could by itself
succeed in strategy and battle attack missions on any battle front, its
position having never been as illustrious as it is now. [6] This has made
the smug General McPeak and his successor determined to go even further.
They feel that one victory is enough to allow them to take the leading role
within the armed forces from this point on. The Air Force, which was molded
50 years ago from an appendage of the Army, is no longer ignorant - it had
suddenly grown wings when it touched the elephant in the Gulf. Even though
Air Force Chief of Staff Fogleman and Army Chief of Staff Reimer were of
the same mind and, having gone through the Gulf War, ‘the two branches
of the military both had deep understanding of military wartime operations
for the 21st century’, ‘relations between the Army and the Air
Force became strained when the two branches tried to work out details and
uses for the lessons gained from the Gulf War.’ [7] The reason is
very simple - neither the Air Force, whose wings were growing increasingly
strong, nor the Army, which regarded itself as the number one authority
under heaven, were willing to hand over the right to control operational
command to the other. Those keeping to each respective stand were seemingly
justified, but upon surmounting it, one would discover that it was a completely
unbeneficial military struggle with the result that each meeting of military
leaders to study joint operations became a mere formality and none of the
new experience obtained from the Gulf War was fully and effectively shared
between them. One need only look at the successive compendia and regulations
issued by the Air Force and Army following the end of the war to understand
this point. |
| |
| What needs
to be pointed out is that after the war, what the Air Force did was of course
not limited to scrambling for power and profit with the other branches of
the military. The main component of ‘Desert Storm’ was the response
to the successful experience of the air attack campaigns -- they reorganized
all the air combat troops into mixed wings in accordance with effective
models that had already been proven. They then used a method of subtracting
seven and adding four to completely reorganize the entire Air Force command
mechanism. They are currently in the middle of testing the formation of
an Air Force expeditionary force that can reach any war zone in the world
within 48 hours and maintain combat capability during the entire course
of any crisis and conflict. The Air Force, which all along has demonstrated
tremendous enthusiasm for electronic warfare and even information warfare,
had taken the lead in establishing an Air Force information warfare center
even before Sullivan established the digitized force. These actions clearly
are directly related to the results of the Gulf War. What is regrettable
is that such a good attempt was unable to break free of the military's boundaries
with the result that the old cry for ‘joint military operations’
was still just a slogan as before. But then all of this did not prevent
the generals of the U.S. Air Force from following the example of their Army
colleagues and using the positive changes within the armed forces and the
positive struggle outside the armed forces as the two wheels that would
advance their own branch's interests. A stagnant military with no fresh
plans is one that could not steal a good portion from the pockets of the
congressmen who administer military funds appropriation. In this regard,
the Air Force has its own multiplication table [xiaojiujiu 1420 0046 0046]
[8]. In the military's intensifying budgetary struggle, space flight weapons
systems are a powerful trump card held by the Air Force. Even though the
‘Star Wars’ system advanced by President Reagan appeared to
be a bluff at the very beginning, and two presidents later it still has
not developed true combat capability, the enthusiasm of Americans for establishing
space combat power has never cooled. [9] Relying on this enthusiasm, many
Air Force Chiefs of Staff have striven for the most possible military funding
for their own armed forces. Probably only heaven knows whether American
space flight power will be as General Estes said, ‘What space flight
troops demonstrated in the Gulf War proved that they had the potential for
independent service.’ |
| |
| If the
Gulf War is really seen as a big elephant, then it can be said that the
U.S. Navy's front fin is hardly touching the fur of the elephant, which
is just the same as saying it is not touching the elephant at all. Perhaps
it is precisely because of this that the U.S. Navy's historically most painful
transformation of strategic theory has begun from the homebound voyage of
the proud and arrogant seamen who slid down from the cold bench of the ‘Gulf
War.’ This suffering has fully tormented for a year and a half those
servicemen growing gills. After that, a White Paper called ‘From Sea
to Land’ put forward by several lieutenant colonels and colonels was
placed on the desk of the Naval Commander. This document clearly deviated
from the creed and altogether old regulations of the U.S. Navy's spiritual
mentor, Mahan. Decisive battles on the ocean striving for command of the
seas must never again be treated as the Navy's eternally unchanging sacred
mission. For the first time, rather, support of coastal and land based combat
would rank as its chief responsibility. This is as good as turning the long
tailed sharks cruising on the deep oceans into short mouthed crocodiles
rolling about in the mire. What is even more surprising is that unorthodox
opinions like these have gone so far as to obtain the joint signatures of
the heads of the Navy, battle commanders, and Marine Corps commanders to
become the most significant naval document since Mahan's ‘The Effect
of Naval Power on History.’ |
| |
| Sudden
bold strategic changes have provided an important turn for the better to
this force which has been in search of a regenerative road against the backdrop
of great change in world structure. Although the objectives that the Navy
has established for itself are not as radical as those of the Army nor as
ambitious as the Air Force, its transformation is obviously more fundamental
and more complete. In doing its calculations, the Navy, which is not one
bit inferior to the Army and the Air Force, of course wants to kill two
birds with one stone in the areas of transforming itself and vying for military
funding. An armed force that did not play any significant role in a major
war, however, must put forward a very attractive plan and carry out the
most thorough reforms if it wants to be sure to get a fixed piece of post-war
benefit pie as well as ambitiously attempt to get a bigger piece. Therefore,
two years after putting forward ‘From Sea to Land’, the Navy
again issued a new White Paper, ‘Forward Position... ... From Sea
to Land’ [10], and poured new hormones such as the more vigorous ‘Existence
of the Forward Position,’ ‘Deployment of the Forward Position,’
‘Combat of the Forward Position’ into the Navy's strategy. Another
two years later, Navy battle commander Admiral Boorda put forward ‘Naval
Concepts for the Year 2020.’ After Boorda killed himself to redeem
his soldiers' honor which he had ruined, his successor, Admiral Johnson,
followed established rules and promoted the reforms begun by all his predecessors.
He classified ‘deterrence and prevention of conflict in peacetime,
and winning victory in wartime’ as the three major responsibilities
of the U.S. Navy in the 21st century. |
| |
| What never
changed was that he was also the same as his predecessors in that all of
the plans he proposed treated the Navy as the axis without exception. His
reasoning this time is that among the many foreign combat tasks that the
U.S. military shoulders, the Army needs to draw support from many areas
to launch a deployment, and the Air Force is exceedingly dependent on the
bases of other countries. Only the Navy possesses cruise freedom in any
maritime space. Using the capability of multiple means for penetrating battle,
the result naturally is that the Navy should become the core of a joint
combat force. The thinking of this admiral is extremely clear. With consensus
for his theory from the three military commanders and the Department of
Defense, followed by logical thought, the probable outcome would be the
preference of his branch in getting budgetary allocations. According to
what has been divulged about the 1998 U.S. national defense budget, during
the past ten years in the course of a steady trend of U.S. military spending
reductions, the Navy and the Marine Corps are the two areas in the whole
military that have had the least reduction in spending. The Naval commanders
have always gotten what they wanted. |
| |
| What is
analyzed and outlined above is the general direction of the U.S. military
since the end of the Gulf War and the current situation of fracture between
the branches of the armed services. Perhaps you will be moved by all the
hard work done by the U.S. military to summarize this war, and perhaps you
will be influenced by the various methods adopted by the U.S. military to
defend the interests of the armed services. At the same time, however, you
may also have deep sympathy that so many outstanding soldiers and remarkable
minds went so far as to be separated inside the military fence, pinning
each other down and counteracting each other to the point that each of these
armed services with strong outlooks in the end still formed an American
military that had its entire pace disrupted by uncertain bugle calls. |
| |
| The
Illness of Extravagance, and Zero Casualties |
| |
| Large-scale
use of costly weapons in order to realize objectives and reduce casualties
without counting costs -- this kind of warfare which can only be waged by
men of wealth is a game that the American military is good at. ‘Desert
Storm’ manifested once again the Americans' unlimited extravagance
in war and has already become an addiction. Airplanes which cost an average
of US$25 million each carried out 11,000 wanton and indiscriminate bombings
in a 42 day period, destroying the general headquarters of the renewed Socialist
Party with each US$1.3 million Tomahawk guided missile, taking aim at foxholes
with precision guided bombs worth tens of thousands of U.S. dollars... even
if the American generals knew as soon as they began that they need not spend
so much on this unrestrained battle banquet costing US$61 billion, using
such an ostentatious battle style of ‘attacking birds with golden
bullets’, their over-extravagance would still not have been prevented.
An American-made bomber is like a flying mountain of gold, more costly than
many of its targets. Shouldn't hitting a quite possibly insignificant target
with tons of American dollars arouse people's suspicions? Aside from this,
during the long duration of 161 days, more than 52,000 personnel and over
8,000,000 tons of goods and materials were brought over day and night to
the front line from America and all over Europe, including thousands of
sun hats long since scrapped in some warehouse and crates of American fruit
rotting on Riyadh. Major General Pagonis, the commanding officer in charge
of logistic support, calls such large-scale chaotic and extravagant safeguarding
activities ‘possibly historically unheard of’ naval operations.
However, according to the vivid statements of the U.S. Department of Defense,
this is analogous to having moved all of the living facilities of Mississippi's
capital city, Jackson, to Saudi Arabia. Of all the soldiers in the world,
probably only the Americans would consider this a necessary extravagance
in order to win one war. [12] |
| |
| It is just
this point that strikes people strangely. However, the Pentagon, which was
completely remolded by McNamara in the spirit of commerce, all along could
only estimate the innumerable costs of luxury style war. [13] Even the Armed
Services Committee of the House of Representatives, an organization that
frequently conducts verbal warfare with four star generals over money, did
not even utter a word regarding the astonishing expenditures of this war.
In the respective investigation reports done on the Gulf War, the key effect
of high technology weaponry was given almost all equally high appraisals.
Secretary of Defense Cheney said ‘we lead fully one generation in
the area of weapon technology,’ and Congressman Aspen responded ‘the
benefits demonstrated by high tech weaponry have exceeded our most optimistic
estimates.’ |
| |
| If you
cannot make out the overtones of my praises and only think they are proud
of the American military for having fully realized their war objectives
by defeating Iraq with the aid of high technology weapons, then you may
think that this however is the typical nonsense spoken by two who have different
opinions regarding the ability of technology to bring success, and you also
are not yet fully aware of the meaning of American style warfare. What you
must know is that this is a nationality that has never been willing to pay
the price of life and, moreover, has always vied for victory at all costs.
The appearance of high technology weaponry can now satisfy these extravagant
hopes of the American people. During the Gulf War, of 500,000 troops, there
were only 148 fatalities and 458 wounded. Goals that they long since only
dreamt were almost realized -- ‘no casualties.’ Ever since the
Vietnam War, both the military and American society have been sensitized
to human casualties during military operations, almost to the point of morbidity.
Reducing casualties and achieving war objectives have become the two equal
weights on the American military scale. These common American soldiers who
should be on the battlefield have now become the most costly security in
war, like precious china bowls that people are afraid to break. All of the
opponents who have engaged in battle with the American military have probably
mastered the secret of success - if you have no way of defeating this force,
you should kill its rank and file soldiers. [14] This point, taken from
the U.S. Congressional report's emphasis on ‘reducing casualties is
the highest objective in formulating the plan,’ can be unequivocally
confirmed. ‘Pursuit of zero casualties,’ this completely compassionate
simple slogan, has actually become the principal motivating factor in creating
American style extravagant warfare. Therefore, unchecked use of stealth
aircraft, precision ammunition, new tanks, and helicopters, along with long
distance attack and blanket bombing - for all of these, weapons are okay
as are tricks, so that there are no dual objectives that at the same time
carry contradictions - there must be victory without casualties. |
| |
| Warfare
framed on this basis can only be like killing a chicken with a bull knife.
Its high technology, high investment, high expenditure, and high payback
feature, make its requirements for military strategy and combat skill far
lower than its requirements for the technological performance of weaponry.
Even in successful wars of this dimension, there is not one outstanding
battle that is laudable. Compared with the advanced technology that they
possess, the American military clearly is technologically stagnant and it
is not good at seizing opportunities provided by new technology for new
military tactics. Aside from effective use of advanced technological weaponry,
we are not sure how much of a disparity exists between the military thought
revealed in this war by Americans and other countries. The difference at
least cannot be any bigger than that between their weaponry. Perhaps it
is precisely because of this that this war was unable to become a masterpiece
of military skill. Instead it became, to a great extent, a sumptuous international
fair of high technology weapons with the United States as the representative
and, as a result, began the spread of the disease of American style war
extravagance on a global scale. At the same time as huge amounts of U.S.
dollars were trampling Iraq, it also muddled soldiers all over the world
for a time. As the world's leading arms dealers, Americans naturally are
overjoyed. In the face of this typical war with its advanced technology,
dull warfare, and huge spending, just as with a Hollywood movie, with its
simple plot, complex special effects, and identical patterns, for a long
time after the war people could not understand the main threads of this
complicated affair and believed that modern warfare is fought in just this
way, leaving those who cannot fight such an extravagant war feeling inadequate.
This is why the military forums in every country since the Gulf War are
full of a faction yearning for high technology weapons and calling for high
technology wars. |
| |
| In discussing
the talented American inventor, Thomas Edison, poet Jeffers writes, ‘We...
... are skilled in machinery and are infatuated with luxuries.’ Americans
have a strong inborn penchant for these two things as well as a tendency
to turn their pursuit of the highest technology and its perfection into
a luxury, even including weapons and machinery. General Patton, who liked
to carry ivory handled pistols, is typical of this. This inclination makes
them rigidly infatuated with and therefore have blind faith in technology
and weapons, always thinking that the road to getting the upper hand with
war can be found with technology and weapons. This inclination also makes
them anxious at any given time that their own leading position in the realm
of weaponry is wavering, and they continually alleviate these concerns by
manufacturing more, newer, and more complex weapons. As a result of this
attitude, when the weapons systems which are daily becoming heavier and
more complicated come into conflict with the terse principles required of
actual combat, they always stand on the side of the weapons. They would
rather treat war as the opponent in the marathon race of military technology
and are not willing to look at it more as a test of morale and courage,
wisdom and strategy. They believe that as long as the Edisons of today do
not sink into sleep, the gate to victory will always be open to Americans.
Self confidence such as this has made them forget one simple fact - it is
not so much that war follows the fixed race course of rivalry of technology
and weaponry as it is a game field with continually changing direction and
many irregular factors. Whether you wear Adidas or Nike cannot guarantee
you will become the winner. |
| |
| It appears
that Americans, however, do not plan to pay attention to this. They drew
the benefit of the Gulf War's technological victory and obviously have resolutely
spared no cost to safeguard their leading position in high technology. Even
though the many difficulties with funding have brought them up against the
embarrassment of having difficulty continuing, they have not been able to
change their passion for new technology and new weapons. The detailed list
of extravagant weapons constantly being drawn up by the U.S. military and
approved by Congress will certainly get longer and longer [15], but the
list of American soldier casualties in future wars may not necessarily be
‘zero’ because of wishful thinking. |
| |
| Group.
Expeditionary Force. Integrated Force. |
| |
| ‘What
kind of army does the U.S. Army need in the 21st century?’ This is
a question that has puzzled the U.S. Army for the last 10 years of the 20th
century. [16] During the Gulf War, the effect of the Army's mediocre show
along with the high technology weapons on the rhythm of battle formed a
clear contrast. The U.S. Army, which all along has been more conservative
than the Navy and the Air Force, finally became conscious of the need to
work out a system for carrying out reforms. What is interesting is that
the role of resistance in this instance was not the Army's upper echelon.
Rather, it was the new division commanders who had just climbed up to higher
positions from command levels and the new commanders who replaced them.
The views of those of the ‘brigade faction’ wearing the eagle
insignia and the sign of the maple leaf, however, are in complete contradiction.
They believe that it is the Army troops that have been unable to pass the
test of war and therefore must undergo a major operation. The ‘crack
troops,’ ‘model troops,’ and ‘primary brigade,’
these three programs, have been handed over to General Sullivan. Even though
this Army Chief of Staff has admiringly embodied the third program's ‘new
thinking for future operations,’ he has still not been able to persuade
the majority of generals to accept it. The result has been that, after he
was relieved of his office, there was a change of heart between the conservatives
and the reformists and the Army made the Fourth Mechanized Unit the foundation
in January 1996 to organize a new experimental brigade of 15,800 men. [17]
The position of the ‘divisional faction’ clearly prevailed.
The members of the ‘brigade faction’, however, were not willing
to just let the matter drop. They staunchly believed that a ‘military
force that is excessively massive and cumbersome will be difficult to suit
to the combat requirements of the 21st century.’ The military force
which began to be implemented during the period of short range to complex
guns must be completely rescinded, and five to six thousand new-type combat
troops should be substituted to form the new Army type for basic combat.
In order to relieve the generals' feelings of disgust, they displayed experience
in the ways of the world and retained equally high-ranking military positions
as the old-style Army in the new program. [18] |
| |
| At just
the critical moment of the incessant debate between the ‘divisional’
and ‘brigade’ factions, the director of the U.S. Army Battle
Command Laboratory, Army Lieutenant Colonel Maigeleige [transliteration
as printed 7796 2706 7191 2047] sounded another new call. In his book, ‘Break
the Factional Position’, he advocated simultaneously abandoning the
systems of divisions and brigades and replacing them with 12 battle groups
of about 5,000 men each. Its new position is determined by the ousted establishment's
set pattern of large and small, and the human numbers of many and few. It
could adopt building-block methods according to wartime needs and put into
practice mission-style group organization. The reverberations that his viewpoint
has brought in the Army has somewhat exceeded expectations, to the point
that General Reimer has required all generals to read this book. [19] Perhaps
the current Army Chief of Staff has exceptional insight and recognizes that
even though the lieutenant colonels' key points may not find miracle cures
for the difficult issues, they can yet be regarded as the magical cure for
sloughing off the thought-cocoons of those old soldiers in general's clothes.
|
| |
| Originally,
the concept of a ‘group’ was certainly not new to the Army.
The reform of the ‘five group atomic troops’ [20] in the 1950s
and 1960s was generally considered to be an unsuccessful attempt and even
criticized as having been an indirect cause leading to the U.S. military's
poor show in the Vietnam War. In the eyes of Maigeleige, however, a prematurely
delivered child may be unable to grow to manhood. If it is said that the
birth of the ‘group’ 30 years ago was unlucky, then today it
can be said that it is a good time. Modernized weaponry has been enough
to make any relatively small scale force not be inferior to previously much
larger armed forces in the areas of fire power and mobility. The appearance
of the C4I has especially brought armed forces which have a mutual superiority
advantage to unite in battle, becoming the new growing point in fighting
power. If this time still embraces the 18-type weapons ready divisional
system or brigade system, then it can truly be said that it is incompatible
with present needs. However, even if military technological development
is the emergence of new high technology, it also is a turning point and
certainly will not automatically bring on advanced military thought and
institutional establishments. One good feature hides one hundred bad --
the leading position with military technology and weaponry has hidden from
view this fact: The U.S. military is no different in the institutional establishment
as in military ideology, and is clearly behind the advanced military technology
it possesses. In this sense, using the ‘group’ to destroy the
position formed by the divisions and the brigades is the most damaging concept
in the institutional establishment of the U.S. Army since the Gulf War and
has represented the new thought wave of the U.S. military system establishment
reform. |
| |
| Unlike
the Army, the Air Force and the Navy do not have deep-rooted ‘positional’
traditions. The pace of their adjustments clearly are comparatively light.
The Air Force particularly made opportune use of the momentum of Desert
Storm to completely eliminate the divisional system in one blow, and they
took advantage of the opportunity to change all of the combat flight wings
into integrated wings and took the lead in achieving the first round of
system establishment reforms. After ‘global arrival, global power’
was defined as the new objective for Air Force strategy, it continued to
flap the wings of reform and began testing the plan for establishing an
‘Air Force Expeditionary Force’ advanced by Air Force Wing Commander
John Jiangpo [transliteration as printed 3068 3789]. According to this commander's
idea, the so-called ‘Air Force Expeditionary Force’ is a capable
and vigorous force of 1,175 men and 34 aircraft put together to aim at striving
for superiority in the air, carrying out air attacks, suppressing enemy
air defense power, and air-to-air refueling, etc., that can reach a theatre
of operations within 48 hours of having received the order, and that can
maintain air combat capability throughout the entire course of a conflict.
In this regard, it can be said that the actions of the U.S. Air Force are
supersonic. They currently have established three ‘Air Force Expeditionary
Forces’ and also have completed real troop deployment. When the fourth
and fifth of these forces began to be set up, its three predecessor ‘Air
Force Expeditionary Forces’ were already outstanding in such military
operations as the ‘Southern Watch’ and ‘Desert Thunder.’
|
| |
| Regarding
the Navy, since there already has been a new strategy of ‘Forward
Position... From Sea to Land,’ formation of an expeditionary force
from a combination of the Naval fleet and ground forces is logical. Unlike
the Army, which is taking strides to protect against difficulties, and the
Air Force, which is like a charging hurricane, the Navy is more willing
to go through repeated maneuvers and actual combat in order to polish the
concept of the ‘Naval Expeditionary Force.’ From [the advent]
of the ‘Ocean Risk’ of the Atlantic Ocean general headquarters,
of the ‘Double Assault’ of the European general headquarters,
of the ‘Silent Killer’ of the Pacific Ocean general headquarters,
and of the ground force's ‘Sea Dragon’ maneuver since May of
1992, to the establishment of the ‘Southern Watch’ no-fly zone
in southern Iraq, the ‘Vigilant Warrior’ to deter Iraq, as well
as the ‘Hope Renewal’ in Somalia, Bohei's [3134 7815] ‘Capable
Guard’, and Haiti's ‘Preservation of Democracy’ -- in
each of these operations the Navy has been diligently testing its new organization.
[22] |
| |
| The mission
that they stipulate for this ‘Naval Expeditionary Force’ of
one battleship group, one amphibious guard force, and Marine Corps task
forces is rapid control of the seas along with combat in coastal regions.
What amazes and pleasantly surprises the Navy most is that the amphibious
landing equipment needed by this expeditionary force actually obtained Congressional
budgetary approval. [23] The partiality that the American politicians have
towards the Navy caused the Navy and especially the Marines to be treated
with coldness upon their return from the Gulf War. Moreover, after establishing
the new Naval system establishment, they were fully confident of occupying
the number one position in the American armed forces. |
| |
| The institutional
reforms that began after the Gulf War not only adjusted the internal structure
of the U.S. military, but also gave impetus to changes in weapons development
and tactics, and even had a far-reaching effect on America's national strategy.
The small-scale, flexible, and quick ‘Expeditionary Force,’
not only used for military attacks but also able to carry out non-warfare
tasks, has become the new style of establishment striven for by each military
branch as well as a convenient and effective tool in the hands of the U.S.
government. We have discovered that, because there are these highly proficient
‘killer mace’ [sha shou jian 3010 2087 9505] forces and a dangerous,
worrisome trend has even been brought about, in handling international affairs
the U.S. government has become increasingly fond of using force, makes moves
more quickly, and seeks revenge for the smallest grievances. These mutual
moves between the armed forces and the government, military and politics,
is causing the U.S. military to begin undergoing a deep yet quite possibly
disastrous change from system establishment to strategic thinking. |
| |
| Currently,
the U.S. Department of Defense is trying to set about organizing the ground,
air, and sea expeditionary forces into an integrated ‘Allied Task
Force.’ This is the newest move in this change. [24] It is still difficult
to foresee whether this completely integrated force will drag the U.S. military
and even the United States using the same special characteristics into a
troublesome mire while nimbly achieving the global mission bestowed on the
U.S. government. |
| |
| From Joint
Campaigns to Total Dimensional War - One Step to Thorough Understanding
When we say that American military theory is behind, it is only behind relative
to its advanced military technology. Compared to the servicemen of other
countries, the fully technological aspect of Americans' military thinking
naturally occupies an insurmountable leading position on the scale of high-tech
war in hypothetical future wars. Perhaps the Soviet Arjakov [Ao'er jiakefu
1159 1422 0502 4430 1133] school of thought which was the first to advance
the ‘new military revolution’ is the only example that has come
to light. |
| |
| The ‘new
military revolution’ is vividly portrayed by the anvil forged in the
Gulf War. Not only with the American military but also with servicemen of
the whole world, these words have become a blindly ludicrous and popular
slogan. It is not a matter requiring great effort due to yearning for the
technology of others and following certain slogans. The only ones using
a great effort are the Americans. If they want to guarantee their own leading
position in a field of military reforms that has already begun and will
be completed right away, then the first thing that must be resolved is to
eliminate the lag that exists between U.S. military thinking and military
technology. Actually, the war dust has only settled [zhan chen fu ding].
|
| |
| The U.S.
military has not yet completed troop withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and
has already begun top-to-bottom ‘thought exchange transfusion.’
This means that, after military technological reforms are initiated, they
will not be able to be make up missed lessons of synchronized follow-up
for military thought reform. Even though in the final analysis they are
also unable to completely break away from their penchant for technology,
Americans still are in this unusual encirclement from which they are unable
to break free. They have achieved certain results that are equally beneficial
for American servicemen as well as servicemen all over the world -- first
is formation of the ‘joint campaign’ concept, second is forging
‘total dimensional warfare’ thinking. |
| |
| Formulation
of the ‘joint campaign’ originally came from the Number One
Joint Publication in November 1991 of the ‘United States Armed Forces
Joint Operations’ regulations issued by the U.S. Military Joint Conference.
This is clearly brimming with new concepts of the Gulf War and has broken
through the confines of the popular ‘cooperative war’ and ‘contractual
war’ which are already dated, and even surpassed the ‘air/ground
integrated battle’ theory seen by Americans as the magic weapon. This
regulation exposes the four key elements of the ‘joint campaign’
- centralized command, equality of the armed forces, complete unification,
and total depth while doing battle. It has made clear for the first time
the command control authority of the battle zone unified commander; it has
stipulated that any one military branch can take the leading battle role
based on different situations; it has expanded ‘air/ground integrated
battle’ into ground, sea, air, and space integrated battle; and it
has emphasized implementation of total depth while doing battle on all fronts.
Under the strong impetus of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting,
each military branch is successively setting about formulating and unifying
mutually matching military regulations in order to make public this new
tactic representative of the direction of future wars. [While the services
have formally accepted this new concept], in private they still constantly
bear in mind the prominent core functions of their branches, and they especially
hope to carry out a unification that is clearly demarcated -- that is a
unification that makes clear each domain and authority, including regulations,
laws, and the differentiation among each other's military honors. Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Shalikashvili feels that this does not intend
to indicate a compromise between each of the Chiefs of Staff. Adopting the
publication called, ‘The Plan for a Joint Force in 2010,’ The
‘Model’ for Leading the United States Military to Joint Operations
[25], he resolutely plays the part of a modern Moses, leading the U.S. military
to dismantle the fences separating the branches of the military, and stride
along the difficult path of really bringing about integrated unified operations
in the midst of a twilight which brings doubt. |
| |
| Even though
it is in the United States, a country which easily propagates and accepts
new things, the situation is still far more difficult than Shalikashvili
thought. In the wake of his retirement, criticism of the ‘joint plan’
for the U.S. military has gradually increased, and skepticism has again
gained ground. The Marine Corps believes that they ‘must not worship
the 'joint [plan]' and stifle relevant future discussions on troop organization,’
that ‘the uniformity of the joint [plan] will lead to the loss of
the distinctiveness of the armed forces,’ and that this is mutually
contrary to the American spirit of ‘emphasizing competition and diversification.’
The Air Force tactfully expressed the opinion that the ‘2010 unification
plan must develop in practice and encourage mutual emulation between the
armed services,’ that ‘in this era of change and experimentation
our thinking must be flexible and cannot become rigid.’ [26] The views
of the Navy and the Army in this regard are similar and have plenty of power
to destroy Shalikashvili's painstaking efforts in an instant. It is thus
evident that it is not only in Eastern reforms that the situation occurs
where policies shift with a change of the person in charge. As onlookers,
we of course can simply sacrifice a valuable ideology for the narrow benefit
of a group. |
| |
| Because
the essence of ‘joint campaigns’ and ‘joint plans’
certainly is not in the confirmation or expropriation of military advantage,
rather its intention is to enable each branch of the military to achieve
unification of operations within a centralized battleground space, and reduce
to the greatest possible extent the negative effects of each branch going
its own way. Before a way is found to truly integrate the forces, this is
obviously a conceivable tactic of high order. The limitation of this valuable
thinking, however, lies in that its starting point and ending point have
both fallen onto the level of armed force and have been unable to expand
the field of vision of ‘joint’ to all of the realms in which
humans can produce confrontational behavior. The drawback of this thinking
at the very end of the 20th century, a time when an inkling of the broad
sense of war has already emerged, is that it appears to attract attention
to such an extent that if the concept of ‘total dimensional warfare’
had not been set forth in the 1993 U.S. Army publication, The Essentials
of War, we would be simply astounded at the ‘anemic’ realm of
U.S. military thinking. |
| |
| Following
the 13th revision of this programmatic document, there was a penetrating
insight into the various challenges that the U.S. military might face in
the following years and for the first time a completely new concept of ‘non-combat
military operations’ was advanced. It was because of this concept
that people saw the possibility of carrying out total positional warfare,
and it brought the American Army to find an extremely lofty new name for
its war theory -- ‘total dimensional warfare.’ What is interesting
is that the person in charge of revising the U.S. Army's 1993 publication
of The Essentials of War and who displayed a fiercely innovative spirit
was General Franks, the man who was criticized by people as an operational
conservative when the Navy commanded the Seventh Fleet. If not for later
circumstances that changed the direction of thinking of Americans, this
commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Headquarters who first took
his post after the war would have brought the history of American military
thinking to a historical breakthrough. Although General Franks and the officers
who compiled his military regulations were unable to reconcile the tremendous
discrepancy between the two sentences, ‘implementation of centralized
air, ground and sea operations supported by the entire theatre of operations’
and ‘mobilization of all mastered methods in each possible operation,
both combat and non-combat, so as to resolutely complete any mission assigned
at the least price’ in this publication The Essentials of War, they
were even less able to discover that, apart from war as a military operation,
there still exists the possibility for far vaster non-military war operations.
However, it at least pointed out that ‘total dimensional warfare’
should possess the special characteristics of ‘total depth, total
height, total frontage, total time, total frequency, and multiple methods’,
and this precisely is the most revolutionary feature of this form of battle
that has never been seen in the history of war. [27] |
| |
| It is too
bad that the Americans, or more specifically the American Army, discontinued
this revolution too early. In one case of dissension, Holder, one-time regimental
commander under General Franks who later held the post of Combined Arms
Commander of the Army Training and Doctrine Headquarters, strongly cross-examined
his superior officer's idea. The then-Lieutenant General Holder already
was not the out-and-out vigorous Colonel Holder on the battlefield. This
time he was playing the part of the Army mouthpiece for conservative tradition.
|
| |
| His view
was that ‘the belief that non-combat operations has its own set of
principles is not welcomed among combat troops and many commanding officers
are opposed to differentiating between non-combat operations and the original
meaning of military operations.’ After Holder's death, ‘the
Army had formed a common consensus to handle differentiation of non-combat
operations as a wrong practice.’ They believe that if ‘non-combat
military operations’ are written into the basic regulations, it will
weaken the armed forces' trait of emphasis on military affairs and also
could lead to confusion in armed forces operations. With the situation going
in this direction, General Franks' revolution ended in an unavoidable miscarriage.
Under the inspiration of the next commander of the Army Training and Doctrine
Headquarters, General Hartzog, General Holder and the editorial group for
the 1998 publication of The Essentials of War finally made a major amendment
to the new compendium with ‘a single principle covering all types
of the Army's military operations’ as the fundamental key. Their practice
is to no longer distinguish between non-combat operations and general military
operations, but to differentiate battle operations into four types -- attack,
defense, stabilization, and support -- and return the original manuscript
to such responsibilities of non-combat operations as rescue and protection
and reassembling the old set of combat operations in order to enable it
to put centralized combat principles on the right course and altogether
discard the concept of ‘total dimensional warfare.’ [28]. At
face value, this is a move of radical reform and simplification by simply
cutting out the superfluous. In reality, however, this is an American edition
of poor judgment. At the same time as the theoretical confusion brought
by the unripe concept of ‘non-combat military operations’ was
eliminated, the rather valuable ideological fruits that they had accidentally
picked were also abandoned on account of the newly-revised compendium. It
appears that in doing the one step forward, two steps back dance, all nationalities
are self-taught. |
| |
| Nevertheless,
pointing out the U.S. Army's lack of foresight is not equivalent to saying
that the ‘total dimensional warfare’ theory cannot be criticized.
Quite the opposite, there are clear flaws in this theory from both its conceptual
denotation and connotation. Indeed, ‘total dimensional war's’
understanding of battle is already much broader than any previous military
theory, but as far as its innate character is concerned, it still has not
escaped the ‘military’ category. For example, the ‘non-military
combat operations’ concept we raised above is much broader in meaning
than military combat operations and can at least be placed along with comparable
war realms and patterns outside the field of vision of American servicemen
-- it is precisely this large domain that is the area for future servicemen
and politicians to develop imagination and creativity -- with the result
that it also cannot count as truly meaning ‘total dimensional.’
Not to mention the phrase ‘total dimensional’ in the U.S. Army,
which also has not in the end reconciled how many dimensional spaces are
referred to, whether it is that each [space] is an interrelated element
of war or it is that there are two simultaneously. This is to say, it still
has not been elaborated on and is in a state of chaos. If, however, what
total dimension is referring to cannot be reconciled, then the nature of
the relationship between each dimension, this original concept with its
rich potential, can of course not be fully launched. Actually, there is
no one who can launch a war in 360-degree three-dimensional space with time
and other non-physical elements of total dimensionality added, and any particular
war will always have its particular emphasis and is always launched within
a limited dimension as well as terminated within a limited dimension. The
only difference is that in the predictable future, military operations will
never again be the entire war, rather they are one dimension within the
total dimension. Even adding ‘non-combat military operations’
as proposed by General Franks cannot count as total dimensionality. Only
by adding all ‘non-military combat operations’ aside from military
operations can total dimensional war's complete significance be realized.
|
| |
| What needs
to be pointed out is that this ideology has never emerged in all of the
theoretical research of the U.S. military since the Gulf War. [29] Even
though these concepts of ‘non-combat military operations’ and
‘total dimensional warfare’ are full of original ideas and are
already fairly close to a military ideological revolution that started from
the military technology revolution, it can be said that it has already arrived
under the last precipice on the rugged mountain path, and the mountain peak
of the great revelation is still far away. Here, however, the Americans
have stopped, and the American hares who have always been ahead of every
other country in the world in military technology and military ideology
have begun to gasp for breath. No matter that Sullivan or Franks let out
‘running hare’ breaths in so many military theses after the
Gulf War, they still cannot leave all the tortoises behind. |
| |
| Perhaps
now this is the time when Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley [30] and these
Americans who have called into question the capability of other countries'
military revolutions should examine their consciences: |
| |
| Why has
there not been a revolution? |
| |
| Footnotes: |
| |
[1]
The 21st Century Army is written by Sullivan. From the time he took his
post until after he left it, he has always been unabatedly enthusiastic
about this issue. Even though many people within the U.S. military and
the forces of other countries have equated The 21st Century Army with
The Digitized Force, Sullivan certainly does not see it this way. He believes
that the U.S. Army should continually promote ‘integration’
reforms, and that The 21st Century Army should be treated more as ‘an
attitude and a direction’ rather than an ‘ultimate plan.’
‘Integration of a 21st century includes such aspects as battle theory,
system of organization, training, commanding officer development, equipment
and soldier issues, and base facilities, etc.’ (United States Military
Theory, May-June, 1995) According to the general view currently held by
the U.S. Army, ‘The 21st century force is the current Army force
carrying out information-age field operations experiments, theoretical
research, and equipment purchasing plans, to enable the ground combat
troops to handle preparations for carrying out missions from now until
2010.’ (Army Training and Doctrine Headquarters Assistant Chief
of Staff, Colonel Robert Jilibuer [transliteration as printed 1015 0448
1580 1422], Armed Forces Journal, October 1996).
[2] General Dennis J. Reimer said, ‘'The 2010 Army
Concept' is also the theoretical link between 'The 21st Century Army'
and 'The Army of Tomorrow'. 'The 21st Century Army' is the plan that the
Army is carrying out right now... 'The Army of Tomorrow' is the Army's
long-range plan that is currently under deliberation... mutual coordination
between the three has determined a complete set of continuous and orderly
changes, so as to guarantee that the Army can develop along a methodical
direction.’ (See The 2010 Army Concept report, 1997).
[3] Technological renewal is a far faster phenomenon than
weaponry, hiding deeper disparities: ‘It is easier for forerunners
to fall behind.’ (This point can be verified from the development
of the telecommunications industry and changes in computers.) This perhaps
is the single most difficult disparity to bring into line for the professional
military and information technology established along the lines of big
industry. It is for this reason that Americans have a morbid sensitivity
to the spread of all new military high technology and even new civilian
technology.
[4] There are also many people within the United States
who are questioning this. Colonel Allen Campen believes that ‘hastily
adopting new tactics that people do not fully understand and that have
not been tested is risky’ and ‘quite possibly will turn a
beneficial military revolution into a gamble with national security.’
(United States Signal Magazine, July 1995).
[5] Even though the Joint Force Air Squadron Headquarters
commanded by Air Force General Charles Horner had to take orders from
Schwarzkopf, in the final analysis he received the most publicity during
the Gulf War.
[6] Global Arrival, Global Power was the strategic plan
of the U.S. Air Force after the Cold War, published in June 1990 in White
Paper format. Six months later, the basic principle of this plan was tested
and verified in the Gulf War.
[7] See United States Army Magazine, December 1996, ‘Army
and Air Force Joint War.’
[8] In 1997, the United States again proposed a new development
strategy, Global Participation - - The Plan for the United States Air
Force in the 21st Century. ‘Our strategic plan can be summarized
in one sentence: 'the United States Air Force will become the outstanding
air and space force in the world... it will be a global force enabling
the United States to show itself everywhere'.’ (See Global Participation
-- The Plan for the United States Air Force in the 21st Century).
[9] Even though President Clinton announced the elimination
of the ‘Star Wars’ plan, in reality the United States military
has never relaxed the pace of space militarization. Global Participation
--21st Century United States Air Force Concept especially points out that
‘the first step of this revolutionary change is to turn the U.S.
Air Force into an air and space force, then to remold it into an air and
space force.’ The sequence of these changes has obviously embodied
the core revisions. The space flight headquarters is putting even more
emphasis on the function of space flight troops (specifically see United
States Military Space Flight Troops and Unified Space Flight Theory).
In April 1998, the U.S. space flight headquarters issued a long-range
plan, ‘Tentative Plan For 2020,’ and advanced four war concepts
for military space flight -- space control, global war, total force consolidation,
and global cooperation. By 2020, space control must have achieved the
following five objectives: ensure entry into space; keep watch over space;
protect the space systems of the United States and its allies; prevent
enemies from utilizing the space systems of the United States and its
allies; and stop enemies from utilizing space systems. (See Modern Military
Affairs, 1998, No. 10, pp. 10-11.)
[10] ‘The White Paper, 'From Sea to Land', issued
in 1992 by the Navy and Navy ground forces, marks changes in the core
and emphasis of strategy... emphasis on naval implementation of forward
deployment, this is the most essential difference reflected between 'Forward
Position... From Sea to Land' and 'From Sea to Land'.’ (Navy Admiral
J.M. Boorda, Marine Corps Magazine, March 1995) This admiral also bluntly
demanded the ‘Navy's preference in budgetary matters.’
[11] See the U.S. Department of Defense's National Defense
Report for the fiscal year 1998.
[12] See The Gulf War -- Final Report of the U.S. Department
of Defense to Congress and Appendix 6.
[13] McNamara, who went from president of the Ford Motor
Company to head of the Department of Defense, introduced the business
accounting system of private enterprise and the concept of ‘cost
comparison’ to the United States military. He has made the forces
learn how to spend less money when purchasing weapons, but they have other
standards for how to fight. ‘The Department of Defense must achieve
the following objective: exchange our country's security for the least
amount of risk, least amount of expenditure, and, in the event of a entering
a war, the least number of casualties.’ (McNamara, Looking Back
on the Tragedy and the Lessons of the Vietnam War, pp. 27-29)
[14] Colonel Xiaochaersi Denglapu [transliteration as
printed 1420 2686 1422 2448 6772 2139 2528] points out that ‘casualties
are an effective way to weaken America's strength... For this reason,
enemies can bring about our casualties by dashing ahead recklessly without
regard to losses or by achieving a blind tactical victory.’ (‘Analysis
From the Standpoint of the Enemy 'Unification Concept for 2010',’
Joint Force Quarterly, 1997-1998 Fall/Winter).
[15] According to the U.S. Department of Defense's National
Defense Report for the fiscal year 1997, there are 20 advanced technological
items that obtained Congressional approval: ‘1, rapid force delivery
systems; 2, precision attack multi-barrel launch systems; 3, high altitude
maximum range unmanned vehicles; 4, medium altitude maximum range unmanned
vehicles; 5, precision target capture signal systems; 6, cruise missile
defense; 7, simulated battlefields; 8, joint counter (submarine) mines;
9, ballistic missile interception with kinetic energy weaponry; 10, advanced
technology utilized to formulate a high-level joint plan; 11, battlefront
understanding and data transmission; 12, anti large-scale destruction
weapons; 13, air bases (ports) for the biological weapons defense; 14,
advanced navigational systems; 15, combat discernment; 16, joint rear
service; 17, combat vehicle survivability; 18, short life expectancy and
low cost medium-scale transport helicopters; 19, semi-automatic image
handling; 20, small-scale air-fired false targets.’
[16] ‘What Kind of Army Does the U.S. Army Need
in the 21st Century?’ Xiao'en Neile [transliteration as printed
5135 1869 0355 0519] in Army Times, October 16 1995, reviews this issue
in detail.
[17] According to the United States Army Times, ‘After
five years of analysis, study, and military internal discussion, Army
authorities in the end finally formulated a new establishment for armored
units and mechanized mobile units. The new plan is called 'The 21st Century
Establishment'. ...a support headquarters composed of troop units, one
armored division, two mechanized mobile units, artillery units (brigade
level), one aviation unit, and one unit for rear services management and
support. The entire division consists of 15,719 men (containing 417 reserve
duty personnel).’ The personnel putting this establishment together
explain that ‘this newly planned establishment does not count as
a revolutionary establishment... actually it is seen as a relatively conservative
establishment.’ (See Army Times, June 22, 1998, Jimu Taisiwen [transliteration
as printed 0679 1191 3141 2448 2429].)
[18] See John R Brinkerhoff, ‘The Brigade-based
New Army,’ Parameter Quarterly, Winter 1997.
[19] For the detailed viewpoint of the book Break Localized
Fronts, see the article by Xiao'en Neile in the United States Army Times,
June 9 1997.
[20] In order to suit the needs of nuclear war and to
try to enable troops to carry out combat in the nuclear battlefield as
well as enable survivability, in 1957 the U.S. Army reorganized the atomic
divisions with the group divisions. The entire division was between 11,000
and 14,600 men, divided into five combat groups with strong motorization,
and all with tactical nuclear weapons. However, this division's attack
capability on a non-nuclear battlefield was relatively low.
[21] For the U.S. Air Force expeditionary force concept,
see the article by Air Force Brigadier General William Looney in Air Power
Journal, Winter 1996.
[22] Just as the Head of the Naval War Office, Kaiersuo
[transliteration as printed 0418 1422 4792], and Army Commander Wangdi
[transliteration as printed 5345 6611] said, under the circumstances of
the continual cutting of military spending and fewer and fewer bases abroad,
‘the United States needs a unified combat force that is relatively
small in scale but rapidly deployed and easy to assemble and train.’
(May 1993, Naval Institute Journal) For the ‘Naval Expeditionary
Force,’ see Marine Corps Magazine, March 1995.
[23] See November 1995, Sea Power, ‘From Over the
Horizon to Over the Beach’: ‘More Than Expected Budget Funds
-- The U.S. Congress recently agreed to allocate funds in the fiscal year
1996 to build the seventh multi-use amphibious attack vessel, making the
Navy very happy. Because of budgetary limitations, the U.S. Navy plans
to wait until 2001 to apply for allocation for this ship... the Navy originally
decided to put off requesting allocation to build the first LPD-17 amphibious
dock transport until the 1998 fiscal year rather than 1996. However, what
exceeded expectations was that Congress voted to approve allocation of
US $974 million for this warship.’
[24] In 1993, the United States Report on the Complete
Investigation of Defense proposed, ‘The following troop 'package'
is enough to handle a large-scale regional conflict: four to five Army
units; four to five ground force expeditionary units; 10 Air Force combat
mechanized forces; 100 Air Force heavy bombers; four to five Naval warship
combat troops; special combat forces... other than this, we have proposed
a new concept for troops abroad - 'self-adapted special establishment
unified troops'. According to the requirements of the battle zone command,
it is organized from specially designated Air Force troops, ground troops,
and special type combat troops and Navy troops.’
[25] For the ‘Joint Doctrine for 2010’ put
forward in 1996 by the United States joint military meeting, see Joint
Force Quarterly, Summer 1996. In the Winter 1996 edition of Joint Force
Quarterly, Naval War Commander Johnson and Air Force Chief of Staff Fogleman
both expressed support for the ‘Joint Doctrine for 2010.’
Army Chief of Staff Reimer also immediately put forward the ‘Army
Concept for 2010’ in response to the ‘Joint Doctrine for 2010.’
[26] See the article, ‘Reform Will Not Be Smooth
Sailing,’ by Commander Huofuman [transliteration as printed 7202
1133 2581] in the United States Naval Institute Journal, January 1998.
[27] There is a detailed introduction to ‘Total
Dimensional Warfare’ in the 1997 World Military Almanac. (pp 291-294)
[28] According to the article, ‘Changes to the Newly
Published Draft of 'Essentials of War',’ by Xiaoen Neile in the
United States Army Times, August 18, 1997.
[29] There probably is only the article, ‘A Military
Theoretical Revolution: The Various Mutually Active Dimensions of War,’
by Antuli'ao Aiqieweiliya [transliteration as printed], that has pointed
out that the ‘various dimensions’ of war should not be such
things as length, breadth, and depth indicated in geometric and space
theory. Instead, it is such factors that are intimately related to war
as politics, society, technology, combat, and logistics. It is too bad,
however, that he still centers on the military axis to look at war and
has not formed a breakthrough in war denotation.
[30] At the Strategy Conference held by the United States
Army War College in April 1996, Army Lieutenant Colonel Lonnie Henley
wrote a paper for a report entitled 21st Century China: Strategic Partner...
or Opponent. The conclusion was: ‘In at least the first 25 years
of the next century, China will be unable to carry out a military revolution.’
(See the Foreign Military Data of the Military Science Academy Foreign
Military Research Department, June 1997.) |
| |
|
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| Conclusion |
| |
‘Computerization
and globalization...have produced several thousand global enterprises
and tens of thousands of international and inter-government organizations.’
- E. Laszlo
‘Mankind is making progress, and
no longer believes that war is a potential court of appeals.’ -
Bloch |
| |
At a time
when man's age-old ideal of ‘the family of man’ is used by IBM
in an advertisement, ‘globalization’ is no longer the prediction
of futurists. An era in which we are impelled by the great trend of technological
integration that is plastered all over with information labels, agitated
by the alternately cold and warm ocean currents from the clash and fusion
of civilizations, troubled by local wars rising first here then there and
by domino-like financial crises and the ozone hole over the South Pole,
and which causes everyone, including the futurists and visionaries, to feel
strange and out of place - [such an era] is in the process of slowly unfolding
between the dusk of the 20th century and the dawn of the 21st century.
Global integration is comprehensive and profound. Through its ruthless enlightenment,
those things which must inevitably be altered or even dispelled are the
positions of authority and interest boundaries in which nations are the
principal entities. The modern concept of ‘nation states’ which
emerged from the Peace of Westphalia [1] in 1648 is no longer the sole representative
occupying the top position in social, political, economic and cultural organizations.
The emergence of large numbers of meta-national, trans-national, and non-national
organizations, along with the inherent contradictions between one nation
and another, are presenting an unprecedented challenge to national authority,
national interests, and national will. [2] |
| |
| At the
time of the emergence of the early nation states, the births of most of
them were assisted by blood-and-iron warfare. In the same way, during the
transition of nation states to globalization, there is no way to avoid collisions
between enormous interest blocs. What is different is that the means that
we have today to untie the ‘Gordian Knot’ [3] are not merely
swords, and because of this we no longer have to be like our ancestors who
invariably saw resolution by armed force as the last court of appeals. Any
of the political, economic, or diplomatic means now has sufficient strength
to supplant military means. However, mankind has no reason at all to be
gratified by this, because what we have done is nothing more than substitute
bloodless warfare for bloody warfare as much as possible. [4] As a result,
while constricting the battlespace in the narrow sense, at the same time
we have turned the entire world into a battlefield in the broad sense. On
this battlefield, people still fight, plunder, and kill each other as before,
but the weapons are more advanced and the means more sophisticated, so while
it is somewhat less bloody, it is still just as brutal. Given this reality,
mankind's dream of peace is still as elusive as ever. Even speaking optimistically,
war will not be wiped out rapidly within the foreseeable future, whether
it is bloody or not. Since things which should happen will ultimately come
to pass, what we can and must focus on at present is how to achieve victory.
|
| |
| Faced with
warfare in the broad sense that will unfold on a borderless battlefield,
it is no longer possible to rely on military forces and weapons alone to
achieve national security in the larger strategic sense, nor is it possible
to protect these stratified national interests. Obviously, warfare is in
the process of transcending the domains of soldiers, military units, and
military affairs, and is increasingly becoming a matter for politicians,
scientists, and even bankers. How to conduct war is obviously no longer
a question for the consideration of military people alone. As early as the
beginning of this century, Clemenceau stated that ‘war is much too
serious a matter to be entrusted to the military.’ However, the history
of the past 100 years tells us that turning over warfare to the politicians
is not the ideal way to resolve this important issue, either. [5] People
are turning to technical civilization, hoping to find in technological developments
a valve which will control war. But what makes people despair is that the
entire century is just about gone, and while technology has made great strides,
war still remains an unbroken mustang. People still expect wonders from
the revolution in military affairs, hoping that high-tech weapons and non-lethal
weapons can reduce civilian and even military casualties in order to diminish
the brutality of war. However, the occurrence of the revolution in military
affairs, along with other revolutions, has altered the last decade of the
20th century. The world is no longer what it was originally, but war is
still as brutal as it has always been. The only thing that is different
is that this brutality has been expanded through differences in the modes
in which two armies fight one other. Think about the Lockerbie air disaster.
Think about the two bombs in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. Then think about
the financial crisis in East Asia. It should not be difficult to understand
what is meant by this different kind of brutality. |
| |
| This, then,
is globalization. This is warfare in the age of globalization. Although
it is but one aspect, it is a startling one. When the soldiers standing
at the crossroads of the centuries are faced with this aspect, perhaps each
of them should ask himself, what can we still do? If those such as Morris,
bin Laden, and Soros can be considered soldiers in the wars of tomorrow,
then who isn't a soldier? If the likes of Powell, Schwartzkopf, Dayan, and
Sharon can be considered politicians in uniform, then who isn't a politician?
This is the conundrum that globalization and warfare in the age of globalization
has left for the soldiers. |
| |
| Although
the boundaries between soldiers and non-soldiers have now been broken down,
and the chasm between warfare and non-warfare nearly filled up, globalization
has made all the tough problems interconnected and interlocking, and we
must find a key for that. The key should be able to open all the locks,
if these locks are on the front door of war. And this key must be suited
to all the levels and dimensions, from war policy, strategy, and operational
techniques to tactics; and it must also fit the hands of individuals, from
politicians and generals to the common soldiers. |
| |
| We can
think of no other more appropriate key than ‘unrestricted warfare.’ |
|
| Footnotes:
|
| |
[1]
The general term for the European agreement of 1648. This brought an end
to the 80-year war between Spain and Holland, and the Thirty Years' War
in Germany, and it is also seen as laying the foundation for all the treaties
concluded up to the break up of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806.
[2] The state's position as the ultimate entity is being
challenged from various quarters, and the thing that is most representative
as well as being most worrisome, is that the state's monopoly on weapons
is being seriously challenged. According to the views of Earnest Jierna
[as published 0679 1422 4780] in Nationality and Nationalism, a state
is defined as the only entity that can use force legally. According to
a 1997 public opinion survey by Newsweek magazine in the United States
regarding ‘where the threat to security will come from in the 21st
century,’ 32 percent believed it would come from terrorism, 26 percent
believed that it would be international crime and drug trafficking groups,
15 percent believed it would be racial hatred, with nation states only
coming in fourth. In a small pamphlet that the U.S. Army has put on the
Web, but which has not been published (TRADOC PAMPHLET 525-5: FORCE XXI
OPERATIONS), the non-nation forces are clearly listed as ‘future
enemies,’ saying that ‘non-nation security threats, using
modern technologies that give them capabilities similar to those of nation
states, have become increasingly visible, challenging the traditional
nation state environment. Based on the scope involved, these can be divided
into three categories.
(1) Subnational. Subnational threats include political,
racial, religious, cultural, and ethnic conflicts, and these conflicts
challenge the defining features and authority of the nation state from
within.
(2) Anational. Anational threats are unrelated to the
countries they belong to. These entities are not part of a nation state,
nor do they desire to establish such a status. Regional organized crime,
piracy, and terrorist activities comprise these threats.
(3) Metanational. Metanational threats transcend the nation
state borders, operating on an interregional or even global scale. They
include religious movements, international criminal organizations, and
informal economic organizations that facilitate weapons proliferation.
See The World Map in the Information Age, Wang Xiaodong, Chinese People's
University Press, 1997, p. 44-46. The U.S. military does not treat transnational
companies which seize monopolistic profits as security threats, and in
addition to their deeply-rooted awareness of economic freedom, this is
also related to the fact that they still limit threats to the military
arena. Transnational companies such as Microsoft and Standard Oil-Exxon,
whose wealth rivals that of nations, may also constitute real threats
to national authority, and can even have a serious impact on international
affairs.
[3] Legend has it that after Alexander the Great led his
army into the interior of Asia Minor, he went to worship in the temple
of Zeus in the city of Gordium. In the temple there was a wagon which
had formerly belonged to Midas, king of Phrygia. It was secured very tightly
by a jumbled cord, and it was said that no one had been able to untie
it. Faced with this, Alexander pondered for a moment, then suddenly pulled
out his sword and severed it at one stroke. From this, ‘Gordian
knot’ has come to be another term for intractable and complex problems.
[4] In future wars, there will be more hostilities like
financial warfare, in which a country is subjugated without spilling a
drop of blood. Think about it for a moment. What would the disastrous
impacts have been on the economies of Hong Kong and even China if the
August 1998 battle to protect Hong Kong's finances had failed? Furthermore,
such situations are by no means impossible, and if it had not been for
the collapse of the Russian financial market, which caused the financial
speculators to be under attack from the front and the rear, it is still
hard to predict how things would have turned out.
[5] Regardless of whether we are talking about Hitler,
Mussolini, Truman, Johnson, or Saddam, none of them have successfully
mastered war. This also includes Clemenceau himself. |
| |
|
| |
| Afterword |
| |
| The motives
for writing this book originated from military maneuvers which caught the
attention of the world. Three years ago, due to participation in the maneuvers,
Xiangsui and I encountered each other in a small city in Fujian called Zhao
An. At the time, the situation was becoming daily more tense on the Southeast
coast, both sides of the straits were all set for a showdown, and even the
task force of two American aircraft carriers rushed a long way to add to
the trouble. At that time, the storm was brewing in the mountains and the
military situation was pressing so that people were suddenly moved to ‘think
up strategies when facing a situation.’ We therefore decided to write
this book, a book which would be able to concentrate together the concerns
and thoughts each of us had over the past several decades and especially
during the last ten years concerning military issues. |
| |
| There is
no way of relating in detail how many telephone calls we made, how much
mail was sent, and how many nights we stayed awake over the next three years,
and the only thing which can serve as evidence for all of this is this small
and thin book. |
| |
| We must
first apologize to readers for the fact that, even though we were very conscientious
and toiled painstakingly in the writing of this book, yet after the written
word reflecting ideas were set down much like shooting stars traveling across
the sky and cooling into meteorites, all of you (including ourselves) will
still be able to find many mistakes and places which are inappropriate.
|
| |
| We shall
not employ the apologetic words of ‘We request your kind solicitude’
to seek forgiveness but shall rather only make corrections in the second
edition (if there is one). |
| |
| Upon the
occasion of the publication of this book, we would like to here sincerely
thank the Chief-of-Staff Cheng Butao and Assistant Chief-of-Staff Huang
Guorong, of the PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House for their unswerving
support whereupon this book was able to be so quickly published within such
a short period of time. We would also like to thank Xiang Xiaomi, Director
of the First Book Editing Department. She has carefully and rigorously proofread
the entire book as she had done with the other four books which we have
edited, and provided many very valuable recommendations. We do not know
any better way of expressing our thanks aside from the deep gratitude which
we feel. |
| |
| Lastly,
we would also like to thank our families for the sacrifices they made towards
the completion of this book, and this is again something which cannot be
expressed in words. |
| |
| The entire
book was completed in manuscript form between March 2 and December 8 of
1998 in Gongzhufen - Baizhifang in Beijing. |
| |
| Written
on February 1, 1999 |
| |
|
| |
| Authors'
Background |
| |
| Qiao Liang,
whose ancestors came from Hunan Province, was born in Xin County, Shanxi
Province, to a military family in 1955. He is a member of the Chinese Writers'
Union. Presently, he is assistant director of the production office of the
air force's political department and holds the rank of senior colonel in
the air force, along with being a grade one [yi ji] writer. |
| |
| His most
important works include Gate to the Final Epoch [Mori Zhi Men]; Spiritual
Banner [Ling Qi]; and Great Glacial River [Da Bing He]. He has repeatedly
won national and military awards. In addition to his literary creations,
he has applied himself over a long period of time to the research of military
theory and joined with other writers to pen A Discussion of Military Officer
Quality [Junguan Suzhi Lun]; Viewing the Global Military Big Powers [Shijie
Junshi Lieqiang Bolan]; and A Listing of the Rankings of Global Military
Powers [Quanqiu Junli Paihang Bang]. |
| |
| Wang Xiangsui
was born in Guangzhou to a military family in 1954. He joined the army at
the end of 1970. He successively assumed the positions of political instructor,
group political commissar, section deputy head, regiment political commissar,
and division deputy political commissar. Presently, he works in the Guangzhou
Military Region Air Force Political Unit and holds the rank of senior colonel.
|
| |
| He has
cooperated with other authors to write the books A Discussion of Military
Officer Quality; Viewing the Global Military Powers; and A Record of Previous
Major Global Wars [Shijie Lici Dazhan Lu]. |
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I agree
with Admiral Jay Johnson....
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